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Abstract
International educational exchanges are widely considered to be an important form of 
public diplomacy. They are thought to build relationships and mutual understanding between 
the peoples of different nations, and thereby contribute to international goodwill and the 
cause of peace. The Fulbright Program, America’s flagship educational exchange endeavour, 
was founded upon such principles and expectations. During its first six decades of exchanges, 
the programme has grown from modest beginnings into an academically prestigious brand in 
international education.
This study offers a newly updated history of the Fulbright Program, based on archival 
research and semi-structured interviews. It examines the role that the Fulbright Program has 
played in American public diplomacy and foreign policy since its establishment in the 
aftermath of the Second World War. It situates the narrative of the exchange programme 
against its larger context of U.S. foreign relations. The exchange programme is shown to be 
remarkably adaptable, as it overcomes a range of political and economic challenges 
throughout its history. 
Three key themes are drawn from this historical narrative and explored in analytical 
chapters: funding, bureaucracy and the Fulbright grantee experience. The ebb and flow of 
Congressional support for exchanges, as well as the phenomenon of cost-sharing by 
partnering nations, reveals a great deal about the Fulbright Program’s purposes and practices. 
The perceived purpose of the exchanges can also be inferred by examining the changes that 
have taken place in the bureaucratic structure of American public diplomacy throughout the 
history of the Fulbright Program. The grantee experience is arguably the greatest determinant 
of an exchange programme’s effectiveness, and has been the subject of most Fulbright 
Program literature. Unlike previous studies, however, which relied primarily on surveys of 
ix
exchange participants, this study adopts a more holistic approach by focusing on the 
institution rather than the individual grantee.
This study’s framework is based upon the parent fields of public diplomacy. Drawing 
upon theories from psychology, communications and political science, the analytical 
framework suggests an original approach for exchange diplomacy research. It critically 
examines the assumptions that are often used to justify exchanges, including the contact 
hypothesis, the opinion leader concept and the perceived link between public opinion and 
foreign policy. Using a combination of archival research and interviews, the study offers new 
insights into the Fulbright Program’s practices and challenges normative assumptions about
the role of exchange diplomacy in foreign policy.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
Introduction
The international movement of scholars is an ancient practice. Some of the first 
recorded encounters date back to the fifth century B.C., when itinerant teachers, the Sophists, 
travelled throughout the Greek-speaking world (Gürüz, 2011, p. 149). During the eleventh 
and twelfth centuries, the first universities were established and scholars travelled great 
distances to the new centres of learning in Bologna, Paris, and Oxford (ibid., p. 154). In these 
early instances, the movement of scholars was motivated by a desire to expand knowledge. In 
the modern era, this purely academic goal has been supplemented by other motivations. In the 
19th century, Western missionaries used education as a means of spreading the Christian faith 
to Asia, Latin America and Africa (Bu, 2003). Literacy was deemed valuable not for its own 
sake, but because it enabled the converted to read and study the Bible for themselves. During 
the same period, the European colonial powers used education as a means of uniting their 
disparate subjects under a common language and culture (Cooper, 2004).
It is only relatively recently, in the twentieth century, that the potential for 
international education to contribute to foreign policy matters has been recognised by states. 
As educational exchange brings people from different nations together, it is thought that this 
interaction generates a sense of understanding and goodwill between the participants and 
their hosts. It is hoped that participants will gain foreign language fluency, develop an 
appreciation for other cultures and grow to understand other ways of life. The practice also 
rests on the premise that exchange participants will share this cultural knowledge with others 
in their communities upon returning home. This shared cultural knowledge is thought to 
influence public opinion and, ultimately, to generate public pressure on foreign policy issues. 
This concept represents a departure from both the purely academic motivations of ancient 
2nomadic scholars, and the colonising and proselytising purposes of nineteenth century 
international education. The use of educational exchange as a foreign policy tool, known as 
exchange diplomacy, is a modern incarnation of scholarly movement which is rooted in 
concepts of interpersonal communication, mutual understanding and cultural hegemony. 
This modern application of educational exchange has figured prominently in the 
public diplomacy and cultural relations activities of many nations. In 1883, France became
the first nation to establish an organisation to promote its culture and language overseas, the 
Alliance Française. In the United Kingdom, the British Council was created in 1934 to 
conduct educational exchanges, cultural exhibitions, and support English language teaching 
abroad. During the same period, in 1936, the United States established its Division of 
Cultural Relations with a similar remit. Students, educators, research scholars, artists and 
other cultural visitors were exchanged between the US and Latin America during the interwar 
period, in the hopes of countering Nazi cultural efforts and gaining allies in the region. This 
study examines this foreign policy role for exchanges, focusing on the case of the Fulbright 
Program, an educational and cultural exchange administered by the U.S. government.
The Fulbright Program was established in 1946, in a post-Second World War climate 
of recovery and peace-building activities. The programme’s founder Senator J. William 
Fulbright was inspired by his own experiences as a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford, where he 
recognised the life-changing nature of international education. The exchange proposal was 
also inspired by his memories of the problems raised by war debts in the aftermath of the 
First World War. Indeed, Germany’s crippling reparations and devastated economy were in 
part to blame for the rise of Adolf Hitler. Fulbright’s bill included measures to prevent the 
recurrence of such problems following the Second World War by using foreign currencies 
owed to the U.S. for surplus war property to pay for the exchange scheme. The declared 
mission of the Fulbright Program is to “increase mutual understanding between the people of 
the United States and the people of other countries by means of educational and cultural 
3exchange.” (Public Law 87-256). It was, as Senator Fulbright described it, “a modest 
program with an immodest aim—the achievement in international affairs of a regime more 
civilized, rational, and humane than the empty system of power of the past.” (Fulbright, 1989, 
p. xi).
When Fulbright exchanges began, they were limited to a handful of countries in Asia 
and Western Europe. The first year of the Fulbright Program saw 84 participants exchanged 
between the United States and four other countries: China, Philippines, Burma and New 
Zealand (BFS, 1948). Over time, the programme expanded in both breadth and depth. 
Bilateral agreements were signed with additional countries and the programme gained 
financial support from new public and private sources. By 2009, more than 310,000 students, 
scholars, teaching assistants and other grantees from 155 countries had participated in the 
programme (FSB, 2009).
This study places the history of the Fulbright Program within the context of American 
public diplomacy and foreign policy. It begins by looking at the precedents that inspired the 
establishment of the Fulbright Program: America’s early international educational and 
cultural activities in Asia, Europe and Latin America. These are discussed alongside relevant 
biographical details about Senator Fulbright. His exchange proposal was introduced at a time 
when Wilsonian liberal internationalist thinking had once again gained prominence in 
Washington, after many years of being disregarded. Fulbright’s bill passed easily in this 
favourable climate, alongside other recovery and peace-building efforts such as the Marshall 
Plan. The context of American foreign policy continued to influence the Fulbright Program 
during and after the Cold War. Educational and cultural exchanges were seen as a means of 
influencing foreign publics during the Cold War. Studying and teaching in the United States, 
it was argued, would offer foreign visitors an opportunity to see the American way of life for 
themselves. This way of thinking reflected a U.S. policy of openness that contrasted with the 
more strictly controlled information practices of the Soviet Union.
4The end of the Cold War presented new challenges and opportunities for the Fulbright 
Program. On the one hand, its ideological component seemed to have disappeared and, some 
policy-makers argued, new justifications for the programme were needed. On the other hand, 
the Fulbright Program was now able to initiate educational and cultural exchanges with 
Eastern bloc countries; six new exchange agreements with the U.S. were signed in the region 
between 1990 and 1995. America’s foreign policy agenda shifted once again in 2001, and the 
Fulbright Program was not immune to the far-reaching effects of the September 11th attacks. 
Public diplomacy became viewed in U.S. policy circles as a means of countering terrorism 
and fundamentalism in the Muslim world. Educational and cultural activities with these 
regions took on new significance, and new exchange initiatives were created to promote 
inter-faith dialogue and understanding. The first decade of the twenty-first century has shown 
the Fulbright Program to be an enduring component of American public diplomacy, as it 
adapts to meet new foreign policy concerns. It has managed to maintain its relevance for
nearly seventy years since its establishment, despite the vast political, economic, social and 
technological changes that have occurred during that time.
The impacts of the Fulbright Program are as varied and complex as the many different 
stakeholder groups that are involved in its administration and activities, from grantees and 
hosts to policy-makers and funding bodies. It has been a life-changing experience for its more 
than 310,000 alumni around the world (FSB, 2009). Returned grantees often attest that the 
grant period has had a profound influence on their lives, both personally and professionally. 
Grantees are nearly unanimous in their praise of the Fulbright Program. One recent official
assessment found a ninety-eight percent satisfaction rate amongst returned grantees (SRI, 
2005a, p. 14). Most Fulbright alumni pursue careers in research and teaching, though there 
are also many who have left academia after their grant period. Some Fulbrighters have 
achieved prominence in public life as political party leaders, cabinet ministers and 
ambassadors. Sweden’s Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson, Poland’s Prime Minister 
5Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, and Ghana’s President John Atta Mills are among the most well-
known examples. Notable alumni in other fields include authors Sylvia Plath, John Updike, 
Joseph Heller and Eudora Welty; economists Joseph Stiglitz and Milton Friedman; opera 
singer Anna Moffo and actor John Lithgow. Leonard Sussman, former president of the 
Fulbright Alumni Association, refers to the phenomenon of Fulbrighters going on to win 
Nobel Prizes as “a favourable commentary on the foresight of the Fulbright selectors.” 
(Sussman, 1992, p. 72). To date, there have been forty-four Fulbright alumni who later 
achieved Nobel laureate status, as well as nine Nobel laureates who later received Fulbright 
scholar or specialist grants (U.S. Department of State, 2014).
The Fulbright Program has also had far-reaching effects on its host countries and 
foreign higher education institutions. The spread of American studies as an academic 
discipline, for example, has been greatly enhanced by the programme. Departments of 
American Studies at overseas universities have often been founded and expanded by 
Fulbright professors visiting from the United States. The exchange programme has also 
contributed to the development of area studies at U.S. institutions, through the work of 
visiting professors who provide foreign language, culture and history courses. In some cases, 
the Fulbright Program has acted as a form of international aid, contributing to the growth of 
higher education in developing countries and in post-conflict environments. The terms of the 
grant also require foreign Fulbrighters to leave the U.S. at the end of the grant period, which 
encourages grantees to contribute to the development of their home countries and thereby 
reduces the occurrence of the “brain drain” phenomenon.
In addition to its official, state-sanctioned purposes, the Fulbright Program has also 
become a globally recognised brand in international educational exchange and a mark of 
academic distinction. For many of its participants, the motivation to apply and undertake a 
Fulbright grant may be simply to have the academic prestige of the Fulbright name on their 
curriculum vitae. The reputation of the Fulbright Program as a competitive scholarship has 
6important implications for its conduct and purpose. The Bureau of Educational and Cultural 
Affairs’ former deputy assistant secretary for academic programs, Thomas A. Farrell, 
remarked that the current state of the Fulbright Program is “too far away from its original 
vision.” (Lipka, 2004). In the years since the end of the Cold War, the programme’s 
reputation has shifted from an emphasis on cultural exchange to a programme that confers 
academic prestige. Farrell and his colleagues have found that the Fulbright is now “perceived 
as a purely academic program...It was never meant to be that.” (ibid.) While academic 
prestige is not incompatible with the objective of promoting mutual understanding, the focus 
on professional development rather than culture learning raises important questions about the 
perceived purpose of the Fulbright Program.
Public Diplomacy Literature and the Present Study
This study uses the Fulbright Program as a case study of educational exchange in 
public diplomacy. By examining the history of the Fulbright Program and positioning it 
within the context of American foreign policy, this project aims to analyse the role of 
educational and cultural exchange within U.S. public diplomacy practices. Much of the 
existing literature on American public diplomacy has focused on information activities, such 
as the international broadcasting of the Cold War era (Nelson, 1997) or the overseas U.S. 
Information Service posts (Dizard, 1961; Tuch, 1990; Dizard, 2004). 
America’s educational and cultural exchanges have been somewhat overlooked in the 
literature. Exchanges are often mentioned alongside other public diplomacy practices, as is 
the case with Nicholas J. Cull’s history of the U.S. Information Agency, but few studies focus 
primarily on the practice of exchange diplomacy (Cull, 2008a; 2012). Notable exceptions to 
this are Richard T. Arndt’s comprehensive account of U.S. cultural diplomacy (2005), Yale 
Richmond’s work on U.S.-Soviet cultural relations (2003), and Giles Scott-Smith’s work on
the U.S. Foreign Leader Program and cultural exchanges (2003; 2007; Scott-Smith and 
7Krabbendam, 2003). The present study hopes to contribute to this growing subset of public 
diplomacy literature. 
In addition to its emphasis on only certain public diplomacy activities, the existing 
literature is also limited in terms of its historical scope. The majority of studies are focused 
upon the Cold War era. This is likely because the modern concept of public diplomacy 
originates from the period. The splitting of the world into two opposing ideological camps 
was the primary factor that drove the development of the ideas and practices of U.S. public 
diplomacy. Scholars have learned a great deal about the particular strengths and limitations of 
public diplomacy from studying its application during the Cold War. The field of public 
diplomacy experienced something of a renaissance after the events of September 11, 2001, 
when a number of studies examined American public diplomacy efforts throughout the 
Muslim world. The period of U.S.-Soviet détente (1969-1979) and the first post-Cold War 
decade (1991-2001) are overlooked by much of the public diplomacy literature. 
The literature on the Fulbright Program focuses on the early years of the programme, 
to the neglect of more recent periods. Walter Johnson and Francis Colligan’s The Fulbright 
Program: a History (1965) is the best-known account of the programme’s early years, but 
there have been a number of other retellings. The May 1987 Fulbright Program special issue 
of the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences contains three 
articles on the programme’s beginnings, dealing with the Senator’s inspirations for the 
programme, the legislative process behind the 1946 Fulbright Act, and early administrative 
concerns (Woods, 1987; Jeffrey, 1987; Vogel, 1987). Sam Lebovic’s recent article explores 
the surplus property element in greater detail than previous studies of the programme have, 
and he argues that the creation of the Fulbright Program was not the altruistic act that has 
been depicted by Johnson and Colligan (1965) and other insider accounts (Lebovic, 2013). 
As is the case with public diplomacy literature more generally, there is a lack of research on 
8the Fulbright Program during both the détente period and the 1990s. This study addresses this 
knowledge gap and offers a comprehensive account of the programme’s first six decades. 
The existing public diplomacy literature has also been criticised as being overly 
empirical, leaving the theoretical side of public diplomacy underdeveloped (Gilboa, 2008; 
Gregory, 2008). Since much of the literature deals with public diplomacy agencies and their 
activities, there has been a natural tendency towards empirical research. In studies of 
educational exchange programmes, there has been very little non-evaluative literature. 
Research has been undertaken primarily to assess whether the programmes are effective, in 
terms of learning outcomes and participant satisfaction. The Fulbright Program could be 
analysed in terms of its contribution to international higher education infrastructures, 
particularly in the field of area studies (Walker, 1975). It could also be examined, as this 
study attempts to do, as an institution, looking at its evolution under the influence of a range 
of different factors. There has been little research on the programme itself, rather than on its 
participants. In the education literature on study abroad, there has been a greater effort to take 
both the programme and its participants into account. The Study Abroad Evaluation Project 
(SAEP), for example, recognised that previous study abroad research had often been limited 
to analysing one dimension of the experience, or one programme as a case study (Burn, 
Cerych and Smith, 1990). Their study addressed the need for more comprehensive research in 
terms of educational research objectives, however, rather than those involved in public 
diplomacy research. It was concerned with, for example, “curricular provisions, modes of 
assessment and matters of academic recognition which are the primary justification for the 
study abroad programmes’ existence.” (ibid., p. 19). In the case of the SAEP, these 
educational aims served as the justification for the programmes. The study abroad 
programmes involved in the study were solely intended to be educational in nature. This is 
not the case for the Fulbright Program, as its rationale is based on public diplomacy 
principles, such as the promotion of mutual understanding and international goodwill. Yet 
9evaluators often measure educational or professional achievements, such as the number of 
papers published, to assess the effectiveness of the Fulbright Program (Sunal and Sunal, 
1991; Demir, Aksu and Paykoç, 2000). The present study seeks to address this by taking a 
more comprehensive approach towards the study of the Fulbright Program, looking at factors 
that extend beyond Fulbright grantee testimonies. It regards the Fulbright Program as an 
institution and examines often overlooked aspects including funding, alumni activities, and 
the impact of American bureaucratic reorganisations on exchange diplomacy activities.
The existing literature is largely descriptive and uncritical. It has been based on a 
series of normative assumptions: contact leads to understanding, scholars are our best 
ambassadors, and participant satisfaction indicates effectiveness. Given that many studies 
have been conducted by scholars who are connected with the Fulbright Program, I would 
argue that the lack of critical research is due to a lack of authorial objectivity. Table 1.1 
illustrates the extent to which the Fulbright Program literature has been written by authors 
who are affiliated with the programme in some way, listing authors, their works and their 
connections to the Fulbright Program. To date, Sam Lebovic (2013) is the only author I have 
found who is unconnected to the programme.
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Table 1.1 Author-affiliated Fulbright Literature
Author Work Connection
Richard Arndt The First Resort of Kings (2005); 
The Fulbright Difference (1993)
Fulbright student in France, 
1949; USIA, 1961-1985 
Francis J. Colligan The Fulbright Program: a History
(1965)
Executive Secretary of the 
Fulbright Program, 1948-
1957
Arthur Power Dudden The Fulbright Experience (1987) Founding President of 
Fulbright Alumni 
Association
Russell R. Dynes The Fulbright Experience (1987) Fulbright lecturer in Egypt, 
India and Thailand, visiting 
professor in the UK
Alice Stone Ilchman The Lucky Few and the Worthy
Many (2004); America’s Dialogue 
With the World (2006).
Assistant Secretary for 
Educational Affairs at the 
U.S. State Department.
Walter Johnson The Fulbright Program: a History
(1965)
Member and Chairman of the 
Board of Foreign 
Scholarships; Member of US
Advisory Committee on 
International and Cultural 
Affairs
Arnaud Roujou de 
Boubée
Retour sur une success story : 
Fulbright en France (2008)
Executive Director, Fulbright 
Commission in France
David Lee Rubin The Fulbright Difference (1993) Fulbright scholar in France
Leonard Sussman The Culture of Freedom (1992) President of Fulbright 
Alumni Association
Nancy Snow Routledge Handbook of Public 
Diplomacy (2009); Propaganda, Inc
(1998); Fulbright Scholars as 
Cultural Mediators (1992)
Fulbright student in 
Germany, 1984; Fulbright 
visiting professor in Japan, 
2012
Ralph Vogel ‘The Making of the Fulbright 
Program’ (1987)
Director of the Board of 
Foreign Scholarships
Francis A. Young ‘Educational Exchanges and the 
National Interest’(1969); ‘The 
Fulbright in Asia’ (1961)
Fulbright Program 
administrator, 1949-1969
R.S. Zaharna Routledge Handbook of Public 
Diplomacy (2009); Battles to 
Bridges (2010).
Fulbright Scholar to the West 
Bank, 1996
The dominance of alumni-authored literature goes unmentioned in the existing 
literature. It is completely reasonable that individuals who are affiliated with international 
education would also be interested in studying it from an academic perspective. They have 
insider knowledge, as Senator Fulbright noted in his preface to Board of Foreign Scholarships 
members Johnson and Colligan’s The Fulbright Program: a History. “Because of their long 
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and close association with educational exchange programs, they are able to tell the story of 
their development with more intimacy and detail and understanding than an outsider.” 
(Johnson and Colligan, 1965, p. ix). This increased level of intimacy could have an impact on 
the quality and critical nature of their academic work, however. As one early evaluative study 
warned, “the investigator must keep in mind the obvious gratification and gratitude of 
persons who have been selected for honorific, subsidized foreign travel. Appreciation of such 
an opportunity and adventure must color the testimony of recent grantees.” (Riegel, 1953, p. 
321). While Riegel and others have asserted that study participants may be biased, the 
potential biases of programme-affiliated researchers are not openly discussed in the literature.
The existing literature on the Fulbright Program is often overly reliant on anecdotal 
evidence. While the accounts of returned grantees praising the programme and saying that it 
changed their lives are no doubt good news for Fulbright Program administrators, they do not 
constitute academically rigorous research findings. As one researcher of exchange-of-persons 
programmes points out, “A gap remains between the usefulness of such qualitative research, 
with its vagaries of human judgment, self-perception, and memory, and the demands of social 
science for empirically verifiable research, fact, and proof.” (Scott-Smith, 2008, p. 174). This 
study takes a more critical, more objective approach in its examination of the Fulbright 
Program in order to address this problematic gap. It challenges mainstream assumptions 
about the way in which exchange diplomacy contributes to the conduct of foreign policy and 
serves the national interest. 
Four primary research questions guide this study. Each question deals with a separate 
aspect of the history of the Fulbright Program: its relationship to American public diplomacy 
and foreign policy, its funding, the grantee experience, and its bureaucratic structure.
1. What role have Fulbright educational and cultural exchanges played in American
public diplomacy and foreign policy since the end of the Second World War?
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2. What does the funding history of the Fulbright Program reveal about its purpose and 
practices?
3. How, and to what extent, has the bureaucratic structure of American public diplomacy 
influenced the development of the Fulbright Program?
4. How does the grantee experience fulfil American public diplomacy objectives?
The first question prompts an examination of the history of the Fulbright Program, and 
situates the Fulbright Program within the context of U.S. public diplomacy and America’s 
foreign policy agenda. Although the Fulbright Program maintains a high degree of autonomy 
and emphasises its apolitical nature, it is not immune to the influence of American foreign 
policy. We can see a number of interesting links throughout the programme’s history between 
Fulbright Program activities and America’s foreign relations. When new bilateral exchange 
agreements are established or exchanges are increased, for example, the partnering countries 
are often important to the U.S. foreign policy objectives at the time. The target country may 
be important in terms of economic interests, as we can see in the case of Mexico. After the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994, Fulbright exchanges with Mexico 
were doubled (Snow, 2010). Alternatively, the target country might be important because of a 
recent conflict, as can be seen in the increase of exchanges with Middle Eastern countries in 
the post-9/11 era. The number of visiting Fulbright grantees from the Near East and South 
Asia more than doubled during the ‘War on Terror’ (FSB, 2000; FSB, 2004). 
Foreign relations can also lead to the suspension of exchanges. The Fulbright Program 
in China was suspended following the 1949 Revolution, for example, and exchanges did not 
resume between the U.S. and China until 1978 (BFS, 1979). Two months after the Tiananmen 
Square incident in 1989, China suspended its participation in the Fulbright Program, 
allegedly in response to U.S. criticism (Berger, 1989). Despite official statements that 
educational and cultural exchange activities are apolitical, exchanges have often been shaped 
by their foreign policy context. 
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This research question also prompts further questions about the relationship between 
the programme and foreign policy more generally, beyond the United States. When a new 
exchange agreements are signed, what are the motivations of each signatory country in 
establishing an educational and cultural exchange programme? During the early years of the 
Cold War, exchange agreements were a statement of alignment with the West. The exchange 
agreement with Finland, for example, took several years of careful consideration and 
negotiation by the U.S. State Department and the Finnish Foreign Ministry before it was 
finalised in 1952. Finland had to balance its ties with the U.S. without violating its 1948 
treaty with the Soviet Union (Mäkinen, 2001). This study considers how the programme is 
perceived overseas, and how it might relate to the interests of foreign partner countries. How 
do exchange partners conceive of the purpose of the programme? Do other countries connect 
their Fulbright Program participation to their own foreign policy agendas? Considering the 
relative unpredictability of their potential impacts, can educational and cultural exchange 
programmes be used strategically? This element of the study considers the consequences of 
linking exchanges to foreign policy goals, either implicitly or explicitly. 
The second research question deals with the matter of exchange programme funding. 
The public and private sources of financial support for the Fulbright Program can tell us a 
great deal about how the programme’s nature and purpose are perceived. In Senator 
Fulbright’s original 1946 legislation, the exchange scheme was to be funded exclusively from 
the sale of surplus war property. When these funds were exhausted, private sector assistance 
and Congressional appropriations were needed for exchanges to continue. The Fulbright 
Program has used many creative means to secure funding, including earmarking foreign loan 
payments for exchanges, establishing cost-sharing agreements, and encouraging alumni 
lobbyists to make the case for further appropriations. What do such innovations tell us about 
the nature of the Fulbright Program and its support? What does the funding history of the 
Fulbright Program reveal about its purpose and practices?
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The third question examines how the bureaucratic structure of American public 
diplomacy has changed throughout the history of the Fulbright Program, and what impact this 
has had on its development. In the years following the Second World War, America’s 
overseas information programme and its educational-cultural activities have been conducted, 
alternately, in the U.S. State Department and the U.S. Information Agency, as well as the 
short-lived U.S. International Communication Agency. With each shift, exchange advocates 
feared that the bureaucratic culture of each department would have a negative impact on the 
conduct of the exchange programme. While the State Department deals with foreign policy, 
the USIA was charged with explaining U.S. policies abroad. How did each environment 
influence the development of the Fulbright Program? Were fears of negative impacts 
justified?
The fourth and final research question examines the grantee experience. How does the 
grantee experience fulfil American public diplomacy objectives? It is a common question 
throughout the literature, but one which I argue has not been applied systematically in prior
evaluations. My study draws upon grantee experiences in the literature, in the press, and in 
interviews. I use a theoretical framework informed by psychology and communications 
studies to analyse their experiences against programme objectives. My approach also 
critiques the nature of the grantee role more generally. Do grantees act as unofficial 
ambassadors, or do they primarily pursue their academic ambitions? Are the two goals of 
scholarly achievement and culture mediation mutually reinforcing or mutually exclusive?
In examining the Fulbright Program’s role in the broad picture of post-Second World 
War U.S. foreign policy, the present study has necessarily had to prioritise some topics, 
geographic areas, and time periods over others. An exhaustive account of the history of the 
Fulbright Program in all 155 participating countries could fill several volumes and would 
take many years to compile, and would require a level of resourcing far beyond the scope of a 
doctoral dissertation. Many books, articles and theses about exchanges are limited to single 
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country programmes and particularly significant time periods. As those authors did, I also 
had to make pragmatic decisions about the examples that I have chosen to highlight in my 
analysis of the Fulbright Program’s history. These choices were guided in part by my own 
interests and foreign language skills, and in part by the availability of archival material and 
access to interview subjects. In selecting examples, I have made an effort to include a 
representative sample that shows the Fulbright Program at work in different cultures, political 
contexts and global regions. Determining an end date to limit the scope of this project was 
perhaps the most challenging aspect, as some new developments seemed too interesting to 
exclude. 2009 was deemed an appropriate concluding point, due to the transition of U.S. 
presidential administrations in that year. Some initiatives from the Obama administration will 
be discussed as comparisons with earlier activities and in reference to future directions for the 
Fulbright Program. Quantitative data on funding and grant numbers will be drawn from 
reports up to the 2010-2011 academic year, inclusive.
Analytical Framework and Methodological Approach
This study is guided by a new analytical framework that outlines the assumptions 
behind exchange diplomacy practices. It utilises a combination of archival research and 
interviews to analyse the history of the Fulbright Program and its role in American public 
diplomacy. I approached the archival material with this exchange diplomacy analytical 
framework in mind, looking for evidence of these assumptions in policy-making and 
programme developments. Archival material was supplemented by a series of interviews with 
former and current Fulbright grantees, a former programme administrator and Senator 
Fulbright’s biographer. The insights gained from these interviews were also analysed with 
reference to my proposed exchange diplomacy framework. Taken together, the study offers 
an original, analytical historical account of the Fulbright Program’s first six decades and an 
examination of the programme’s integral role in American public diplomacy over the period.
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The analytical framework, outlined more extensively with reference to the literature in 
chapter two, is based upon three major assumptions of how exchange diplomacy is thought to 
function. Each of these assumptions draws upon the literature of a different academic field, 
and these can each be considered a ‘parent field’ of the relatively young discipline of public 
diplomacy. They are interrelated and ultimately dependent upon each other for effectiveness. 
If any element is missing, the desired net effect of increased mutual understanding will fail to 
come to fruition. 
 The first assumption is the concept that contact leads to understanding, known 
as the ‘contact hypothesis.’ It is drawn from the psychology literature, 
specifically from Gordon W. Allport’s work on intergroup relations and 
prejudice (1954). Many studies have tested this hypothesis and found evidence 
to suggest that contact in an educational exchange does improve understanding 
and reduce prejudice (Snow, 1992; Stangor et al., 1996). Contact must take 
place under certain conditions, however, to produce these results. This study 
will consider whether the Fulbright Program facilitates a type of contact that 
meets these conditions.
 The second assumption is the idea that exchange participants will share their 
knowledge with peers and act as opinion leaders in their societies. In the 
public diplomacy literature, this idea is known as the ‘multiplier effect’ but it 
is clearly linked to the ‘two-step flow hypothesis’, drawn from 
communications studies. In their work on opinion leadership, Katz and 
Lazarsfeld (1955) proposed that information and ideas flow from the media to 
opinion leaders, and then from those opinion leaders to the general public. 
When applied to the Fulbright Program, the two-step flow model of 
communication has particular relevance for cultural knowledge. Grantees gain 
expertise in the host nation that is then shared with the home nation. 
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Understanding the process behind the multiplier effect is a means of 
optimising this effect in exchange diplomacy practices.
 The third assumption is a conceptualisation of the relationship between public 
opinion and foreign policy. This is a contested idea from the field of political 
science. On the one hand, some scholars have argued that public opinion on 
foreign policy matters doesn’t exist, because the public pays little attention to 
foreign affairs (Lippmann, 1922; Rosenau, 1961). On the other hand, public 
opinion should be an essential part of policy-making in a democracy (Holsti, 
1992; Nacos, Shapiro and Isernia, 2000). If the public is informed on foreign 
policy issues by those with exchange experience, then the resulting public 
opinion will have the desired influence on foreign policy matters and, in turn, 
will influence democratically accountable policy-makers. Of the three 
assumptions, the public opinion-foreign policy link is the one most frequently 
used to justify exchange diplomacy. All three, however, are essential 
components of the exchange’s effectiveness. Figure 1.1 illustrates these three 
assumptions as a sequential process, where each step depends upon the 
successful completion of each previous step.
Figure 1.1 Theoretical Basis of Exchange Diplomacy
The practice of exchange diplomacy is often praised in the literature without being subjected 
to scrutiny. It is often assumed to be effective, without reference to relevant literature from 
psychology, communications studies or political theory. This framework asserts, however, 
that it is a highly conditional practice with varying results. Outcomes are not consistent 
Contact Multiplier Effect
Public 
Opinion
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between cases, due to political factors, cultural contexts or even simply the personalities of 
individual exchange participants.
Archival Sources
The archives relating to the Fulbright Program are spread across different locations, 
due to the fact that the programme has been administered by different organisations at various 
points in time throughout its history. For the first thirty-two years of Fulbright exchanges, 
from 1946-1978, the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (known as CU) was located 
in the Department of State. Under President Carter’s reorganisation of public diplomacy 
activities, the bureau was incorporated into the United States International Communications 
Agency (USICA). This new entity was soon reverted to its previous form, the U.S. 
Information Agency (USIA) under the Reagan administration. When USIA closed in 1999, 
the bureau was moved back into the State Department.
These shifts in the Fulbright Program’s bureaucratic administration have meant that 
its records are somewhat scattered. In 1983, the USIA presented the University of Arkansas 
with a collection of CU records dating back to 1938, when it had been known as the Division 
of Cultural Relations. The location was selected because of Senator Fulbright’s ties to the 
institution; he was not only an alumnus, but also a professor of law and a former President of 
the University of Arkansas. The Senator’s papers and records of the Fulbright Association, 
the programme’s alumni organisation, are also held at the University of Arkansas.
Records covering the period 1983-1999, the years when the Fulbright Program was 
administered by the USIA, are held in the National Archives and Records Administration, in 
the College Park, Maryland annex. The National Archives collection also includes some CU 
material dating back to 1949, such as Board of Foreign Scholarships annual reports, 
administrative correspondence and Board member travel reports. There is some duplication 
between the National Archives records and the CU records at the University of Arkansas, but 
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most of the material dealing with the Fulbright Program between 1957 and 1975 is held at the 
University of Arkansas.
The annual reports of the Board of Foreign Scholarships (BFS), later renamed the J. 
William Fulbright Foreign Scholarship Board (FSB), provide a wealth of information. 
Published annually since 1961, these reports begin with a letter from the current board chair, 
reflecting on the concerns of the day. A summary of the Fulbright Program’s activities is 
offered, along with funding and grant distribution data. Country programme stories and 
features on individual Fulbright grantees are also included in the reports. The content of these 
reports reveals a great deal about the state of the programme year by year. This study collates
the annual funding and grant data, allowing us to observe shifts and trends over time.
The archives of the U.S. State Department, in both the National Archives and the 
University of Arkansas, also include country visit reports. When board members travel to 
Fulbright commissions abroad, they report back to their fellow board members about the state 
of affairs in the field. These are often far more candid and detailed than the summaries 
included in annual reports, as they were intended for an internal audience of board members. 
They express concerns about challenges in the field and discuss possible solutions and long-
term recommendations. 
Another valuable resource has been correspondence between members of the 
programme’s administrative staff. Ralph Vogel, for example, features prominently in the 
collection; he served as staff director of the Board of Foreign Scholarships for three decades. 
His letters reveal a great deal of the day-to-day work that went into managing the Fulbright 
Program’s activities. Another particularly interesting category is the correspondence that took 
place between binational commission members and Washington officials. Their negotiations 
often deal with resource allocation, which helps to contextualise funding data. In a similar 
vein, the CU archives also contain post reports, summaries of activities and conditions
written to notify Washington-based administrators of individual country needs and 
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challenges. Some countries might specify academic fields in which a professor is needed, for 
example. The preferences expressed in these reports have important implications for the grant 
selection process. The use of archival material throughout the thesis has been highlighted by 
italicised in-text citations. Archival material is also listed separately in the bibliography under 
the heading of ‘Primary Sources’.
Interviews
My archival research was supplemented by a series of interviews, in order to create a 
more complete account of the programme’s history. This was particularly important for more 
recent years, as these records have not yet been added to the National Archives. Speaking 
with individuals who have first-hand knowledge of the programme is also a means of gaining 
their candid impressions of the Fulbright experience. One of the weaknesses of the existing 
literature, however, is that grantee statements are largely uncritical. They often focus solely 
on describing how the experience changed the grantee’s life. Anecdotes are offered to support 
the life-changing capacity of the programme in terms of career trajectories, research interests, 
or even meeting a future partner during the sojourn. The reflective essays of Fulbright 
grantees that have been collected in volumes like The Fulbright Experience (Dudden and 
Dynes, 1987) and The Fulbright Difference, 1948-1992 (Arndt and Rubin, 1993) are 
fascinating, but highly polished and uncritical. Candid impressions, reflecting on both the 
positive and negative aspects of the experience, are largely absent from the literature.
In addition to the lack of candid, nuanced reflections by grantees, the existing 
literature also has a lack of diversity in terms of interview subjects. Most studies of the 
Fulbright Program and educational exchange more generally feature only the voices of the 
exchange participants themselves (Mendelsohn and Orenstein, 1955; Burn, 1982; Sunal and 
Sunal, 1991; Snow, 1992). There are many others who could contribute to our understanding 
of exchange diplomacy. In the present study, interview subjects were selected to include both 
the administrators and the participants of the Fulbright Program. 
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The interview questions followed a semi-structured format, as this allows for the 
flexibility of further questioning while maintaining the focus on the topic. Semi-structured 
interview formats that utilise open-ended questions are the preferred method for elite 
interviewing (Aberbach and Rockman, 2002; Lilleker, 2003). My interviews with grantees 
were more structured than the interviews with experts, as can be seen in the transcripts 
(Appendix A). My questions were adapted to the individual participant in each case.
In my interview with Randall Bennett Woods, Senator Fulbright’s biographer, my 
questions were related to aspects of the Senator’s views and his activities with the programme 
in later life. The discussion covered a wide range of points about both the programme and 
Senator Fulbright. As Professor Woods specialises in U.S. diplomatic history, he skilfully 
situated the programme within the overall context of American foreign policy.
The interview with Hoyt Purvis, former assistant to Senator Fulbright and former 
member of the Board of Foreign Scholarships, was mostly focused on the activities of the 
Board. My questions progressed chronologically from his work in Senator Fulbright’s office 
where he met a young Bill Clinton working as an office boy, to his years on the Board of 
Foreign Scholarships as an appointee of President Clinton’s. He served on the Board until 
2003, and I was very much interested in hearing his thoughts on the Fulbright Program’s role 
in America’s post-9/11 public diplomacy activities. Professor Purvis was also involved with 
the alumni activities of the Fulbright Association, an area that has been less explored in the 
literature but which has important implications for the long-term impacts of the Fulbright 
Program. Our conversation strayed from the central focus at points but generated some 
fascinating insights into how the Board operates.
In my interviews with Fulbright grantees, my questions focused on their motivations 
and experiences. I was interested in hearing why they had applied to the Fulbright Program in 
the first place, as this would give me a sense of their perception of the programme. If they 
replied that they wanted to spend a year living and studying in the host country, that response 
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suggests that they see it as a cultural programme. On the other hand, if their answers were 
related strictly to their career aspirations, this would suggest that they viewed the programme 
as being more significant for their academic and professional development, and that they are 
less focused on the mutual understanding or culture learning elements of the programme.
Asking the students about their experiences during the grant year was a means of 
understanding the effects of participation. I asked about their first impressions of the host 
country, in order to gauge their general attitude and whether it had changed. Due to the fact 
that the exchange diplomacy assumption relies on interpersonal communication, I asked 
about their social activities. I enquired whether they had made friends with locals, engaged in 
local holiday celebrations and shared their own culture with local friends. These activities 
would confirm that intergroup contact and culture learning had taken place. Their absence, of 
course, would indicate that contact and culture learning had not taken place. Well-considered 
follow-up questioning is essential to determine the reasons behind a lack of engagement with 
the local culture and people. Research commitments and a heavy workload, for example, may 
prevent a grantee from engaging in social activities.
After transcribing the interviews from audio recordings and notes, I analysed the 
resulting texts with my research questions and framework in mind. In the historical section of 
the dissertation, quotes from Randall Bennett Woods and Hoyt Purvis have been included as 
supporting evidence, while the interviews of grantees have contributed to chapter six, which 
examines the grantee experience. 
Structure of the Thesis
Following this introductory chapter, the thesis is divided into six further chapters. It 
begins with a theoretical chapter and a history of the Fulbright Program; builds upon this 
foundation with three analytical chapters on the themes of funding, bureaucracy and the 
grantee experience; and closes with a summary of findings and discussion of the study’s 
policy relevance.
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The analytical framework is described in chapter two, where I have explored the 
underlying assumptions about public diplomacy practices. This section provides a review of 
the public diplomacy literature, while also drawing upon research from public diplomacy’s 
parent fields: psychology, communications studies and political science. It breaks down the 
ways that exchange diplomacy is thought to work into three assumptions. Each of these are 
then described and analysed with reference to the relevant literature in the parent fields. 
Taken together, the assumptions create a framework for understanding the expectations that 
guide exchange diplomacy programmes. These expectations have influenced how the 
Fulbright Program’s purpose has been perceived throughout its history, with important 
implications for the programme’s administration, funding and structure.
The historical section, chapter three, provides an overview of the Fulbright Program’s 
first six decades. Some background information on the history of American exchanges is 
included in this section, in order to highlight the precedents that inspired Senator J. William 
Fulbright to propose his programme. Periodisation of the history of the Fulbright Program is 
challenging, given the many factors that make up the context of international educational 
exchanges. Changes that took place in the administration and conduct of the Fulbright 
Program can be attributed to prevailing international political relations, economic conditions, 
the state of war, or a change of presidential administrations. With all of these factors at play, 
it can be difficult to divide the history of the programme into concrete dates and phases. The 
timeline below illustrates the periodisation that I have applied to the present study.
Timeline
1909-1945: Early American educational exchange activities: the Boxer Rebellion 
Scholarships, the Belgian-American Educational Foundation, and the U.S. State 
Department’s Division of Cultural Relations.
1946-1960: Fulbright Program established and expands dramatically in early years. Cold War 
begins and USIA established in 1953.
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1961-1966: Expansion under Fulbright-Hays Act and peak of exchange activity.
1967-1975: Decline of exchange activity and funding levels decrease, Senator Fulbright 
leaves Congress. Advisory panel proposes reorganisation.
1976-1980: Carter administration’s reorganisation of information and educational-cultural 
activities creates USICA.
1981-1988: USICA reverts to USIA and Fulbright remains with information activities. 
Reagan and Wick initiatives focus on media and youth exchanges rather than Fulbright.
1989-2000: The end of the Cold War triggers a new conceptualisation of American foreign 
policy, culminating in the 1999 closure of USIA and resumption of Fulbright into the State 
Department.
2001-2009: The Fulbright Program and American public diplomacy undergo a renaissance, 
as the events of September 11th cause policy-makers to reflect on and seek to improve 
America’s image abroad.
The analytical section builds on three major themes arising from the historical section: 
programme funding, the grantee experience, and administration. It begins with chapter four, 
in which the funding structure of the Fulbright Program is examined. The original funds came 
from a single source: the sale of surplus war property, which resulted in millions of dollars’ 
worth of non-convertible currencies owed to the U.S. by Lend-Lease participating countries. 
This creative means of funding was a vital component of the original bill’s successful 
passage, but this limited source of funding was soon depleted. Today, the programme is 
funded by a variety of sources, public and private, foreign and domestic. The exchange 
programmes with Germany, Japan and Finland, and the Agricultural Trade and Assistance 
Act of 1954 are included in this chapter as case studies of innovative funding practices. The 
story of the Fulbright Program’s funding illustrates how adaptable and resourceful the
programme has been, and gives us an insight into its longevity. 
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Chapter five looks at two elements of the administration of the Fulbright Program: its 
placement in the bureaucratic structures of Washington, D.C. and its administrative body, the 
J. William Fulbright Foreign Scholarship Board (formerly known as the Board of Foreign 
Scholarships). It begins by chronicling the search for a bureaucratic home for the Fulbright 
Program. The Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, which conducts the Fulbright 
Program and other U.S. Government exchange-of-persons activities, had several different 
hosts throughout the twentieth century. The U.S. State Department, the U.S. Information 
Agency and the short-lived U.S. International Communication Agency have all served as the 
bureau’s home at different periods. Each entity has its own mission and its own bureaucratic 
culture, and of course each is perceived in a different way by foreign audiences. The State 
Department is home to the diplomatic Foreign Service, but also to America’s foreign policy 
apparatus. The U.S. Information Agency (USIA) was established in 1953 and was America’s 
Cold War propaganda agency. It was in charge of Voice of America and Radio Liberty/Radio 
Free Europe broadcasting as well as overseas posts of the U.S. Information Service, libraries, 
performing arts tours and cultural exhibitions. The Carter administration’s reorganisation of 
the USIA and rebranding as the U.S. International Communication Agency combined 
information activities with educational and cultural affairs from the State Department. This 
approach emphasised the importance of genuine two-way engagement with foreign publics, 
but it was reverted to USIA and its original mission by the Reagan Administration. When the 
USIA was closed in 1999, the Fulbright Program was once again administered by the State 
Department, after a twenty-one year absence. The causes and implications of each of these 
shifts will be discussed and analysed in this section.
This discussion of bureaucratic history is followed by an analysis of the key 
administrative body of the Fulbright Program, the J. William Fulbright Foreign Scholarship 
Board. Present since the establishment of the programme, this presidentially appointed body
meets quarterly to review the Fulbright Program’s activities, report on visits to binational 
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commissions and field offices around the world, and make policy decisions for the conduct of 
the exchange programme. The Board also makes the ultimate decision on grant applications, 
after they have been screened and recommended by selection committees. The composition 
of the Board has changed over the years, and appointments often reflect the attitude of the 
current presidential administration toward exchanges. Presidential statements specifically 
about the Fulbright Program are rare, but their overall approach can be deduced by looking at 
the institutional affiliations and professional backgrounds of their appointees to the Board. A 
comprehensive table of Board members is included as Appendix B.
The Fulbright grantee experience is examined in chapter six. The chapter begins by 
looking at the making of a Fulbrighter, the application and selection process. This section 
discusses the applicants’ motivations and objectives as well as the administrators’ selection 
criteria. Carrying on from this first step in the Fulbright experience, the next sections use 
quantitative demographic data to create a census of Fulbright grantees, in terms of grant 
categories (student, researcher, lecturer, etc.) and countries of origin, or in the case of 
American grantees, destination countries. 
One area in which there is less demographic information available is the matter of 
women and the Fulbright Program. Although the programme has been open to female 
applicants since its foundation, women have constituted a minority, between 35%s and 48%, 
of Fulbright grantees (SRI, 2005a; 2005b). There have been, however, many women who 
accompanied their husbands on Fulbright sojourns, where they contributed to the culture 
learning experience in important and often overlooked ways. This section also includes a 
profile of one of the programme’s early notable alumni, Sylvia Plath, and analyses her 
Fulbright experience as seen through her letters and diaries.
From this foundational profile of the Fulbright grantee, the section then looks at the 
challenges and opportunities that grantees face while abroad, as well as their research areas
and extra-curricular activities, before moving into a discussion of the Fulbright Program 
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alumni and their contributions. In many ways, alumni have taken up the advocacy role that 
Senator Fulbright once performed. The chapter closes with a comparison between the 
experiences of Fulbrighters and other study abroad participants.
The concluding chapter will summarise the findings of the study and consider their 
policy relevance. It recommends that policy-makers and programme administrators develop a 
clear, concrete statement of objectives, using more precise language and clearly defined
measures of effectiveness. The archival material and interviews will be discussed with 
reference to the theoretical framework and primary research questions. The chapter will close 
with a discussion of future research directions prompted by the present study. 
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Chapter 2
Exploring the Theoretical Basis for Exchange Diplomacy
Introduction
Public diplomacy is a relatively new academic field that draws upon ideas from 
communications studies, political science and international relations. In recent years, there 
have been attempts to create and improve public diplomacy definitions, paradigms and 
theoretical frameworks (Gilboa, 2008; Gregory, 2008). Most of the literature, however, 
consists of descriptive institutional histories and policy recommendations that lack analytical 
depth. This has been true particularly in the case of the United States. Much of the literature 
on American public diplomacy has been written by former practitioners and is based upon 
their observations (Dizard, 1961; Tuch, 1990; Arndt, 2005; Kiehl, 2006). Few studies have 
applied the theories of the parent fields mentioned above to the practice of public diplomacy. 
There is a great deal of theoretical work in psychology, communications and political science 
that is relevant to public diplomacy, but it is rarely utilised. A notable exception is Giles 
Scott-Smith’s exploration of exchanges and international relations theory (Scott-Smith, 
2008). His approach demonstrates how public diplomacy researchers can apply the ideas of 
other fields to better understand the theoretical underpinnings behind public diplomacy 
practices. Rather than invent new theoretical constructs for the study of public diplomacy, 
scholars can use its interdisciplinary nature to borrow relevant concepts from other fields. 
This enables them to benefit from existing research and apply it in new ways to public 
diplomacy practices.
In this chapter, I will explore the ideas that underpin exchange diplomacy, the practice 
of using educational and cultural exchange as a public diplomacy tool. When examining the 
literature, it becomes evident that there are a few key theoretical concepts that can be applied 
in this emerging academic field. I have found three points that are largely agreed upon in the 
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literature, and will discuss them here as a theoretical basis for exchange diplomacy. The 
practice of exchange diplomacy is based on a series of assumptions about public opinion, 
foreign policy, and the relationship between the two ideas.
1. Contact between individuals of different nations contributes towards the goal of 
mutual understanding and influences the exchange participants’ views of each other’s 
nations.
2. Engaging with opinion leaders in a target nation will shape elite opinion and 
ultimately influence public opinion.
3. Public opinion can influence, to varying degrees, a nation’s foreign policy.
Each of these ideas relates to theoretical literature from a different discipline. The first deals 
with interpersonal contact and attitude change theories drawn from psychology. The second 
looks at the opinion leader concept, an idea borrowed from the communications studies 
literature. The third assumption turns to the political science literature in order to understand 
the relationship between public opinion and foreign policy. The chapter will begin with basic 
definitions and a review of the public diplomacy literature, in which we can see these themes 
emerge. The three concepts will then each be addressed and explored in turn, with reference 
to the theoretical literature from psychology, communications studies and political science. 
Taken together, these ideas constitute a new framework for the study of exchange diplomacy, 
one that is informed by decades of previous research across multiple disciplines.
Public Diplomacy and Exchange Diplomacy
The phrase public diplomacy is a modern term for the very old practice of persuasive 
communication. It was coined in 1965 by Edmund Gullion, founder of the Edward R. 
Murrow Center of Public Diplomacy at Tufts University (Cull, 2009, p. 19). It was first 
employed as a euphemism for propaganda, a term that carried negative connotations of 
deception, thought-control and brainwashing. In the U.S., propaganda has become associated 
with totalitarian regimes, such as Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union, or the ‘doublespeak’ of 
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George Orwell’s 1984. Orwell’s ‘Ministry of Truth’, based on the real-life Ministry of 
Information in the United Kingdom, demonstrated the potential for abuse and misuse of 
propaganda. The highly negative perception of propaganda created the need for a more 
neutral phrase for persuasive communication.
There have been many attempts to define the term public diplomacy and delineate its 
activities (Tuch, 1990; Manheim, 1994; Melissen, 2007; Cull, 2008a). The essential 
components that are common to all definitions are that public diplomacy is a foreign policy 
practice that is characterised by engagement with foreign publics. There is also generally 
agreement on the distinctions between public diplomacy and traditional diplomacy. While 
traditional diplomacy consists of communication between two or more representatives of 
states, public diplomacy involves communication with foreign publics. These core concepts 
are consistent across the public diplomacy literature, though the specific actors, methods and 
purposes of the practice have been subjected to scholarly debate.
For much of the term’s history, public diplomacy has been viewed primarily as a state 
activity. Jarol B. Manheim defines strategic public diplomacy as “efforts by the government 
of one nation to influence public or elite opinion in a second nation for the purpose of turning 
the foreign policy of the target nation to advantage.” (Manheim, 1994, p. 4). His work 
highlights the case of Kuwait’s image management in the U.S. during the run up to the Gulf 
War. When Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, the organisation Citizens for a Free Kuwait (funded 
by the Kuwaiti government-in-exile) worked with a public relations firm in the U.S. to 
generate a pro-Kuwait, interventionist sentiment amongst the American people (ibid.). The 
efforts of the Kuwaiti government successfully turned U.S. foreign policy to advantage, and 
the majority of Americans supported the Gulf War against Iraq. The story of Kuwait and the 
Gulf War is an example of the traditional, state-centric definition of public diplomacy.
The concept that only states can be public diplomacy actors has been challenged in 
recent years by the introduction of the ‘new public diplomacy.’ Jan Melissen and others have 
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expanded the scope of the public diplomacy definition to include activities that are conducted 
by private, non-state actors. The ‘new public diplomacy’ includes many types of engagement 
between publics across borders, such as activities undertaken by non-governmental 
organisations, private corporations and other non-state actors (Cull, 2008a, p. xv). This new 
definition has removed the actors entirely, defining public diplomacy simply as “the process 
by which direct relations with people in a country are pursued to advance the interests and 
extend the values of those being represented.” (Melissen, 2007, p. 106). While the absence of 
actors differentiates this definition from that offered by Manheim, the goal of advancing 
interests and extending values is similarly strategic in nature.
Another recent definition also omits the identity of an actor. Historian Nicholas J. 
Cull defines public diplomacy as “the conduct of foreign policy by engaging with foreign 
publics.” (Cull, 2008a, p. xv). This is perhaps the simplest and most inclusive definition in 
the literature, and its concept of engagement is particularly well-suited to exchange 
diplomacy. In addition to this concise definition, Cull introduces a framework of five 
categories of public diplomacy activities. It provides a useful way of thinking about the 
various activities that are included under the public diplomacy umbrella. The first two 
categories are listening and advocacy, which describe the basic process of communicating 
with foreign publics. New policy ideas would be presented to foreign publics (advocacy), and 
then the foreign public opinion of those policies would then be fed back into the policy-
making process (listening). Cull’s third category is cultural diplomacy, the exportation of 
culture, which includes language teaching. The fourth category is exchange diplomacy, 
differentiated from cultural diplomacy in the sense that it involves the two-way exchange of 
people and culture, rather than the one-way exportation of cultural artefacts. The fifth and 
final category is international broadcasting, the efforts to reach foreign publics through the 
mass media (ibid.). This is perhaps the best-known form of public diplomacy, exemplified by 
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international public broadcasters such as the BBC World Service, Voice of America and 
Deutsche Welle.
Due to the fact that public diplomacy is a relatively new academic field, it can be 
difficult to identify the seminal texts of public diplomacy literature. The earliest public 
diplomacy literature refers not to ‘public diplomacy’ but to propaganda, information 
activities, and cultural relations. During the 1950s and 1960s, a number of insider accounts 
about U.S. overseas information activities were published to inform the public about the work 
of the new U.S. Information Agency after its 1953 founding. Edward W. Barrett’s Truth is 
Our Weapon (1953) and Wilson P. Dizard’s The Strategy of Truth (1961) reflect on the 
organisation, purposes and methods of Truman’s Campaign of Truth and the U.S. 
Information Service, respectively. Two significant works in the U.S. educational and cultural 
affairs literature appeared in the mid-1960s: Philip Coombs’ The Fourth Dimension of 
Foreign Policy (1964) and Charles Frankel’s The Neglected Aspect of Foreign Affairs (1965). 
Both works were written by Assistant Secretaries of State for Education and Culture. 
Coombs, the first to hold the position when it was created by President Kennedy, and his 
successor Frankel argue for a reorganisation of America’s educational and cultural activities. 
They share a fundamental view that the government should play an active role in promoting 
these activities, and that such activities are effective means of promoting mutual 
understanding and international goodwill. 
While Coombs and Frankel focused on the bureaucratic organisation of American 
public diplomacy, USIA veteran Dizard focuses on the activities themselves, including radio, 
films, television broadcasts and publishing. Dizard frequently refers to the corresponding 
activities of the Soviet Union in these areas, and the Cold War context is prominent in his 
study. The Foreign Language Publishing House in Moscow, for example, is compared with 
U.S. Information Service activities in publishing and library sponsorship. This is used to 
illustrate the threat posed by the Soviet Union’s extensive efforts in these areas, and to 
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encourage increased involvement on the part of the United States in the book world (Dizard, 
1961, p. 147). While Coombs and Frankel mention the Cold War as part of their discussion, 
they present international understanding as a worthwhile activity for its own sake and not 
solely as a strategic tool. Dizard, on the other hand, links the Cold War directly to America’s 
public diplomacy efforts. In his view, the goal is not to encourage international understanding 
for its own sake, but to promote American interests abroad. “The measure of its effectiveness 
is the degree to which the program advances the strategic policies abroad.” (ibid., p. 187). In 
short, Dizard wholeheartedly agrees with the USIA’s unidirectional mission, “To tell 
America’s story to the world.”
When the Cold War ended with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the collapse of 
the Soviet Union in 1991, many public diplomacy studies tried to explain these events. 
Scholars in other fields focused on the political and economic causes, particularly the Soviet 
policies of glasnost and perestroika, but public diplomacy scholars focused on the cultural 
factors that contributed to the end of the Cold War (Kotkin, 2003). While acknowledging the 
role that Soviet policies had played in bringing about the collapse of the Soviet Union, these 
scholars argued that the end of the Cold War had also been a triumph of international 
broadcasting. The empire had been taken down, they argued, by ‘subversive’ jazz and rock 
and roll music and the news programming of the BBC World Service, Radio Free Europe, 
Radio Liberty and Voice of America (Nelson, 1997). Others looked to educational and 
cultural exchanges for an explanation, noting that many leaders in the Moscow bureaucracy 
during the 1980s were alumni of U.S. exchanges, including Aleksandr Yakovlev, a special
adviser to Mikhail Gorbachev and an architect of glasnost (Richmond, 2003). These works 
joined a larger discussion in political science, economics and history that tried to explain the 
demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War.
In the first decade of the twentieth century, public diplomacy became a popular topic 
amongst policy-makers, think tanks and academic circles. In the United States, the terrorist 
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attacks of September 11, 2001 highlighted the importance of foreign public opinion. The 
event made the U.S. government realise that they needed to address anti-American sentiment 
abroad in order to prevent future attacks. This task demanded the renewal of public 
diplomacy practices, which had been neglected since the end of America’s previous 
ideological battle, the Cold War. Along with a renewal of state interest in public diplomacy 
practices came a renewal of scholarship in the field of public diplomacy. Academics looked 
beyond the American mainstream media’s questions of ‘why do they hate us?’ to explore 
what could be done to improve or repair America’s image abroad (Kiehl, 2006). A special 
issue of the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science appeared in 
2008 to examine the state of the field and recent developments (Cowan and Cull, 2008). R.S. 
Zaharna’s Battles to Bridges: U.S. Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy after 
9/11 (2010) offers a comprehensive review and critique of the period.
The renewal of interest in public diplomacy was not limited to the United States. A 
number of other national case studies have appeared across the public diplomacy literature in 
recent years. British public diplomacy has been the subject of several studies by the Foreign 
Policy Centre (Leonard and Alakeson, 2000; Leonard, Small and Rose, 2005). Nikolas 
Glover’s study of Sweden’s public diplomacy explores the ways in which Swedish identity 
has been negotiated and projected by the Swedish Institute (Glover, 2011). China’s 
impressive opening ceremony for the 2008 Beijing Olympics has been analysed in terms of 
image projection and nation branding (Cull, 2008b). Taiwan’s efforts to gain recognition and 
negotiate its place in world affairs offer a compelling case for the use of public diplomacy by 
small, constrained states (Rawnsley, 2000). Although the term public diplomacy originated in 
the U.S. and much of the scholarship comes from American institutions, it has become an 
increasingly global academic field.
Over the past two decades, public diplomacy has often been linked to the concept of 
soft power. Harvard political scientist Joseph S. Nye, Jr. first introduced ‘soft power’ in 1990 
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but developed it more fully in 2004’s Soft Power: the Means to Success in World Politics. 
His basic premise is that the ability to attract is a more effective means of persuasion than the 
ability to dominate by force (Nye, 2004). The attractiveness of a nation is found in its culture, 
including its language, arts, cuisine, institutions and brands. Soft power is related to public 
diplomacy in the sense that soft power resources, a nation’s attractive qualities, are 
communicated to foreign publics through public diplomacy efforts. “Public diplomacy tries to 
attract by drawing attention to these potential resources through broadcasting, subsidizing 
cultural exports, arranging exchanges, and so forth. But,” Nye warns, “if content of a
country’s culture, values, and policies are not attractive, public diplomacy that ‘broadcasts’ 
them cannot produce soft power.” (Nye, 2008, p. 95). Public diplomacy practices cannot 
create soft power where there is none. They can only raise awareness of soft power where it 
already exists.
One recent critique of the soft power concept has arisen in relation to China’s 
appropriation of the term. The Chinese government uses the term ‘soft power’ to describe 
what are more accurately labelled traditional propaganda activities (Wang and Lu, 2008; Gill 
and Huang, 2006). There is also an argument that soft power can only be successfully 
wielded by countries like the U.S. which also have a great deal of hard power (both military 
and economic power). Nye’s more recent work has coined the term ‘smart power,’ a hybrid 
of the cultural attractiveness of ‘soft power’ and the ‘hard power’ of military and economic 
resources. It is also important to remember that soft power ultimately remains a form of 
power. As Foreign Scholarship Board chair Tom Healy recently remarked, “No matter how 
decent our intentions or benign our strategies, one of the problems with persuasion is that it is 
not an effort of tender wonderment and questioning. Persuasion is not meant to explore truth,
but to enforce it. Soft power is still meant to be power, our power.” (Healy, 2013). The fact 
remains that one party wields power over another party, and as such, soft power cannot be 
separated from hegemony. 
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Communicating through the means of educational and cultural exchange is markedly 
different from that of international broadcasting, listening and advocacy. It does not reach 
mass audiences in the way that other techniques do. Educational and cultural activities 
engage foreign audiences on a small scale, and the audiences are active participants rather 
than passive consumers. There is a distinct emphasis on mutuality in exchange diplomacy
rhetoric, as opposed to the unidirectional approach that characterises international 
broadcasting, for example. In exchange diplomacy, both parties are considered to be learning 
from each other.
The speed at which effects can be observed is another distinguishing characteristic of 
exchange diplomacy. Exchanges do not produce instant, quantifiable results in the same ways 
that information campaigns might. Education and culture are slow, long-term approaches that 
might only prove to be effective years or decades after the initial contact has been made. 
Margaret Thatcher is often cited as an example of successful exchange diplomacy, as she 
came to the U.S. as a participant in the International Visitor Program (IVP) in 1967 (Scott-
Smith, 2003). Her experience demonstrates the long-term nature of public diplomacy efforts; 
it would be twelve years before she became Prime Minister. The IVP was arguably quite an 
effective tool in this case, as relations between the United States and the United Kingdom 
remained warm during Thatcher’s long tenure as Prime Minister. Investing in Thatcher early 
in her career, when she was a rising young Member of Parliament in the 1960s, paid off for 
the United States when she maintained and strengthened the ‘special relationship’ throughout 
the 1980s. Of course, it is difficult to generalise the results of this case more broadly. For 
every Prime Minister Thatcher there have been thousands of less prominent exchange alumni, 
as well as many pro-American world leaders who were not alumni of exchange programmes. 
Exchanges are thought to be effective because they utilise personal relationships and 
networks, which are seen as a highly credible means of communication. While information 
from a government’s mass media may be criticised by audiences, a discussion with an 
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individual representative is more credible and offers an opportunity for follow-up questions 
and responses. Individuals are better equipped than government media sources for a genuine 
two-way flow of communication. In addition to being more credible, individuals have other 
advantages over their governments. A Foreign Policy Centre study of British public 
diplomacy recognises that “...our broader society will often have more capacity, expertise and 
credibility than the British government when it comes to successfully interacting with a key 
group on a particular issue.” (Leonard and Alakeson, 2000, p. 5). Society has built-in 
communication resources, and exchange diplomacy enables governments and other actors to 
utilise them. R.S. Zaharna argues that the current global communications environment 
requires a new network-based communication approach. The network approach, prioritising 
relationship-building and message exchange, she argues, is more effective than a mass 
communication approach. “In what is arguably a new global communications’ era—defined 
by connectivity, interactivity and cultural diversity—those who master message exchange 
will command communication power.” (Zaharna, 2007, p. 225-226). Genuine exchange is 
well-suited to meet the communication challenges of engaging with diverse, interconnected 
publics on a global scale.
Exchange diplomacy is not without its flaws and criticism. As mentioned above, it is a 
slow method, the results of which may not be known for several decades. From a political 
standpoint, elected officials may not see the rationale of supporting a method that will not 
benefit their chances of re-election. From an economic standpoint, it requires continual
investment for uncertain long-term returns. It also has moral and ethical considerations to 
take into account. The idea that a government might derive national benefits from educational 
and cultural activities is a somewhat controversial concept. On the one hand, government 
spending of taxpayer funds ought to benefit the nation, to promote the national interest in 
some way. On the other hand, aligning national interests with educational activities might 
undermine the academic integrity of such programmes. Education and culture ought to be 
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promoted for their inherent value, rather than for the national interest, according to this 
argument. The tensions between these two viewpoints, which are yet to be fully reconciled, 
remain a dominant theme in the story of American public diplomacy.
The Origins of Exchange Diplomacy
The first use of education and culture in foreign policy has been attributed to France. 
As far back as the seventeenth century, French missionaries spread the French language 
throughout Europe and the New World (Mitchell, 1986, p. 22-23). Education played an 
important part in the French Republic, both domestically and in its imperial ambitions. The 
architects of the French Republic saw education reforms as a vital element in achieving their 
wider agenda of a democratic, secular nation. Education had long been exclusively in the 
hands of the Catholic Church in France. Reforms in the 1880s created free, secular and 
compulsory education for both girls and boys between the ages of 7 and 13. “Republicans 
believed the classroom to be the most critical public space for forging a republican citizenry.” 
(Conklin, Fishman and Zaretsky, 2011, p. 62). As Prime Minister and Minister of Education, 
Jules Ferry promoted both educational reform and colonialism. “France cannot merely be 
free,” he declared, “she must be great, exercising over the destinies of Europe all the 
influence which is rightly hers, and carrying it all over the world.” (ibid., p. 69). Domestic 
education reforms provided a model for France’s educational activities abroad. 
Education played a major role in colonial governance, and was at the heart of 
France’s overall aim, its mission civilisatrice (civilising mission). Colonial texts taught native 
students that they had benefitted from French rule. The French were depicted as kind 
protectors, deserving of respect and loyalty. One manual used in Indochina spoke of the 
obligations that students have towards their patrie d’adoption (adopted fatherland). “In 
recognition of all its favours, we must love France, our adopted fatherland, with the same 
love that we have for our own country. We owe France even greater respect, and this respect 
obliges us to conform to the orders of the government which represents France here, to 
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educate ourselves at the French school and to vow great fidelity to France.” (Cooper, 2004, p. 
145). In the context of French colonialism, overseas education was used to unite the people of 
the empire under a common language and cultural identity.
American Exchange Diplomacy
Compared with France’s long history of exchange diplomacy, the United States has 
only recently begun to engage in the practice. The early twentieth century Boxer Rebellion 
Indemnity scholarships are the earliest example of U.S. government exchanges. The Boxer 
Rebellion nationalist uprising of 1898-1901 resulted in China having to pay crippling 
indemnities to the U.S. and its allies (Hunt, 1972). An agreement between the U.S. and China 
determined that indemnity funds were to be used to fund scholarships for Chinese students. 
Established in 1909, the programme sent thousands of Chinese students to the United States 
over the next two decades (Bu, 2003, p. 25). In 1924, a conference was held to discuss the 
problems of returned Chinese students who had become ‘denationalized’ and found it 
difficult to adjust. The scholarships were then restricted to graduate students, who were 
expected to be less impressionable and thus have fewer adjustment problems (ibid., p. 75). 
The fact that such problems arose, however, suggests that the exchanges were highly 
successful in terms of culture learning objectives.
The story of these scholarships has often been framed in terms of China’s 
appreciation of American friendship after the Boxer Rebellion. The following summary, by 
historian Carroll B. Malone, was the dominant account of the Boxer scholarships for many 
years. “China expressed her deep gratitude, left the time and manner of the remission entirely 
to the American government, and apparently quite voluntarily stated her intention of using 
the money for the education of Chinese students in the United States. This was done as an 
expression of her appreciation of the friendliness of the American government.” (Malone, 
1926, p. 68). In this narrative, China initiated the scholarship arrangement voluntarily, and in 
a spirit of gratitude towards the United States.
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This account was widely accepted in American scholarship for the next five decades 
until historian Michael Hunt challenged it in 1972. Hunt argued that the United States had 
pushed the Chinese government into the arrangement, and that the exchanges were not a 
spontaneous show of China’s gratitude. He cites Chinese perspectives to make his case, 
quoting historian T’ao Chu-yin: “Their [the Americans’] ‘cultural investment’ was used to 
open up a ‘cultural leasehold’ and an ‘educational factory,’ to spread the poison of enslaving 
thought to overthrow and destroy the Chinese people’s culture, and to injure the spirit of 
China’s youth...Americans have called cultural investments ‘fertilizer for America’s trade 
with China,’ and in substance it is completely like economic investment.” (Hunt, 1972, p. 
541). This perspective changes the story, and reveals a great deal about the potential role of 
educational exchange in international political and economic affairs. In Malone’s account, 
educational exchange serves as a goodwill gesture and a mutually beneficial arrangement. 
Contradicting this narrative, T’ao Chu-yin sees educational exchange as a means by which 
the U.S. could dominate China by influencing youth values and culture. From the Boxer 
Rebellion indemnity example, we can see that educational exchange can be a gesture of 
friendship or a subtle form of imperialism, depending upon context and perspective.
In terms of non-governmental exchanges, the earliest American educational activities 
overseas were conducted by religious organisations. American missionaries spread not only 
their Christian culture abroad, but their American culture as well. As early as the mid-
nineteenth century, missionary organisations began sending promising indigenous students to 
religious institutions in the U.S. This practice sometimes led to unintended consequences. 
“Although the education aimed to imbue foreign students with Christian doctrines and to 
train them to be indigenous leaders of Christianity, it nonetheless contributed to the political 
liberalization of the students from non-Western societies.” (Bu, 2003, p. 43). Observing this 
phenomenon led to a belief during the interwar period that education could be used to shape 
people’s values and ultimately to maintain world peace (ibid.).
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The interwar peace movement resulted in an increase of educational and cultural 
exchange programmes. Most were conducted by private, independent entities such as the 
Institute of International Education (IIE), and the Ford, Carnegie and Rockefeller 
philanthropic organisations. The first annual report of the IIE tells the story of its beginnings 
and its mission. The backdrop of total war “aroused great interest among our [American] 
people in foreign nations and in international affairs. That fact,” it tells us, “prompted Dr. 
Nicholas Murray Butler of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace to discuss with 
the writer [Stephen Duggan, Sr.] the possibility of organizing an institution devoted to the 
specific purpose of enabling our people to secure a better understanding of foreign nations 
and of enabling foreign nations to obtain an accurate knowledge of the United States, its 
people, institutions and culture.” (Duggan, 1920, p. 1). The Institute of International 
Education cooperated with two previously existing organisations in the field, the American 
University Union and the American Council on Education. The American University Union 
had established offices in London, Paris and Rome during the First World War in order “to 
meet the needs of American college men and their friends in Europe for military or other 
service in the cause of the Allies.” (ibid., p. 3). The American Council on Education dealt 
with higher education issues within the U.S. Although they focused on domestic activities, 
their work with foreign students in the U.S. had some overlap with IIE’s efforts. The two 
organisations worked with the newly established IIE to avoid duplication of work and 
coordinate their efforts.
America’s first two-way state-sponsored educational and cultural exchanges began 
during the interwar period, alongside the private, philanthropic efforts. They focused on Latin 
America, a region already given prominence in American foreign affairs by President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor policy. First introduced in Roosevelt’s 1933 
inaugural address, the Good Neighbor policy was a declaration of respect. “In the field of 
world policy, I would dedicate this nation to the policy of the good neighbor—the neighbor 
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who resolutely respects himself and, because he does so, respects the rights of others—the 
neighbor who respects his obligations and respects the sanctity of his agreements in and with 
a world of neighbors.” (Roosevelt, 1933). The promise of respect was especially resonant 
with listeners in Latin America, where the United States had a history of political interference 
and economic exploitation. Roosevelt’s policy was a marked shift away from these types of 
engagement, and towards the promotion of international goodwill and regional cooperation.
While Roosevelt was promising to be a good neighbour, the Nazi government in 
Germany was looking to Latin America with a different aim in mind. Germany and France 
were both active in cultural diplomacy towards Latin America during the 19th century, 
promoting their national language and culture alongside their economic interests in the region
(Frye, 1967). By 1936, the United States had become increasingly concerned with Germany’s 
cultural relations activities in Latin America. The Nazi government targeted the region with 
information activities that American officials described as “well-organized and well-
subsidized, and designed to counteract and weaken U.S. relationships with the Latin 
American countries and discredit U.S. motives and purposes in the area.” (Espinosa, 1976, p. 
103). Nazi cultural activities included the sponsorship of German schools, where many 
wealthy Latin American families sent their children. American schools in the region, by 
contrast, operated on limited budgets and could not compete with their German counterparts 
(ibid., p. 177). Thus in the years prior to the outbreak of the Second World War, Latin 
America became a cultural battleground for the U.S. and Germany.
In 1936, the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace brought leaders 
from North and South America together in Buenos Aires, Argentina. One agreement resulting 
from the conference, the Convention for the Promotion of Inter-American Cultural Relations, 
proposed a scheme for binationally-sponsored educational exchanges. The exchanges were to 
be administered by a new body within the Department of State, the Division of Cultural 
Relations. Established on 27 July 1938, the new division was responsible for managing 
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America’s cultural engagement with Latin America (ibid., p. 102). Private scholarship 
programs continued as they had before, and while division officials cooperated with private 
organisations, they avoided overstepping their remit. State Department official Laurence 
Duggan advised that the Department “should do what it can to assist in the execution of the 
plan, without of course, becoming too closely identified with it.” (ibid., p. 103). The 
government was meant to act as a facilitator, but was not meant to engage too much with 
private activities. This arrangement continues to exist today, as the binational educational 
commissions abroad that administer US government-sponsored exchanges also act as 
clearinghouses for information about private opportunities for study in the United States. 
Educational and cultural exchanges have a long history of use in the conduct of 
foreign policy, from the early imperialists and missionaries to modern-day exchange 
diplomacy institutions like the Fulbright Program. They operate on an assumption that 
increased contact will lead to enhanced understanding, international goodwill and more 
peaceful relations. Programmes select future leaders on the basis that alumni who become 
leaders will produce a ‘multiplier effect,’ as they influence others in their society. Ultimately, 
it is believed that public diplomacy efforts will have an effect on a target nation’s foreign 
policy, because they will shape the prevailing attitudes and opinions in that nation. These 
three assumptions, as stated in the introduction, will be examined in greater detail in the 
following sections, with reference to the relevant bodies of literature from psychology, 
communications studies, and political science.
Contact and Attitudes
The primary assumption behind the practice of exchange diplomacy is the idea that 
contact between individuals of different groups will lead to increased mutual understanding. 
Across the exchange diplomacy and study abroad literature, the reduction of stereotypes and 
prejudice is one of the most frequently expressed objectives of exchange programmes. A 
1959 report from the Board of Foreign Scholarships to the President offers an example of this 
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type of rhetoric. “Comparatively recent revolutions in transportation and communication 
have brought peoples closer together. But they have also served to demonstrate the deeply 
ingrained prejudices that centuries of intercultural isolation have nurtured and the calculated 
distortions of our enemies have inflamed. By bringing carefully selected groups of foreign 
citizens into personal contact with our citizens and their way of life, the educational exchange 
program has done much to convey the truth about the US to the leaders and future leaders of 
the other nations of the world and, through them, to their peoples.” (BFS, 1959, p. 2). There is 
a broad consensus throughout the exchange diplomacy literature that contact is an effective 
means of reducing prejudice and improving intergroup relations.
This concept, known as the contact hypothesis, has been the subject of many studies 
in social psychology. It has been used to examine interracial contact scenarios, such as 
integrated schools and housing initiatives in the United States (Macrae, Stangor and 
Hewstone, 1996). It has also been applied to studies of disability stereotyping (Langer, 
Basner and Chanowitz, 1985). Researchers have tested the contact hypothesis in order to 
understand how stereotyping occurs, why prejudices persist, and how attitudes might be 
changed. These questions have a great deal of relevance for questions of intercultural contact, 
as stereotypes and prejudice are barriers to international understanding. 
The contact hypothesis originated in Gordon W. Allport’s seminal work The Nature 
of Prejudice (1954). His studies deal primarily with interracial contact and efforts to improve 
intergroup relations. Allport specifies four conditions that intergroup contact must meet in 
order to effectively reduce prejudice. “Prejudice (unless deeply rooted in the character 
structure of the individual) may be reduced by equal status contact between majority and 
minority groups in the pursuit of common goals. The effect is greatly enhanced if this contact 
is sanctioned by institutional supports, and provided it is of a sort that leads to the perception 
of common interests and common humanity between members of the two groups.” (Allport, 
1954, p. 281). It is important to note that these conditions must be met in order for the contact 
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to be effective in reducing prejudiced attitudes. Contact alone is not necessarily an effective 
means of improving intergroup relations. 
How well does the contact hypothesis fit the intergroup contact scenario that takes 
place in exchange diplomacy programmes? Firstly, the participating groups must interact on a 
basis of equal status within the situation. For peers or colleagues in an educational exchange 
scenario, their status is most likely equal. For other contact relationships in exchanges, 
however, such as lecturer-student or employee-supervisor, this would not fulfil the contact 
conditions for prejudice reduction. Secondly, the interaction must take place in the pursuit of 
common goals. Again, this is not always the case for exchange participants. In some 
situations, Fulbright grantees might work on collaborative projects with locals during their 
sojourn. Many, however, will work on independent research. These projects offer little scope 
for the establishment of common goals. Thirdly, there must be an element of intergroup 
cooperation. As with the idea of common goals, the degree of cooperation depends upon the 
project in which the exchange participant is engaged. There may be opportunities outside of 
the institution of higher education for cooperative work, such as sport teams or volunteering. 
This cannot, however, be relied upon as a feature of the exchange diplomacy programme. 
Finally, the contact must be supported by authorities. Exchange diplomacy does meet this 
condition, as the contact is supported and facilitated by authorities, both the programme 
administration and the participating institution of higher education. Overall, exchange 
diplomacy does not fulfil the conditions for effective prejudice reduction set out by the 
contact hypothesis.
Although exchange diplomacy does not meet the standards of the contact hypothesis, 
this does not mean that it cannot reduce prejudice. The contact hypothesis has been subjected 
to a number of criticisms. Social psychologists have explored and tested various elements of 
the contact hypothesis in the decades since its introduction. Like the original studies that 
Allport conducted, many have focused on the contact that occurs in educational 
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environments. In a study of a multi-cultural high school in the U.S., contact under the 
specified conditions was found to reduce intergroup bias, supporting Allport’s contact 
hypothesis. Contact was found to “transform students’ cognitive representations from ‘us’ 
and ‘them’ to a more inclusive ‘we’.” (Gaertner et al., 1994, p. 242). 
Critics have found the contact conditions specified by Allport to be unrealistic. One 
study noted that participants may be unconvinced by overly artificial contact scenarios. “The 
elaborate creation of harmonious interpersonal relations was so obviously artificial when 
considered against the external realities of residential segregation, widespread discrimination 
and numerous intergroup inequalities.” (Macrae, Stangor and Hewstone, 1996, pp. 327-328). 
The exchange situation does not take place in a vacuum. External factors can and do 
influence contact outcomes. In terms of exchange diplomacy, a recent example of an 
‘external reality’ might be found in the 2003 renewal of U.S.-Iraq Fulbright exchanges. The 
contact between American and Iraqi scholars took place against a backdrop of the U.S. 
invasion of Iraq in March of the same year. At a press conference soon after their arrival in 
the U.S., Iraqi Fulbrighters told of their gratitude for the programme and gave details of their 
warm reception with President Bush. As one visiting lecturer described his objectives, “I 
want to play the role of a cultural ambassador to my city, to my country, Iraq, and to let the 
Americans know everything about Iraq. I’m sure that they have a lot of questions about Iraq 
right now, and there is a lot of misunderstanding about the situation in Iraq, about the Iraqi 
people’s attitudes, so I’m going to explain that whenever I have the opportunity to do so.” 
(U.S. Department of State, 2004). Yet while twenty-five Iraqis received Fulbright grants and 
travelled to the U.S. for postgraduate studies and lecturing posts, millions of other Iraqis lived 
in a warzone under U.S. occupation. The ‘harmonious’ image of intergroup contact and the 
realities of warfare are difficult to reconcile.
Richard Brislin’s work on intercultural communication describes the difficulties and 
limitations of the contact hypothesis. “Contact itself does not guarantee favorable results. 
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Some people are so rigid in their prejudices that any out-group behaviour can be interpreted 
as supporting their initial attitudes...Administrators must realize these possibilities as well as 
some background factors which participants bring to the contact situation.” (Brislin, 1981, p. 
197). Background factors might be as simple as previous brief experiences with the foreign 
culture, or as pervasive as fundamentalist religious beliefs. This was the case with several of 
the September 11, 2001 hijackers, who had lived and studied in the West prior to carrying out 
their attacks. In their post-9/11 public diplomacy strategy, the Council on Foreign Relations 
acknowledged this limitation. “The United States will never convince the fanatics who hate 
us most, and it would be a waste of resources to try.” (Peterson, 2003, p. 21). Resources are 
more efficiently used by engaging with moderates in the target society, who might be 
persuaded, rather than with extremists who never will be. 
Opinion Leaders
The second common assumption of how exchange diplomacy operates focuses on the 
ability to influence individuals, particularly those in leadership positions who might go on to 
persuade others. A 1942 U.S. State Department report on the Travel Grant Program stated 
this assumption as part of its programme objectives. “One of the immediate objectives of the 
program is to acquaint distinguished visitors...with the cultural and artistic life of the country 
visited, so that upon their return they will exert a definite influence on public opinion. This is 
particularly valuable in the case of distinguished visitors who are held in high regard by their 
fellow citizens and who are in a position, either through their official positions or otherwise, 
to influence public sentiment towards a better appreciation of North American culture, life, 
and government.” (Espinosa, 1976, p. 281). It is expected that the elite participants of 
exchange diplomacy programmes are the leaders, or future leaders, of a target society. Their 
views will be shared with others in their society and, it is assumed, will influence and shape 
public opinion. One participant will influence many others, multiplying the influence across 
the society, hence it is known as the ‘multiplier effect.’ 
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The case of exchanges between the U.S. and the Federal Republic of Germany after 
the Second World War offers a compelling example of the multiplier effect. Many of the 
exchange alumni went on to achieve leadership positions in the government in the decades 
that followed their exchange experience, including Chancellors Willi Brandt and Helmut 
Schmidt. A State Department monograph on U.S.-German exchanges describes the effects of 
these success stories. “By occupying high offices in public life, many were able to translate 
their personal experience into policies and programs which benefited both countries and over 
the years contributed to the good relations existing today between the United States and the 
Federal Republic of Germany.” (Kellermann, 1978, p. 241). The ability of leaders to 
influence others, including policy-makers, makes them ideal participants for exchange 
diplomacy programmes.
The multiplier effect is known in communications studies research as the opinion 
leader concept. It was introduced by Paul Lazarsfeld in The People’s Choice (1944) and 
elaborated upon in his collaborative work with Elihu Katz, Personal Influence (1955). 
Opinion leadership, they assert, “is leadership at its simplest: it is casually exercised, 
sometimes unwitting and unbeknown, within the smallest grouping of friends, family 
members and neighbors.” (Katz and Lazarsfeld, 1955, p. 138). Status is not necessarily a 
determining factor, as they argue that anyone can be an opinion leader, depending upon the 
context of interpersonal communication. It is less a matter of class than a matter of perceived 
expertise and trust. The authors do recognise, however, that elites influence a larger audience 
than non-elites would. “Higher ranking members...tend to address themselves to a larger 
number of group members than do lower ranking individuals.” (ibid., p. 88). In terms of 
exchange diplomacy, this means that influencing elites will, in turn, influence the ideas of 
many others in the target society. 
The opinion leader concept is part of the two-step flow model of communication put 
forward by Katz and Lazarsfeld. It is the concept that information travels from the mass 
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media to certain leaders, and then is passed on by these leaders to others in their societies. 
“The ‘two-step flow’ hypothesis suggests, in the first place, that these interpersonal networks 
are linked to the mass media networks in such a way that some people, who are relatively 
more exposed, pass on what they see, or hear, or read, to others with whom they are in 
contact who are less exposed.” (ibid., pp. 44-45). The two-step flow hypothesis is applicable 
to the culture learning that takes place in exchange diplomacy. If we think of the information 
not as that communicated through the mass media but as knowledge of another culture, for 
example, then the two-step flow is discernible. The first step is the exchange experience, 
where this cultural knowledge is gained first-hand. The second step is the subsequent sharing 
of cultural knowledge by the grantee with his or her society. According to this model, the 
exchange participant’s post-sojourn behaviour is of central importance. Grantees must share 
their experiences and knowledge gains with others upon returning home in order for the 
exchange diplomacy programme to achieve its aim of increased mutual understanding 
between the people of each country.
The concept of the opinion leader also has important implications for the participant 
selection process of an exchange diplomacy programme. The application process and 
selection criteria vary according to the different types of exchanges, but most educational 
exchanges are competitive, merit-based awards. Selection committees look for future 
leadership potential in interviews and personal statements, in addition to the evidence of high 
academic merit found in transcripts and test scores. The inclusion of leadership as a selection 
factor suggests that exchange diplomacy targets opinion leaders deliberately and strategically.
There have been a number of challenges to the original two-step flow model, 
including Robinson’s work on elections which argued that elites communicated primarily 
with each other, rather than ‘the masses’ (Robinson, 1976). This argument has a great deal of 
relevance for the Fulbright Program. When grantees become elites, according to this model, 
they will influence other elites, rather than the general public. This challenges the exchange 
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diplomacy assumption that influencing future elites will ultimately have a significant impact 
on public opinion.
Recent research on network communication dynamics has also offered a new 
perspective on the opinion leader concept. Network models suggest that information 
circulates amongst interconnected individuals or organisations, rather than flowing from the
mass media to opinion leaders and on to the public in the two-step model. Interpersonal 
connections between individuals are more influential than the mass media in the new global 
communications environment, because it is based on connectivity and personal interaction. In 
light of these developments, R.S. Zaharna argues in favour of a network or relational 
approach to public diplomacy (Zaharna, 2007; 2010). Informational mass media approaches 
are less credible and less effective than they were before the advent of the World Wide Web.
The relational approach, which includes educational and cultural exchanges, “may not be the 
most efficient medium, but it is the most effective and preferred one for building and 
sustaining relationships. It is highly credible and resonates positively with the participatory 
nature of the relational perspective.” (Zaharna, 2010, p. 147). Thus opinion leaders may have 
lost their relevance in the new global communications environment, but this development has 
not diminished the relevance of educational and cultural exchanges. Relationship-building
initiatives, whether in the form of the Fulbright Program, the International Visitor Leadership 
Program, or Humphrey Fellowships, still hold an important place in American public 
diplomacy.
Public Opinion and Foreign Policy
The public diplomacy literature often expresses an assumption that domestic public 
opinion plays an important role in shaping a democratic nation’s foreign policy. According to 
the Foreign Policy Centre, the spread of democracy in the twentieth century means that today, 
“the power to inspire publics is now often the most powerful weapon in international 
politics.” (Leonard and Alakeson, 2000, p. 38). Nye shared this view in his reflections on the 
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expansion of democracy and its implications for public diplomacy. “Shaping public opinion 
becomes even more important where authoritarian governments have been replaced...Even 
when foreign leaders are friendly, their leeway may be limited if their publics and 
parliaments have a negative image of the United States.” (Nye, 2008, p. 99). Winning over 
hearts and minds is considered to be vital in a democratic target nation, where those hearts 
and minds have the power to influence foreign policy decisions. This assumption is largely 
unquestioned in the public diplomacy literature, but has been met by far more criticism in the 
field of political science.
The importance of public opinion in foreign policy was used as a rationale for early 
U.S. involvement in educational and cultural exchanges. The founders of the IIE were liberal 
internationalists who felt that education could play an important role in international 
relations. Elihu Root, an IIE founder and President of the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, believed that education could serve as a means of promoting rational, 
well-considered public opinion on foreign policy matters. “With correct information about 
their relations to other peoples...about what has happened and is happening in international 
affairs...the people themselves will have the means to test misinformation and appeals to 
prejudice and passion based upon error.” (Root, 1922, p. 5). Root and his colleagues in the 
peace movement felt that there were important lessons to be learned from the experience of 
propaganda in the Great War. They saw education as a solution to the problems of 
misinformation and prejudice. 
The founders of early U.S. exchange diplomacy programmes were adherents of the 
liberal internationalist school of thought. The peace movement had a great deal of faith in the 
power of world opinion to prevent future war. President Woodrow Wilson promoted the 
notion of collective security, the idea that cooperation between states was the only way to 
ensure peace. This concept was embodied in the League of Nations, a post-Great War attempt 
at international governance. “The cement that was supposed to bind together the loose sand 
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of the League’s member-states was world opinion, the popular liberal sentiment embedded in 
all peoples that was being unleashed by the global spread of democracy.” (Ninkovich, 1999, 
p. 14). Despite the failure of the U.S. Congress to agree to League membership, the League 
of Nations set an important precedent in global politics and inspired the post-Second World 
War liberal internationalist push to establish the United Nations.
While liberal internationalists and public diplomacy advocates take the importance of 
public opinion for granted, other political science scholars have questioned its significance. 
Does public opinion actually have any effect on foreign policy? The extent to which policy-
makers pay attention to public opinion and act accordingly has long been debated. The 
dominant academic approach has changed over time to reflect changes in communication and 
political structures. According to political scientist Ole R. Holsti, a consensus based on the 
works of Walter Lippmann and Gabriel Almond emerged after the Second World War and 
dominated research on the topic until the Vietnam War era. The consensus view was made up 
of three primary arguments. Firstly, public opinion is volatile and therefore cannot be used to 
support foreign policy. Secondly, attitudes towards foreign affairs lack structure and 
coherence. They are not based upon reasoned arguments and evidence. Thirdly, due to these 
limitations and to the overall policy-making apparatus, public opinion has very little impact 
on a nation’s foreign policy. (Lippmann, 1922; Holsti, 1992). The view that the public is 
uninformed about foreign policy was shared by other political and communications scholars, 
such as James Rosenau. Agreeing with Lippmann, Rosenau argues that the general public is 
not only uninformed about foreign affairs, but is also largely uninterested in them. “Except 
for acute peace-or-war crises (and not always then), the mass public is usually unmoved by 
the course of world events. Few of its members are likely to have more than headline 
acquaintance with public discussions of foreign policy issues or be willing to listen to more 
than truncated news broadcasts over radio and television.” (Rosenau, 1961, p. 36). For the 
majority of audiences, then, foreign policy issues are of low salience. 
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The consensus view of an uninvolved public was challenged by the advent of the 
Vietnam War. The growing opposition of the American public to the war became politically 
significant over time. This caused even Walter Lippmann to change his views on the 
relationship between public opinion and foreign policy. Due to his opposition to the Vietnam 
War and the Johnson administration’s policies, Lippmann “came to regard the public, which 
had become increasingly sceptical of the war effort, as more enlightened than the 
administration.” (Holsti, 1992, p. 445). As a result of the Vietnam War, as well as the end of 
the Cold War, there has been further research on the relationship between public opinion and 
foreign policy. Although a new consensus has not yet emerged, some of the issues that have 
arisen have suggested that public opinion does play an important role in world affairs, 
supporting the liberal internationalist view of public diplomacy advocates.
Comparative research has shown that the relationship between public opinion and 
foreign policy in a given country depends upon domestic policy-making and social structures. 
In a comparative study of the U.S., the Federal Republic of Germany, France and Japan, the 
structures in each nation were found to have an impact on whether public opinion correlated 
to foreign policy. In the U.S. and the Federal Republic of Germany, where the foreign policy-
making process is less centralised and society forces are relatively strong, there was a match 
between public opinion and policy. In Japan and France, where policy-making is more 
centralised and societal forces are weaker, public opinion and foreign policy were less closely 
aligned (Risse-Kappen, 1991).
The impact of exchange diplomacy on public opinion and foreign policy has been the 
subject of relatively little research. Whitney Walton’s recent study of U.S.-French exchanges 
argues that study abroad between the two nations had an important effect on their relations 
and on national identity, as well as far-reaching personal impacts (Walton, 2010). As 
mentioned above, the Soviet Union case has also served as an example of the impact of 
exchange diplomacy on both public opinion and foreign policy (Richmond, 2003). These 
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compelling case studies suggest that there are many more examples of successful exchange 
diplomacy yet to be explored.
Conclusion
Theory is largely absent from most public diplomacy literature, as it is a relatively 
young academic field that has yet to establish its own theories, paradigms and frameworks. 
The practice of public diplomacy, moreover, is driven by the specific needs and requirements 
of individual cases. Practitioners and policy-makers take a pragmatic approach to public 
diplomacy. They must take into account the context of public diplomacy activities, the nature 
of the audiences, the purposes of the communication and any potential challenges that might 
arise. As much of the literature consists of empirical, historical research written by former 
practitioners, little attention has been paid to theory in the field.
In order to better understand how public diplomacy activities, and exchanges in 
particular, are thought to function, we must read between the lines of practitioner literature. 
This section has attempted to do this, by drawing out a series of basic assumptions that often 
go unquestioned (and sometimes go unvoiced altogether) in the public diplomacy literature. I 
have attempted to summarise these ideas that underpin the practice of exchange diplomacy. 
Theory has been drawn from each of the parent disciplines of public diplomacy studies: 
psychology, communications studies, and political science. The research from each of these 
disciplines has important implications for the study of public diplomacy. This section has 
revealed that, although these assumptions are not approached critically in the public 
diplomacy literature, they have been examined more thoroughly in other disciplines. 
In the psychology literature, we have found that the concept of intercultural contact is not as 
straightforward and effective as the exchange diplomacy literature assumes it is. Allport’s 
contact hypothesis has been tested and disproven in many cases that do not meet his specific 
contact conditions. It is important to recognise that exchange diplomacy contact scenarios 
often do not fulfil Allport’s criteria. Another important concept in exchange diplomacy and in 
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social psychology is the idea of stereotyping. Hewstone’s work on stereotypes demonstrates 
that stereotypes are not always negative, and that intergroup contact does not always succeed 
in disproving them. In some examples of exchanges, contact may simply reinforce 
stereotypes, as explained with the example of the Western-educated 9/11 hijackers. Social 
psychology does not wholly support the exchange diplomacy assumption that contact leads to 
increased mutual understanding and influences attitudes towards foreign countries.
The communications studies literature, particularly the work of Katz and Lazarsfeld, 
enabled us to explore more thoroughly the public diplomacy concepts of the opinion leader 
and the multiplier effect. This assumption has largely been supported by the literature, in fact, 
though communications research has not often been applied or cited in public diplomacy 
studies. There is some scope for further exploration of the multiplier effect and the role of 
elites in other disciplines, as well. Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of the reproduction of elites in 
educational institutions has particular relevance for more prestigious, elite examples of 
exchange diplomacy. Network theory would also be a useful lens through which to examine 
the international networks that result from exchanges.
Finally, we have looked to political theory in order to understand the extent to which 
public opinion can influence a nation’s foreign policy. Although public diplomacy has been 
defined as a foreign policy tool that works by engaging with a foreign public, the relationship 
between public opinion and foreign policy is somewhat unclear. Are the public uninterested 
and uninformed, as Lippmann and Almond argued? Or are they more engaged than 
previously thought? Recent developments in the global communications environment have 
also caused some to rethink the relationship between public opinion and foreign policy. The 
2011 social media-based protests of the ‘Arab Spring’, for example, inspired communications 
research on the role of new information and communications technologies in international 
politics (Howard and Parks, 2012). Such developments may have important implications for 
exchange diplomacy, as the realms of public opinion and interpersonal contact move online.
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Taken together, these three assumptions contribute towards a theoretical framework 
for exchange diplomacy. With a thorough understanding of the basic concepts that underpin
exchanges and public diplomacy in general, we can move beyond the simplistic questions of 
how states use exchanges and consider instead why they do so and the extent to which these 
exchanges might be deemed effective. This theoretical framework guides the analytical 
section of this study, as the guiding principles and assumptions of exchange diplomacy are 
uncovered in archival materials and interviews.
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Chapter 3
A History of the Fulbright Program
Introduction
This chapter chronicles the development of the Fulbright Program from its modest 
beginnings as a means of dealing with surplus war property to its current status as “America’s 
flagship educational exchange program” (Fulbright Program, 2014c). Its history is a 
fascinating case study in adaptability and resilience, as the Fulbright Program has overcome 
many challenges. Alice Stone Ilchman, former Assistant Secretary of State for Educational 
and Cultural Affairs, marvelled at the programme’s ability to endure “through budget cuts, 
wars, economic recessions, political disfavour, and unsympathetic management.” (Ilchman in 
Kiehl, 2006, p. 53). Indeed, the Fulbright Program has come up against many threats 
throughout its history, domestic and foreign, political and economic. Its ability as an 
institution to weather these challenges is remarkable, and warrants closer examination.
The section begins by discussing the origins of the Fulbright Program, including the 
precedents that inspired Senator Fulbright’s 1946 amendment to the Surplus War Property 
Act of 1944. It then moves into a discussion of the activities of the Fulbright Program during 
its early years. The work of establishing further exchange agreements and deciding upon 
policies took place against the backdrop of the Korean War, the Red Scare and McCarthyism. 
The Fulbright Program expanded significantly during the Kennedy era, with the passage of 
the 1961 Fulbright-Hays Act, but this peak soon diminished. The Vietnam War had a 
negative impact on the programme, as funds were drained away from exchanges and towards 
defence spending. This situation was perhaps further exacerbated by Fulbright’s feud with 
President Johnson, over the Senator’s opposition to the war. The story then moves to the 
period of détente, in which exchanges were established with the Soviet Union, and renewed 
with China after nearly three decades of suspended activity. The Carter years were also 
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significant because of their impact on the bureaucratic organisation of the Fulbright 
Program’s home, the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs. The ‘Project Democracy’ 
agenda of the Reagan era is discussed in a further section, culminating with the end of the 
Cold War. The post-Cold War era witnessed a steep decline in U.S. public diplomacy, yet a 
relatively stable period for educational exchange. The shift of USIA activities into the State 
Department was, if anything, a beneficial move for the Fulbright Program in terms of grant 
numbers and funding impacts. Finally, I consider the Fulbright Program’s activities in the 
post-9/11 era. Exchanges with the Muslim and Arab world became a new priority for the 
programme in the post-9/11 context, as new initiatives were developed and existing 
programmes were expanded. American public diplomacy benefitted from significantly 
increased attention and funding.
The historical account concludes with a discussion of the three primary themes that 
emerge: the significance of funding for the programme’s success, the bureaucratic shifts that 
have impacted the programme over time, and the centrality of the grantee experience to 
programme outcomes. These themes offer a foundation for further analysis in the subsequent 
chapters of the thesis.
Origins of the Fulbright Program
The international educational exchanges that became known as the Fulbright Program 
were first proposed in the days following the U.S. bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In 
later years, Senator J. William Fulbright recalled the horrific event as one of the contributing 
factors that led him to propose the use of exchanges as a peace-building effort. “One thing 
that inspired the introduction of the bill at that particular time was that we had just dropped 
two atomic bombs on Japan in August.” (Roundtable Conference, 1987, p. 83). In the 
bombings, Senator Fulbright saw the destructive capacity of the nuclear age and knew that 
mankind had reached a point of desperation. The invention of the bomb changed international 
relations irrevocably. The international peace movement, which had seen only brief and 
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limited success in the wake of the Great War, came back onto the agenda. In his statements in 
exchange programme reports, Senator Fulbright’s advocacy for peace was explicitly linked to 
his recognition of the horrors of war. “The ingenuity of man in inventing such power of 
destruction as the hydrogen bomb makes it absolutely essential that this movement proceed. 
The alternative seems to be utterly intolerable and disastrous.” (Armbruster, 1976, p. 5).
Humans must live to learn in peace with each other, he argued, or else face total annihilation 
by their own hands. “Such indiscriminate destruction of life and property by new and 
sophisticated methods suggested that some new approach to international relations was 
essential” (Fulbright, 1976, p. 2). At the heart of Senator Fulbright’s proposal was the belief 
that educational exchange might be a suitable new approach to resolving international 
conflict.
The Democrat freshman Senator from Arkansas had already made his internationalist 
views known while serving in the House of Representatives. The Fulbright Resolution, 
passed in September 1943, pledged U.S. participation in a post-war international peace-
keeping organisation. “Participation by this nation in a system designed to prevent war is 
inspired and justified primarily by the desire to preserve that integrity and freedom of the 
individual,” he told the House (Fulbright, 1943). This represented a return to Wilsonian 
internationalism, and a form of atonement for America’s failure to join the League of 
Nations. It was a marked departure from America’s inter-war isolationist foreign policy 
stance.
The text of the resolution promised America’s involvement in what would become the 
United Nations. “Resolved: That the House of Representatives hereby expresses itself as 
favouring the creation of appropriate international machinery with power adequate to prevent 
future aggression and to maintain lasting peace, and as favouring participation by the United 
States therein.” (ibid.). Representative Fulbright asserted that joining the international 
institution, in whatever form it might take, would be an initial step towards building and 
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maintaining a lasting peace. “Surely it is worthwhile to try a new approach to the problem of 
total war, even though no one can guarantee the success of our efforts. After this first step is 
taken, it is obvious that many more steps must be taken before an adequate policy can be 
achieved.”(ibid.). One of these further steps, of course, was his exchange programme. Other 
initiatives that arose in the aftermath of the Second World War included recovery loans and 
grants, such as the Marshall Plan. The proposed exchange programme complemented these 
post-war peace-building and recovery efforts.
The Fulbright Program was not America’s first foray into educational exchanges, but 
it was on a much larger scale than any previous exchange programmes had been. It drew 
inspiration from three of America’s past exchange endeavours. Firstly, the Fulbright Program 
took its binational structure from the Boxer Indemnity scholarship agreement. Secondly, the 
precedent of the Belgian-American Educational Foundation gave Senator Fulbright the idea 
of using surplus war property to fund his exchanges. Finally, the inter-war period Pan-
American cultural exchanges had established an administrative structure within the 
Department of State that the Fulbright Program would later use. Thus, the basis for the 
Fulbright Program’s binationalism, its funding and its administration can be found in earlier 
American educational exchanges activities.
The Boxer Indemnity scholarships were established by an agreement between the 
governments of the United States and China. At a conference on U.S.-China educational and 
cultural relations, Senator Fulbright admitted that he had kept the Boxer Indemnity 
scholarships in mind when he proposed his exchange programme. “I might say that one of the 
precedents, one of the reasons why the first agreement under the [Fulbright Act] legislation 
was with China, was the Boxer Indemnity precedent. In the Senate, you must look for a 
precedent if you propose anything relatively new. It’s a standing principle in the Senate that 
nothing should ever happen for the first time. So we always look for a precedent to prove that 
it’s happened before.” (Roundtable Conference, 1987, p. 83). Although Senator Fulbright 
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strikes a humorous tone in his telling of events, there is no doubt that the Boxer Indemnity 
scholarship precedent strengthened his arguments for educational exchange in the Senate.
Senator Fulbright also looked to the Belgian-American Educational Foundation 
(BAEF), which was established in the aftermath of the Great War. The exchanges were 
financed by the aid funds that remained in the hands of the Commission for Relief in Belgium 
at the end of the war. Before his career in public life and his presidency, Herbert Hoover was 
working as an engineer and financier in London. When the Great War was declared on 28 
July 1914, thousands of American tourists were stranded on the Continent, and many went to 
London to seek help (Nash, 1988). The situation very quickly overwhelmed the U.S. 
Embassy. Hoover and his fellow American residents of London created the American 
Committee, an organisation that helped the stranded Americans obtain return passage. After 
officials noticed his success with the American Committee, Hoover was asked to help with 
the plight of the Belgian people (ibid.) Under German occupation, over one million Belgians 
were on the edge of starvation. Hoover organised and chaired the Commission for Relief in 
Belgium, an organisation that provided food and other forms of aid. At the end of the war, the 
Commission had some $33 million in aid funds remaining (ibid.). Under Hoover’s direction, 
this surplus was used to establish an educational exchange programme and funding scheme to 
assist Belgian higher education institutions (Johnson and Colligan, 1965). Establishing the 
educational foundation contributed to Belgium’s post-war recovery and added another 
dimension to the country’s alliance with the United States.
The Belgian-American Educational Foundation (BAEF)’s application of surplus war 
funds for educational purposes inspired the funding arrangements in Senator Fulbright’s 
proposal. The BAEF served as a model for the creative funding in his first legislation, an 
amendment of the 1944 Surplus War Property Act. In this amendment, Senator Fulbright 
proposed to use the funds resulting from the sale of surplus war property to pay for 
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educational exchanges. The example of the BAEF had already demonstrated that this could 
be a feasible means of securing funding and promoting international goodwill. 
The BAEF was also important in terms of its bipartisan support for international 
educational exchange efforts. Herbert Hoover’s record of supporting international educational 
exchange made him an important ally for Senator Fulbright, a Democrat. In a letter to Senator 
Fulbright, former President Hoover described the success of the BAEF and related it to the 
Senator’s proposal. “In 1920, as a disposal of part of the funds from liquidation of supplies, 
etc., for the Belgian Relief Commission, I established the Belgian-American Educational 
Foundation, the purpose of which was exactly what you propose.” (BFS, 1955). In the years 
after his presidency, Hoover remained a prominent figure in the Republican party. The 
former President wrote a letter to Republican members of Congress endorsing Senator 
Fulbright’s proposed exchange programme. Another Republican and BAEF member, Senator 
H. Alexander Smith, also approved Fulbright’s proposal and lobbied for its support (Jeffrey, 
1987). These Republican allies helped Senator Fulbright gather bipartisan support for his 
international educational exchange proposal.
The U.S. Government had an infrastructure for educational and cultural exchanges in 
place prior to Senator Fulbright’s proposal. It had been created in 1938 to support exchanges 
between the U.S. and Latin America. The Division of Cultural Relations served as a model 
for the administrative structure that later exchanges would follow in the State Department’s 
Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs.
On a more personal level, two events in the Senator’s life inspired his views on 
education and its potential role in international relations. Firstly, as a Rhodes Scholar at 
Pembroke College, Oxford, Fulbright learned the value of international education. He saw 
first-hand how an early experience abroad could shape one’s views for years to come. At the 
time that he received his Rhodes award, the twenty-year-old had never left the United States, 
nor visited a major city. Reflecting upon his journey to Oxford in later life, the Senator spoke 
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of how he sought out “exciting experiences, and if convenient, some knowledge.” (quoted in 
Woods, 1995, p. 22). The social and cultural elements of study abroad were the highlights of 
his stay. He played rugby and lived and dined with his British peers. He read politics at 
Pembroke College for three years, studying under Oxford don R. B. McCallum, who became 
a life-long friend. After graduating from Oxford, Fulbright then spent an additional year 
travelling around Europe. This first experience abroad was hugely influential for the young 
man from Arkansas. It shaped his ideas about international cooperation, as it “heightened his 
awareness of the basic unity of Western culture and of the dimensions of its responsibility for 
much of the rest of the world.” (Johnson and Colligan, 1965, p. 13).
In addition to his Rhodes Scholar experiences, J. William Fulbright also drew 
inspiration from his memories of the problems raised by war debts in the aftermath of the 
First World War. The costs of that war, in terms of lives lost and property destroyed, were 
devastating. The damage of reparations to Germany’s economy is well-known, but many 
other countries suffered as well. The United States loaned more than $11 billion to fifteen 
European countries, during and after the war, but nearly all of them defaulted on these loans 
(All Debtors to U.S. Excepting Finland to Default Today, 1934). Eager to prevent similar 
problems in the wake of the Second World War, Senator Fulbright proposed a scheme that 
would enable these countries to purchase surplus war property in their own currencies, much 
of it at scrap value. His proposal would then convert the proceeds from the sale of surplus 
war property abroad into scholarships and travel grants (Lebovic, 2013). His educational 
exchange scheme was to be funded by war property in the hope that such goods would not be 
needed in the future. In later years, this motivation prompted President Kennedy to assert, 
“Of all the examples in recent history of beating swords into plowshares, of having some 
benefit come to humanity out of the destruction of war, I think that this program in its results 
will be among the most preeminent.” (White House, 1961a).
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Founding the Fulbright Program 
Although J. William Fulbright was a freshman Senator when he introduced his bill 
proposing an educational exchange programme, he was politically adept and managed to get 
the bill passed quickly by using a range of tactics. Knowing that the proposal could be 
controversial, he chose to introduce it to a near-empty chamber, saying later that “the less 
attention the matter got the greater would be the chance of victory for idealism.” (Woods, 
1995, p. 131). Neither the Senators nor the members of the press in the chamber that day took 
any notice of the bill. It went to committee review without discussion. Following consultation 
with the State Department and Senate committees, Senator Fulbright abandoned his original 
bill and drafted a more detailed version. This resulting piece of legislation, introduced in 
November 1945, took up the consultation recommendations and proposed that the State 
Department should be the sole disposal agency for surplus war property abroad (Jeffrey, 
1987). The bill also created the Board of Foreign Scholarships, an independent, nonpartisan 
body of presidential appointees who would establish rules, select grant recipients and 
administer the programme. It was this second, more comprehensive piece of legislation that 
ultimately became the Fulbright Act of 1946. 
Senator Fulbright managed to move the bill quickly through the legislative process by 
utilising a combination of political tactics. Firstly, there was a distinct effort to make the bill 
transcend party lines and be accepted by lawmakers on both sides of the aisle. Former 
President Herbert Hoover and Senator H. Alexander Smith were influential Republicans who 
also advocated international educational exchange, and Senator Fulbright valued their 
support. In addition to this effort at bipartisanship, Senator Fulbright also showed skilful 
political manoeuvring when it came to arranging his bill’s funding. Aware that his colleagues 
in the Senate might reject any bill that required new appropriations, Fulbright found a 
creative solution in America’s surplus war property. When American troops returned home at 
the end of the Second World War, they left millions of dollars worth of surplus war materials 
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scattered around the world, abandoned on beaches and left to rot, creating a logistical 
problem for those in charge of war surplus (Lebovic, 2013). Bringing the goods back to the 
U.S. was untenable, due to prohibitively high transportation costs. The war-torn countries 
holding the goods were unable to pay for them in U.S. dollars. Essentially, America had a
great deal of nonconvertible currency frozen abroad.
By designating the State Department as the sole disposal agency for these goods, 
Fulbright created a means for these non-convertible currencies to be spent in a manner that 
would bring “intangible benefits” to the United States (ibid.). Senator Fulbright later recalled 
telling his colleagues, “’These bills are all owing to us what you can’t collect.’ I don’t think I 
could have got it enacted in any other way.” (Quoted in Dudden and Dynes, 1987, p. 1). 
Fulbright’s arrangement enabled him to fund the exchange programme while simultaneously 
addressing the issue of surplus war property disposal.
Senator Fulbright’s third measure that aided the passage of his bill was its provision 
for the Board of Foreign Scholarships. This was a proposed administrative body, included in 
the bill after consultation with the Senate expenditures committee. It was the only major 
change proposed by the committee, and was added “because members distrusted the State 
Department.” (Jeffrey, 1987, pp. 45-46). They feared that the State Department might use the 
exchange programme for its own foreign policy agenda, damaging the programme’s 
academic integrity. The establishment of the Board of Foreign Scholarships as an 
independent, autonomous decision-making body quelled their concerns that government 
involvement in such matters as educational exchange would turn students into tools of the 
State Department. According to the legislation, a ten-member board of Presidential 
appointees would oversee the programme’s administration, serving without compensation 
(Public Law 79-584). Their responsibilities would include the selection of grantees, 
negotiating bilateral agreements with other nations, and deciding upon official policies. 
Members of the Board were to be drawn from “cultural, educational, student and war 
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veterans groups,” including the U.S. Office of Education, the Veterans Administration, and 
public and private educational institutions (ibid.; Johnson and Colligan, 1965, pp. 21-22). 
The Board would be composed of representatives from a range of fields, ensuring that its 
decisions would not be biased in any one direction. This would ensure the programme’s 
integrity and protect it from the influence of short-term foreign policy demands. Thus, the 
creation of the Board addressed the concerns of those who did not trust the State Department.
Another line of defence against political interference came in the form of the 
programme’s binational structure. The binational Fulbright Commissions, established in most 
participating countries, would act as overseas counterparts to the Washington-based 
programme administrators. They would publicise programme competition announcements, 
manage applications, and host receptions and orientations for grantees. In addition to these 
Fulbright grant duties, the Commissions would also act as clearinghouses for information on 
other U.S. study abroad opportunities, both public and private. Binational commissions 
significantly raised the profile of the partnering nation in conducting Fulbright Program 
exchanges. Commission boards consist of both local citizens and American residents, which 
encourages an equitable distribution of control. The binational structure provides an element 
of insulation from short-term foreign policy objectives. 
Senator Fulbright’s political manoeuvring over several months succeeded. The Senate 
unanimously passed the Fulbright Act with no debate and without a roll call vote (Woods, 
1995, p. 133). Shortly before Congress adjourned, President Truman signed the bill into law 
on 1 August, 1946. Following the bill’s passage, a great deal of administrative work had to be 
completed before any participants could be exchanged. Binational agreements with the 
governments of participating nations had to be negotiated by the State Department. Official 
statements of selection criteria and programme policies needed to be established by the Board 
of Foreign Scholarships, the members of which were appointed on 17 July 1947 (BFS, 1948).
Funding with surplus war property funds proved to be more complex than anticipated. In the 
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interest of getting the programme off the ground, funds were initially provided by the 
Carnegie and Rockefeller foundations. These philanthropic organisations were already well-
established in the field of education, and agreed to support exchanges for the first six months 
of the programme (Johnson and Colligan, 1965). At the first press conference about the 
exchange programme, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs William Benton referred 
to it as “the Fulbright Program” and this unofficial name became the permanent title
(Fulbright, 1989, pp. 214-215). The first binational agreement for exchanges was made with 
China in November 1947; Burma, the Philippines and New Zealand followed within the next 
six months (BFS, 1948). By the early 1950s, the framework for the Fulbright Program was in 
place and students, scholars and professors began criss-crossing the world.
Early Exchanges and the Cold War
No sooner had the Fulbright Program taken off than it came up against its first crucial 
challenge. Just months after the first American and Chinese grantees had taken up their 
awards, political developments threatened the existence of the U.S. Educational Foundation 
in China. Civil war had broken out in China after the end of the Second World War, fought 
between Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist party and Mao Zedong’s Communist party. The 
Fulbright exchange agreement had been made with the Nationalists, and the first year of 
exchanges had been paid for with gold yuan, a currency that was soon threatened with 
devaluation as a result of the conflict.
When Communist troops took Peking on 31 January 1949, neither the Foundation nor 
the U.S. Embassy knew how events might unfold. The Foundation initially resisted calls to 
suspend the programme, and discussed the possibilities of having a limited programme or 
deferring action on the matter until a later meeting (Fairbank, 2005 [1976], p. 192). In a 
despatch to the State Department in July 1949, Foundation director George Harris asked for 
assurances that funding from China’s Nationalist government would be available for the 
following year’s exchanges, “should events render a programme possible.” (ibid., p. 197). By 
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the 31st of August, the Foundation had exhausted its funding and had to suspend its activities, 
as it was no longer able to obtain funding from the Nationalist government. The suspended 
exchange programme in China could be considered the Fulbright Program’s first Cold War 
casualty.
The advent of the Cold War had major repercussions for U.S. foreign policy, as well 
as America’s educational and cultural relations with the world. International exchange 
activities took on a new meaning in the context of the Cold War. The Fulbright Program 
became seen as a means of giving foreign visitors a taste of life in the ‘free world.’ Fulbright 
Program administrators travelled to parts of the world that they considered vulnerable to the 
influence of Communism in order to understand the best approach towards this new conflict. 
Francis J. Colligan, executive secretary of the Fulbright Program, writes of his impressions 
on a trip to the Middle East and Far East in early 1951. He explicitly links the agenda for 
educational exchange to the ‘Communist threat’ in his report to the Board of Foreign 
Scholarships. “As far as the Fulbright program is concerned, we can best meet this situation 
by 1) helping certain countries fill their need in terms of knowledge and skills, 2) informing 
them of the true nature of democracy and of communism, 3) demonstrating the achievements, 
cultural and intellectual, which have grown out of our way of life, and 4) in all cases 
demonstrating a spirit of genuine, broad-gauged cooperation as the basis of our attitude 
towards the free world.” (Colligan, 1951, p. 3). This second point, telling foreign audiences 
about democracy and communism, is a commonly used phrase in early Cold War rhetoric. 
These ideas are typically linked with information-based forms of public diplomacy activities, 
rather than educational exchanges or cultural diplomacy. The Truman administration’s 
‘Campaign of Truth’ (Barrett, 1953) and the US Information Service (Dizard, 1961) are 
examples of the advocacy public diplomacy referred to by Colligan. This passage shows that 
the divisions between informational and educational-cultural forms of public diplomacy were 
blurred during the early days of the Cold War.
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The Board of Foreign Scholarships agreed with Colligan’s views and explicitly linked 
its mission with the ideological competition taking place during the Cold War. “With the 
world divided into two competing ideological camps, it has been apparent for many years that 
the only real solution to the stalemate that confronts mankind lies in greater mutual 
understanding among nations.” (BFS, 1959, p. 2). Grantees were thought to have an 
important role to play during the exchange experience, which administrators conceived as a 
microcosm of international relations. “By bringing carefully selected groups of foreign 
citizens into personal contact with our citizens and their way of life, the educational exchange 
program has done much to convey the truth about the U.S. to the leaders and future leaders of 
other nations of the world and, through them, to their peoples. By sending carefully selected 
groups of Americans abroad to study and teach among the citizens of foreign countries, the 
program has helped to destroy many false, stereotyped impressions of the attitudes and 
capabilities of people living in the United States.” (ibid.).
The rhetoric used in this passage highlights the distinct lack of reciprocity in the 
exchange. Bringing foreign visitors to the U.S. was thought to indoctrinate them in the 
American way of life, while Americans sent abroad were thought to proselytise to foreign 
audiences about the virtues of the American way of life, as well. There was no consideration 
of the possibility that foreign visitors might share their country’s culture with Americans 
during their stay in the U.S., or that Americans might learn from other cultures when they 
travelled abroad. In this conceptualisation of the exchange as a Cold War tool, there is an 
absence of mutuality between the exchange participants.
Educational exchange was another arena in which the U.S. competed with the Soviet 
Union. An article appearing in The New York Times expressed concern at the Soviet Union’s 
expanding efforts in student exchange. “Many of those who cannot enter the United States 
are turning toward the Soviet Union. The Russian universities are offering scholarships and 
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educational grants to foreign students, particularly those who reside in Eastern Europe...[and] 
now inviting students from Western Europe as well.” (Fine, 1947, p. 9) The move towards 
Western Europe encroached on U.S. higher education ‘claims’ in the region.
For his part, Senator Fulbright did not view the programme as a weapon against 
Communism. He believed in the intrinsic value of educational exchange and the importance 
of building mutual understanding between the peoples of different nations. He knew, 
however, that the programme would need additional funding sources. The proceeds from 
surplus war property would quickly be exhausted, and his colleagues in Congress would have 
to be convinced to appropriate further funds, if the programme were to survive. He began to 
promote his exchange programme as a tool of Cold War foreign policy in the early 1950s.
Congressional appropriations for exchanges came under the same umbrella as 
overseas information activities, authorised by the 1948 United States Information and 
Educational Exchange Act, known as the Smith-Mundt Act (Public Law 80-402). In order to 
ensure that his exchange programme would be adequately funded, Senator Fulbright chose to 
promote it as a Cold War weapon. In a New York Times article from 5 August 1951, Fulbright 
asserts that his programme is such a weapon. “Since the program has gotten under way, the 
Russians have attacked it as being a clever propaganda scheme. I can agree that, as matters 
have developed, this program of exchange of persons is one of the most effective weapons we 
have to overcome the concerted attack of the Communists.” (Fulbright, 1951, p. 26).
When I spoke with Senator Fulbright’s biographer Randall Bennett Woods, he 
pointed out that the strategy of selling the Fulbright Program as a Cold War weapon was 
short-lived. “After 1955 he just completely rejected the notion of selling it as an anti-
Communist tool, overtly. He was afraid it had been co-opted by the hard right, and he wanted 
to prevent that.” (Appendix A, p. 261). Fulbright fought to keep exchanges in the State 
Department, rather than the U.S. Information Agency (USIA), in order to insulate exchanges 
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from the influence of propagandists in the new agency. While the State Department’s foreign 
policy influence on exchanges had once been a concern, the USIA was altogether more 
threatening to the exchange programme’s academic integrity. Its mission was “Telling 
America’s Story to the World”, a decidedly unidirectional purpose that did not accommodate 
the concepts of mutual understanding behind the Fulbright Program.
The Fulbright Program grew quickly in its early years. Between 1947 and 1952, new 
exchange agreements were made between the United States and twenty-nine other countries 
(BFS, 1952). Table 3.1 lists these countries and the dates of their exchange agreements. The 
geographic scope at this stage was still limited to the countries that had purchased surplus 
war property from the U.S. under the terms of the Surplus War Property Act of 1944. 
Table 3.1 Exchange Executive Agreements, 1947-1952 (chronological)
Country Fulbright Program Executive Agreement Date
China 10 November 1947
Burma 22 December 1947
Philippines 23 March 1948
Greece 23 April 1948
New Zealand 13 September 1948
United Kingdom 22 September 1948
Belgium and Luxembourg 8 October 1948 (joint agreement)
France 22 October 1948
Italy 18 December 1948
Netherlands 17 May 1949
Norway 25 May 1949
Egypt 3 November 1949
Australia 26 November 1949
Iran 1 September 1949
Turkey 27 December 1949
India 2 February 1950
Austria 6 June 1950
Korea 28 April 1950
Thailand 1 July 1950
Pakistan 23 September 1950
Iraq 16 August 1951
Denmark 23 August 1951
Japan 28 August 1951
Union of South Africa 26 March 1952
Finland 2 July 1952
Federal Republic of Germany 18 July 1952
Ceylon 17 November 1952
Sweden 20 November 1952
(Sources: BFS, 1948-1952)
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The US-Chinese exchanges were the first to be suspended, but there were two further 
suspensions in the early years of the Fulbright Program. The outbreak of the Korean War on 
25 June 1950, less than two months after the educational exchange agreement had been 
signed with Korea, led to a suspension of the Fulbright Program before any exchanges had 
taken place. The Board’s 1950 Annual Report to Congress states simply “Earlier plans for a 
program in Korea had to be postponed during the summer of 1950,” making no comment on 
the conflict (BFS, 1950, p. 3). The programme with Iran carried out exchanges for three 
academic years (1950-1952), but exchanges were suspended when funds were exhausted in 
1953 (BFS, 1953). A new agreement renewed exchanges in 1957, using funds from the sale 
of American surplus agricultural commodities to Iran to finance an educational and cultural 
exchange programme (U.S. Department of State, 1957b). The Fulbright Program with Iran 
was the first to be suspended for lack of funds, rather than for political reasons.
The Fulbright Program’s expansion in binational exchange agreements is reflected in 
the rapid growth of grant numbers. Figure 3.1 shows the increase of awards over the first six 
academic years. The number of Fulbright grants went from just 84 in its first year to 4,182 by 
1953, a nearly fifty-fold increase.
Figure 3.1 U.S. and Foreign Grants, 1948-1953
(Sources: BFS, 1948-1953)
Although the Fulbright Program expanded rapidly during this period, it was not 
without its detractors. Some criticised the Fulbright Program for the allegedly ‘dangerous’
ideas that it might bring to the United States. Senator Fulbright liked to tell the story of an 
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encounter with Senator Kenneth McKellar just after his bill had passed. “Young man, that 
measure you had is a very dangerous bill. If I’d known about it I would have opposed 
that...Don’t you know it’s very dangerous to send our fine young boys and girls abroad, and 
expose them to those foreign isms?” (Woods, 1995, p. 131). The very mission of the 
programme, cultural learning through exposure, aroused suspicion and fear in some quarters.
Others found fault with the programme’s scope and inclusivity. One such critic was 
Fulton Lewis, Jr., a McCarthyite radio broadcaster and columnist “known for his complete 
lack of objectivity” (Boehlert, 2005). His column in the New York Mirror attacked the State 
Department’s plans to expand the Fulbright Program to Communist states. “The State 
Department, ever secretive, has a grandiose but carefully guarded scheme in the making for a 
big Fulbright Scholarship exchange with Soviet Russia and three Iron Curtain satellites. The 
so-called ‘scholarships,’ lest you be misled, are not necessarily for scholars. They can—and 
will—go to professional or technical people, artists, writers, singers—almost anybody in the 
arts, sciences and professions.” (Lewis, 1957). The proposed exchanges that Lewis feared did 
not take place for nearly two decades. Despite the State Department’s efforts, the Soviet 
government did not agree to participate in the Fulbright Program until 1974 (Richmond, 
2003). Nevertheless, his column offers an interesting example of the types of criticism that 
the Fulbright Program faced during this period.
Senator Joe McCarthy, infamous for his anti-Communist witch-hunt of the early 
1950s, was an adversary of Senator Fulbright. In 1953, McCarthy used an appropriations 
hearing to attack the exchange programme. “He started by firing angry questions at William 
Fulbright. Were there Communist students in the program? Communist teachers? Communist 
books? When Fulbright objected, Joe grabbed an ashtray, banged it loudly on the table, and 
demanded ‘some answers.’” (Oshinsky, 1983, p. 316). Fulbright was infuriated by both the 
content and manner of the questioning, but managed to calmly defend the integrity of his 
exchange programme. McCarthy left the Fulbright Program alone after that encounter, 
74
though the two Senators remained fierce adversaries. In 1954, Fulbright cast the single 
dissenting vote against funding McCarthy’s subcommittee and played a key role in the move 
to censure McCarthy (Fulbright, 1989, pp. 53-54). As an aside, one early evaluation study 
notes that support for educational exchange was so universal, “Even Senator McCarthy avers 
that he likes the idea of exchange-of-persons programs and is critical only of their manner of 
execution.” (Riegel, 1953, p. 326).
The Cold War context shaped the trajectory of the Fulbright Program in its early 
years. It created challenges, such as the suspensions in China and Korea, and the impact of 
McCarthyism on America’s reputation abroad. The ideological battle of the Cold War also 
created opportunities for the Fulbright Program, as educational exchange became seen as a 
means of fighting Communism. Showing foreign visitors the American way of life was seen 
as the best means of convincing them of its merits. Bringing them into contact with an 
American visitor, who could explain these merits, was also thought to be persuasive. 
Although some emphasis was placed on the mutuality of exchanges, the programme became 
increasingly focused on promoting the American way of life during the Cold War.
The Fulbright-Hays Act of 1961
By the end of the 1950s, the Fulbright Program had changed dramatically from the 
modest exchange programme of its first year. New funding sources enabled the programme to 
include regions such as Latin America which had not been eligible under the surplus war 
property funding requirements. Between 1955 and 1960, fourteen additional countries entered 
into exchange agreements with the United States (Table 3.2).
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Table 3.2 Exchange Executive Agreements, 1955-1960 (chronological)
Country Fulbright Program Executive Agreement Date
Chile 31 March 1955
Peru 3 May 1956
Israel 26 July 1956
Ecuador 31 October 1956
Argentina 5 November 1956
Colombia 9 January 1957
Iceland 23 February 1957
Ireland 16 March 1957
Paraguay 4 April 1957
Brazil 5 November 1957
Taiwan 30 November 1957
Spain 16 October 1958
Portugal 19 March 1960
Uruguay 22 July 1960
(Sources: BFS, 1963; no new agreements were signed in 1953-1954).
In addition to the original Fulbright Act of 1946, there had been a number of other 
pieces of legislation during the 1940s and 1950s relating to international educational 
exchanges. The most significant of these was the aforementioned 1948 Smith-Mundt Act,
which authorised overseas information activities as well as exchanges (Public Law 80-402).
The 1949 Finnish Educational Exchange Act had created a binational exchange programme 
between the U.S. and Finland, funded exclusively by Finland’s repayments of its First World 
War loans to the U.S. (Public Law 81-265). Another country-specific exchange programme 
was created by the 1951 India Emergency Food Aid Act (Public Law 82-48). The terms of 
the act’s food aid loan authorised the use of India’s interest payments for an educational 
exchange programme between India and the U.S. (ibid., section 7). 
Similarly, the 1954 Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act approved the 
use of funds resulting from the sale of surplus agricultural commodities abroad for
educational and cultural exchanges (Public Law 83-480). This was a highly significant piece 
of legislation for the Fulbright Program, as it enabled several Latin American countries to 
enter into exchange agreements for the first time. The 1956 International Cultural Exchange 
and Trade Fair Participation Act included provisions for cultural activities which overlapped 
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with those of the Fulbright Program (Public Law 84-860). By 1960, it was clear that 
America’s educational and cultural exchange activities would benefit from improved 
coordination under new legislation.
The new bill, the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961, not only 
consolidated the existing array of legislation, but also strengthened and expanded America’s 
educational and cultural exchange programmes. Senator Fulbright introduced the bill on 2 
March 1961, telling his colleagues in the Senate “the approach to the international scene of 
the 1940s is not good enough for the 1960s.” (Fulbright, 1961b, p. 3028). The new bill was 
co-sponsored by Wayne Hays in the House of Representatives, thus it became known as the 
Fulbright-Hays Act. It passed easily by a vote of 329 to 66, and was signed into law by 
President Kennedy on 21 September 1961 (Johnson and Colligan, 1965, p. 304). Kennedy
remarked at the signing ceremony that the bill represented “full recognition by the Congress 
of the importance of a more comprehensive program of educational and cultural activities as 
a component of our foreign relations.” (White House, 1961b). 
The statement of purpose of the Fulbright-Hays Act does not include any elements of 
Cold War rhetoric, of persuading foreign publics or fighting against Communism. Rather, it 
emphasises education and culture, cooperation and peace.
“The purpose of this Act is to enable the Government of the United States to increase 
mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the people of other 
countries by means of educational and cultural exchange; to strengthen the ties which 
unite us with other nations by demonstrating the educational and cultural interests, 
developments, and achievements of the people of the United States and other nations, 
and the contributions being made toward a peaceful and more fruitful life for people 
throughout the world; to promote international cooperation for educational and 
cultural advancement; and thus to assist in the development of friendly, sympathetic, 
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and peaceful relations between the United States and the other countries of the 
world.” (Public Law 87-256).
In terms of the theoretical framework, we can see both the contact and the public opinion-
foreign policy assumptions in the language of this act. The first clause relates quite clearly to 
the contact hypothesis, as it assumes that mutual understanding will increase “by means of 
educational and cultural exchange”. There is an implied connection between public opinion 
and foreign policy in the last two clauses, as a connection is drawn between educational-
cultural cooperation and friendly international relations. The use of “thus” in the last clause 
emphasises the simplification of this connection. The link is not explained in the remainder of 
the act, nor is the contact scenario elaborated upon. Rather, these are normative assumptions 
about the way in which exchanges relate to the national interest and the stabilisation of 
international relations. The concept of the multiplier effect is not clearly evident in the text of 
the act, though the term “demonstrating” implies a distinction between demonstrators (elites) 
and audiences (mass publics).
The Fulbright-Hays Act includes elements of each of the acts that it consolidated, 
such as provisions for U.S. participation in international fairs and expositions, continued loan 
repayment funding for the Finnish and Indian exchange programmes, and other measures. 
The act also includes a number of new features that had important implications for the 
Fulbright Program. Section 105 of the act authorised partner nations to contribute financially 
to their exchanges with the United States. Cost-sharing had taken place with West Germany 
prior to this amendment, where it had enabled the programme to exchange more participants 
each year than any other country. It also authorised exchange programme administrators to 
enter into contracts prior to the granting of appropriations, which enabled them to plan 
exchange activities further in advance than had previously been permitted. 
The act also had substantial effects on the administration of the programme. Section 
106 of the act increased the size of the Board of Foreign Scholarships from ten members to 
78
twelve, and designated the Board as the authority for all programmes authorised by the act, 
not only the Fulbright Program. The act also established the U.S. Advisory Commission on 
International Educational and Cultural Affairs, replacing the former Commission on 
Educational Exchange, and requested the new Commission to conduct a “study of the 
effectiveness of past programs with emphasis on the activities of a reasonably representative 
cross section of past recipients of aid.” (ibid.) The resulting report to Congress, entitled A 
Beacon of Hope: the Exchange-of-Persons Program, was the first large-scale official 
evaluation of the Fulbright Program. The study involved the consultation of thousands of 
exchange participants, educators, ambassadors and foreign service officers (Gardner, 1963).
The Fulbright-Hays Act was a highly significant moment in the development of the 
Fulbright Program. It increased the degree of coordination between America’s various 
educational and cultural exchange activities, authorised further funding sources and 
strengthened the role of the Board of Foreign Scholarships. It is also worth noting that 
although the Fulbright Program has expanded and evolved over the past six decades, no new 
legislation has been enacted. The Fulbright-Hays Act of 1961 remains the legislative basis for 
the exchange programme today. 
The Vietnam War and Retrenchment
The years immediately following the passage of the Fulbright-Hays Act were a time 
of great expansion and development for the Fulbright Program. With new funding sources 
designated by the act, as well as the Board’s enhanced authority to enter into new 
agreements, the size and scope of the programme increased dramatically. By 1963, forty-five 
binational commissions had been established around the world, and a further ninety countries 
participated in Fulbright exchanges through local U.S. Embassies (BFS, 1963). The Kennedy 
administration had looked favourably upon the Fulbright Program, as it was sympathetic to 
the cause of promoting mutual understanding and international goodwill. The administration 
saw the Fulbright Program, as well as initiatives like the Peace Corps, as a means of 
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exporting the American way of life and winning the Cold War by promoting modernisation 
on a global scale (Latham, 2000). When Lyndon B. Johnson became President following 
Kennedy’s assassination on 22 November 1963, there was every reason to believe that this 
favourable attitude towards educational and cultural exchange would continue. Senator 
Fulbright and President Johnson had been friends and colleagues in the Senate; both were 
Southern Democrats with a great deal of experience in Washington politics. The matter of 
U.S. military action in Vietnam, however, damaged their relationship permanently, and had 
lasting consequences for the Fulbright Program.
Senator Fulbright’s most well-known legacy is, of course, the exchange programme 
that bears his name, but he is also remembered for his opposition to the Vietnam War. As 
Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he watched the situation carefully as it 
developed and expressed his views on the strategy of containment. He fundamentally 
disagreed with President Johnson’s understanding of Cold War international politics, and 
believed that “the domino theory and the notion of a monolithic communist threat were 
fallacious.” (Woods, 1995, p. 415). Senator Fulbright officially broke with the administration 
on September 15, 1965, when he rose in the Senate and declared “The Administration acted 
on the premise that the revolution was controlled by Communists—a premise which it failed 
to establish at the time and has not established since.” (Yergin, 1974, p. 78). After this event, 
Fulbright claimed that “Johnson never forgave me. With a man like President Johnson, you 
either went along or you got off. He didn’t tolerate differences of opinion very easily.”(ibid.). 
Senator Fulbright was not alone in his criticism of U.S. military action in Vietnam. In 
1965, University of California at Berkeley economics professor Dr. Carl Landauer declined a 
Fulbright lecturing grant to Germany, writing that he felt unable “to defend not merely the 
morality but also the wisdom of American action.” (Stalnaker, 1965). BFS Chair John M. 
Stalnaker’s response accepts Dr. Landauer’s decision, but rejects his conceptualisation of 
grantee responsibilities. “You have noted that a Fulbright grantee is an unofficial 
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representative of his country. The Board of Foreign Scholarships has always considered this 
to mean representative in the sense of representing the American intellectual and scholarly 
community, and in no sense as a spokesman or advocate of American foreign policy. We 
have a Diplomatic Service for this purpose...You are, in fact, a private citizen free to agree or 
disagree with foreign criticisms of American policy on Viet-Nam, limited only by your own 
judgment, discretion, and professional responsibilities.” (ibid.). This statement of purpose is 
clearer than many other attempts, before and since, to describe the role and responsibilities of 
Fulbright grantees.
As the United States military became increasingly entrenched in the Vietnam War, so 
too did taxpayer dollars. In the late 1960s, the Fulbright Program was subjected to a series of 
budget cuts, year upon year. As Senator Fulbright put it, “Congress, unfortunately, has far 
fewer misgivings about appropriations for military items than it does about those which are 
tagged as educational or cultural.” (Fulbright, 1961a, p. 26). Reflecting on the period in an 
interview, Senator Fulbright blamed these cuts on his opposition to the war in Vietnam, 
attributing them to the President’s “falling out with me” over the war (Sussman, 1992, p. 26). 
Figure 3.2 illustrates the decline in the number of Fulbright Program grants over the course of 
the Johnson years, 1963-1969. 
Figure 3.2 U.S. and Foreign Fulbright Grants, 1963-1969
(Sources: BFS, 1963-1967, 1968b, 1969)
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In addition to the high costs of the Vietnam War, there was also now an increase in domestic 
spending during these years. The Johnson administration’s Great Society programmes had 
introduced a number of domestic welfare initiatives, including Medicare and Head Start, 
which also required new appropriations from Congress. This further reduced the amount of 
available funds in the U.S. budget. Educational and cultural exchanges were not tied to the 
Vietnam War, nor to Johnson’s Great Society domestic welfare reforms, and were therefore 
all the more vulnerable to budget cuts. 
The Board of Foreign Scholarships decried the budget cuts in its 1968 Annual Report. 
“It is false economy to have invested, and to have encouraged others to invest, so much 
energy and resources in programs and activities whose full potential in many cases cannot 
now be realized because of a reduction or withdrawal of Federal support.” (BFS, 1968b, p. 
iv).In the 1969-70 academic year, Fulbright grants and funding were at their lowest point in 
over a decade (BFS, 1969). 
The Fulbright Program’s funding was slowly restored during the years of the Nixon 
and Ford administrations, but by 1975 it had still not reached pre-1968 levels (Figure 4.3). 
Neither Nixon nor Ford took a strong interest in exchanges or public diplomacy more 
generally. President Nixon saw them as part of U.S. cultural imperialism, and believed that 
the exchange programme should send more Americans abroad and bring fewer international 
students to the U.S. (Woods, 1998, p. 212). The U.S. foreign policy of détente with the Soviet 
Union opened up new possibilities for the Fulbright Program and other exchanges. Fulbright 
exchanges of lecturers with the Soviet Union began in 1974 (Richmond, 2003).
For his part, President Ford had even less interest than Nixon did in reconfiguring the 
American public diplomacy apparatus. As Gifford Malone writes, he was unelected and 
“preoccupied with many serious problems...unlikely to expend energy on a controversial 
reorganization effort...in which it [the Ford administration] had no stake and no special 
interest.” (Malone, 1988, p. 38). In a news conference during the Indiana primary of 1976, 
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President Ford linked concerns about international student visa regulations to the 
unemployment problem. “It has to be on a selective basis…I agree with you entirely that 
these young Europeans or others coming to this country for an education, a living experience 
with American families, may go back in most instances and are goodwill ambassadors for the 
United States. I strongly believe in the program, but there has to be a balance when it comes 
to them getting jobs, competing with Americans who also need jobs.” (Ford, 1976). He 
implies that Europeans are more likely to return home after their education is completed, but 
that foreign students from other regions may want to stay and work in the U.S., accelerating 
the ‘brain drain’ phenomenon. In terms of his actions with the Board of Foreign Scholarships, 
Ford reappointed many of Nixon’s appointees, including John E. Dolibois, who played an 
important role in the foundation of the programme’s alumni organisation, the Fulbright 
Association. The alumni organisation soon became an important lobbying voice for the 
programme, which had lost its strongest advocate when Senator Fulbright retired.
In the 1974 midterm elections, there was a strong anti-incumbency mood in the U.S., 
due to the Watergate scandal and Nixon’s resignation. Due to his reputation as a Washington 
insider and despite being unconnected with the scandal, Senator Fulbright failed to secure the 
nomination for re-election during the Arkansas primaries. His thirty-year career in the Senate 
ended on 20 January 1975. In his retirement, the Senator frequently travelled to binational 
Fulbright Commissions for programme anniversaries and other speaking engagements.
According to the Senator’s biographer “the last 25 years of his life was one triumphal tour 
after another. He’d go to these countries and they’d treat him like royalty.” (Appendix A, p. 
263). Although he continued to support the programme in his private life, when J. William 
Fulbright left the Senate, the Fulbright Program lost its most powerful voice in Congress.
Reorganising Information and Educational and Cultural Affairs
After several years of decline and retrenchment, it was clear to many exchange 
advocates that a new approach to America’s overseas information and educational-cultural 
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affairs was needed. In 1974, U.S. Advisory Commission on Educational and Cultural Affairs 
member Leo Cherne initiated a panel review into American public diplomacy activities and 
their organization within Washington bureaucracy. The review was organised by the Center 
for Strategic and International Studies at Georgetown University, and Frank Stanton, a CBS 
broadcasting executive, was chosen to chair the panel.
The panel’s consultations and deliberations took place over the course of a year, and 
its final report was published in March 1975. The Stanton Report proposed the creation of a 
new agency, the Information and Cultural Affairs Agency, which would combine the Bureau 
of Educational and Cultural Affairs with many of USIA’s activities. It would be semi-
autonomous, “under--but not in--the Department of State” (Stanton, 1975, p. 20). A 
distinction was drawn between policy information and cultural information to distinguish 
between different public diplomacy activities for the purpose of bureaucratic organisation. 
Policy information meant communicating U.S. policies to overseas audiences, while cultural 
information meant informing overseas audiences about U.S. culture. This would include 
educational exchanges as well as arts exhibitions and other cultural diplomacy activities. 
The Stanton Report had a mixed reception. Its recommendations were generally 
supported by those involved in international education and cultural diplomacy, but opposed 
by USIA director James Keogh and others involved in overseas information activities 
(Malone, 1988). Little action was taken on the matter of reorganising America’s public 
diplomacy activities until President Jimmy Carter took office in January 1977 (ibid.).
The Carter administration reviewed past assessments of America’s public diplomacy 
activities and only partially accepted the recommendations of the Stanton Report in its 
reorganisation plan. They agreed that CU and USIA activities should be merged, but did not 
adhere to the Stanton proposal to move policy information activities into the Department of 
State. Instead, they moved CU into USIA and renamed it the U.S. International 
84
Communication Agency (USICA). The Carter administration replaced Information with 
International Communication, and added the notion of listening to the agency’s mission.
While the USIA had been charged with the responsibility of telling foreign publics about the 
U.S., Carter’s USICA had to tell the world about America and listen to the world in turn.
President Carter was keenly supportive of exchange diplomacy and promised
throughout the reorganisation process to protect the integrity of America’s educational and 
cultural exchange programmes (Sablosky, 1999, p. 32). During its years in the USICA, the 
Fulbright Program fared remarkably well. Grant figures increased year-on-year, from 4,081 
Fulbright grants in the 1977-78 academic year to 5,248 in the 1979-80 academic year (BFS, 
1978; BFS, 1980). New initiatives, such as the Hubert Humphrey programme for early career 
leaders, were established and the programme was expanded. In 1978 the educational 
exchange agreement was renewed with China, after being suspended since the country’s 1949 
Communist Revolution. USICA also published the first general information brochure on the 
Fulbright Program (BFS, 1980, p. 10).
The USICA was a short-lived incarnation, however; in 1981, the Reagan 
administration reverted its name and mission to its previous state as the U.S. Information 
Agency. Some accounts of America’s public diplomacy history have skimmed over the 
USICA as a brief episode that moved educational and cultural exchange diplomacy from the 
State Department to the U.S. Information Agency (Thompson, 1987; Malone, 1988). Other 
accounts suggest that educational and cultural programmes should have received greater 
priority than they did under USICA, but scarce resources prevented this (Sablosky, 1999; 
Arndt, 2005). I would argue that the USICA years were, in fact, a time when the Fulbright 
Program’s mission of promoting mutual understanding and international goodwill through 
genuine, two-way engagement was widely appreciated by its administrators. The Carter 
administration’s favourable approach towards educational and cultural exchange is a 
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fascinating moment in the Fulbright Program’s history. It is all the more interesting when 
contrasted with the very different approach taken by his successor.
Project Democracy
When President Ronald Reagan was inaugurated in January 1981, his administration 
soon changed the direction of American public diplomacy. The USICA was changed back to
the United States Information Agency. The ‘second mandate’ of learning from other 
countries was discarded and the Agency’s motto was once again ‘Telling America’s Story to 
the World.’ The administration emphasised anti-communist Cold War objectives, such as 
countering Soviet propaganda and promoting U.S. policies around the world. The Reagan 
administration’s agenda promoted democracy, free trade and U.S. cultural hegemony.
Although total USIA funding increased, the Fulbright Program did not benefit in real 
terms, as the agency directed more funding to information programmes than exchange of 
persons and cultural activities. “The administration has successfully boosted agency funding, 
but it has earmarked most of the new appropriations for programming involving one-way 
dissemination of propaganda.” (Nichols, 1984, p. 132). USIA director Charles Z. Wick, a 
long-time friend of President Reagan from California, had a background in broadcasting and 
a keen interest in the developments taking place in cable television. Wick’s preference for 
information activities over educational-cultural affairs was evident from the beginning of his 
tenure, particularly in terms of budget allocations. “He [Wick] arrived in his job to find that 
David Stockman’s Budget Office had mandated a general cut of 8 percent for USICA. With 
ambitious media plans, Wick proposed to focus the entire cut on ECA [Educational and 
Cultural Affairs]—which would have caused a 50 percent cut in exchanges and closed half 
the world’s Fulbright programs. He justified the risk by explaining that his friend the 
president would reinstate the funding, sooner or later.”(Arndt, 2005, p. 527).
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Amongst other accomplishments during his eight-year tenure at USIA, Wick 
established Radio Marti, the Spanish-language broadcasts aimed at Cuban audiences. Both 
this move and his activities in Eastern Europe reflected Wick’s hard-line anti-Communist 
stance. “He called for ‘a wartime urgency’ in pursuing initiatives that included a television 
arm to USIA’s radio station in West Berlin and a worldwide live television program 
celebrating Poland’s resistance to the Soviets, complete with Frank Sinatra singing in Polish.” 
(Martin, 2008). Wick’s innovations were not always well received by those in Congress. 
Representative Edward Derwinski (R-IL), for example, met with Wick and White House 
budget director David Stockman to discuss the 1981 budget cuts. “I told them it is ludicrous 
to be talking about a Radio Free Cuba [Radio Martí] when we are cutting all these things, 
including the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe.” (Crossette, 1981, p. 3).
Although educational and cultural exchange activities were generally given a low 
priority at this time, the Reagan administration did promote youth exchanges. Youth 
exchanges were thought to have a greater potential multiplier effect than other exchange-of-
persons programmes, and there was also a prevalent assumption that younger participants 
would have more malleable views. The Fulbright Program included an undergraduate 
programme for the first time, the Central American Program of Undergraduate Scholarships, 
or CAMPUS (BFS, 1985). The initiative brought “undergraduates from Central American 
countries, particularly for upwardly mobile youth with leadership potential,” to the U.S. for 
up to two years of study at one of twelve participating universities (ibid., p. 1; BFS, 1987).
The programme broadened the scope of Fulbright to include students from the undergraduate 
level and from low-income backgrounds.
Another example of these youth exchange programmes was a 1983 initiative with 
West Germany. Every member of the U.S. Congress and of the West German Bundestag
would nominate a teenager from his or her district to be exchanged for one academic year. 
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The programme was seen as a return to the earlier exchanges between the U.S. and West 
Germany that had taken place after the Second World War. Ambassador Arthur F. Burns 
praised the move in a speech to the Overseas Club in Hamburg. The focus on youth was due 
to the fact that “...it has been observed time and again that exchange youngsters reinforce the 
bonds of friendship they had formed with their host families through their own parents, other 
relatives, and fellow students. We need precisely such a matrix of human contacts to rebuild 
the warm spirit of partnership that existed between our two peoples during the late 1940s and 
1950s.” (Burns, 1983, p. 4). While the Reagan administration did not actively promote 
exchanges to the extent that it pursued information activities, its addition of youth exchange 
programmes to the Fulbright Program was an important innovation.
In terms of the theoretical basis for exchange diplomacy, youth exchanges have a high 
potential multiplier effect. Teenage participants will live with host families, whereas 
postgraduate researchers and lecturers will live independently during their academic sojourn. 
Youth will thus have more contact with members of the host society simply by the fact of 
their accommodation. In terms of the opinion leader concept, targeting promising youth is 
thought to be an effective means of influencing future elites. There is also no clear benefit, 
from the U.S. perspective, to delaying participation until the postgraduate stage. As the 
impacts of the exchange experience are thought to be life-long and enduring, then the earlier 
the exchange contact scenario takes place, the better.
The End of the Cold War and the Decline of American Public Diplomacy
The end of the Cold War changed the nature of international relations within the space 
of just a few short years, from the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 to the collapse of the Soviet 
Union in 1991. The ties between the Fulbright Program and American foreign policy were
not severed with the end of the Cold War, though some officials felt that public diplomacy 
had lost its relevance in the post-Cold War era. The United States had emerged as the sole 
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superpower, and its counter-propaganda could not exist without Soviet propaganda. There 
was no longer a need to ‘Tell America’s Story to the World,’ as there was no other narrative 
to compete with America’s story.
For the Fulbright Program, the end of the Cold War offered an opportunity to expand.
Poland was the first to sign an executive agreement for Fulbright exchanges in March 1990, 
followed by Hungary in December of that year, the Czech Republic in 1991, Bulgaria and 
Romania in 1992, and the Slovak Republic in 1994. President George H. W. Bush’s approach 
towards the USIA and public diplomacy was largely a continuation of his predecessor’s, with 
an emphasis on media, but with a crucial difference in the quality of management. Bush’s 
USIA director Bruce Gelb lacked the management skills and personal influence of Charles Z. 
Wick, and struggled with his role, stepping down in 1991 (Cull, 2012). His replacement 
Henry Catto was more successful, but neither Gelb nor Catto paid much attention to 
educational exchanges, preferring to focus on media and television as Wick had. There were 
also fundamental problems in American public diplomacy at the time. Historian Nick Cull 
describes the ironies of the period, how winning the Cold War had cost the USIA its 
justification. “The success of Voice of America proved corrosive to the well-being of the 
agency as a whole; the same free-market idea that the USIA was selling in Eastern Europe led 
many Americans to assume that publicly funded information work in the region was a short-
term measure only.” (ibid., p. 64). U.S. public diplomacy had lost its relevance in the eyes of 
many Americans, just at a time when newly independent states had become receptive to its 
message.
In the absence of the Cold War context, the promotion of international trade and 
economic relations became the primary foreign affairs concern of policy-makers. Joseph 
Duffey, director of the USIA during the Clinton administration, agreed that the end of the 
Cold War seemed to cause this shift towards economic priorities. “It soon became clear to me 
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that waves of new Cold War triumphalism were emerging around the concept of a ‘new 
world order’ as well as that of a dominant military power. There was a growing popular view, 
expressed widely, that the victory of the Cold War was more a triumph of free markets and 
diminished government than free spirits.” (Duffey quoted in Snow and Taylor, 2009, p. 330).
The ‘new world economic order’ took centre stage in the minds of members of the Clinton 
administration. 
It has been suggested that even the seemingly unrelated Fulbright Program was 
affected by this shift in priorities. When the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) was signed, Fulbright exchanges with Mexico were increased. Nancy Snow argues 
that this increase was motivated by purely economic interests, citing a USIS report that stated 
“The expansion of this program will strengthen educational opportunities in both countries 
and build on the success of NAFTA whereby exports to Mexico are up by 37 percent, an all-
time high, creating jobs for Americans.” (Snow, 2010, p. 91). Thus, Snow’s account suggests 
that the Fulbright Program was increased in order to benefit American business interests in 
Mexico. It accuses the administration of interfering, of undermining the programme’s 
academic integrity by promoting business concerns. This critique fails to recognise, however, 
that this was not a new development. In many other countries, trade benefits are among the 
expected outcomes of educational and cultural relations. The British Council was established,
in the words of one official, to “enable Britain to make direct contact with overseas peoples, 
and to present herself to them as a future trading and cultural partner of major importance, 
rather than in the role of a leading world power.” (Mitchell, 1986, p. 19). This perceived link 
between economic interests and public diplomacy is not unique to the Clinton administration.
President Clinton had a close friendship with Senator Fulbright, going back to
Clinton’s undergraduate years in the late 1960s. Former special assistant to Senator Fulbright 
Hoyt Purvis tells the story of how Clinton came to work in Senator Fulbright’s Washington 
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office. “He needed a job while he was going to school in Georgetown, and some prominent 
people in Arkansas had contacted Lee [Fulbright’s Chief of Staff Lee Williams] on behalf of 
Clinton, to say, you know, this is a fine young man and he needs a job, and so Lee Williams 
talked to Clinton and he said there were two part-time jobs that were open...and Clinton said 
‘Well, that’s great, can I take both of them?’ And that’s what he wound up doing; he took 
both of the part-time jobs.” (Appendix A, p. 271). Fulbright acted as a mentor to his fellow 
Arkansan, and supported Clinton’s application for a Rhodes Scholarship to Oxford (Woods, 
1995).
President Clinton appointed Purvis, Williams and Senator Fulbright’s wife Harriet 
Mayor Fulbright to the J. William Fulbright Foreign Scholarship Board. In 1993, Clinton also 
awarded Senator Fulbright with the Presidential Medal of Freedom, the highest civilian 
award in the United States. On 9 February, 1995, Senator Fulbright passed away at the age of 
89. The man and the programme are forever linked, not only in name but in ideology and 
reputation. As a piece in The New York Times once observed, “it is difficult to name any 
other Federal program which is so much the creation of a single man.” (Oberdorfer, 1965, p. 
80). Senator Fulbright is remembered for the exchange programme above any of his other 
actions, such as his opposition to the Vietnam War, or his signing of the Southern Manifesto 
supporting segregation.
Fulbright’s final book, The Price of Empire, covers a wide range of topics, from the 
U.S. Constitution to his Vietnam War views to the military-industrial complex, but it closes 
with a discussion of the exchange programme. Even after all of the other noteworthy 
achievements and events in the Senator’s life have been considered, the Fulbright Program 
remained the most salient subject in his manuscript. The final chapter contains an eloquent 
summary of his belief in the power of educational exchange. “The essence of intercultural 
education is the acquisition of empathy—the ability to see the world as others see it, and to 
allow for the possibility that others may see something that we have failed to see, or may see 
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it more accurately.” (Fulbright, 1989, p. 217). The Senator’s understanding of the purpose of 
international educational exchange has always, to varying degrees, informed the views of 
those responsible for the administration of his programme.
After 9/11: The Fulbright Program in the Arab and Muslim World
The cover of the 2001 Annual Report of the Fulbright Foreign Scholarship Board 
featured a memorial to the international victims of the September 11th World Trade Center 
attacks. The list of countries and their flags extends beyond the edges of the photograph, 
emphasising its length and making the list of victims appear endless. There were dozens of 
flags on the list, demonstrating the global nature of the event. The World Trade Center and 
the Pentagon may have been American targets, but the victims included nationals of eighty-
eight nations (FSB, 2001).
The report began, as previous reports had, with a letter from the Board’s Chair Alan 
Schechter, but the scope and content of the report was a departure from its traditional format. 
Rather than selecting highlights of Fulbright Program activities around the world, the report 
centred on America’s relationship with the Muslim world, and the role of the Fulbright 
Program in these areas. “We have chosen to focus the Annual Report for 2001 on the 
Fulbright Program in the Muslim world,” Schechter writes, “and the response by the 
Fulbright community—current and former grantees, professional staff members in Fulbright 
Commissions around the globe, government officials, staff of non-profit organizations, and 
volunteers—to the challenge of terrorism.” (ibid.) It is worth noting that the phrase ‘challenge 
of terrorism’ refers to a very particular form of terrorism. The report is not concerned with 
Basque separatist group Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) or the Irish Republican Army (IRA), 
for example, but deals specifically with Islamic fundamentalist terrorism. The report aimed to 
demonstrate how the Fulbright Program contributed to the improvement of relations between 
the U.S. and the Muslim world.
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The events of September 11, 2001 had undeniable political, economic and cultural 
impacts, and also had particular relevance for American public diplomacy. After the end of 
the Cold War, the United States had largely stopped worrying about its image abroad. As the 
U.S. had become the sole remaining superpower, most American officials didn’t see the need 
to court public opinion overseas. The attacks on 9/11 revealed America’s vulnerability; the 
superpower was not omnipotent. It also showed that foreign public opinion can have real, 
tangible effects: for good or evil, for tourism or terrorism. In the immediate aftermath of the 
attacks, many Americans didn’t understand what had happened, who had carried out the 
attacks and why. The question on headlines and on people’s lips was ‘why do they hate us?’ 
Of course, some observers, particularly those outside of the U.S., knew a number of reasons 
why America might be hated, from capitalist greed and globalisation to military aggression 
and charges of imperialism. The American people themselves, however, were not so aware of 
how the world saw them. As Philip M. Taylor pointed out, “That this question should have 
even been asked suggests a serious failure in U.S. Public Affairs over the previous 10 years.” 
(Taylor, 2006, p. 11). Most Americans simply didn’t know enough about their government’s 
actions abroad, nor how their country was perceived by others around the world.
In the wake of horrific events, there is a tendency to dehumanise the perpetrators. The 
U.S. media portrayed the 9/11 hijackers as simply a ruthless, evil ‘other.’ It is important to 
remember, however, that these were Western-educated, elite young men. They were the 
target audience of American public diplomacy efforts. They were poised to become future 
opinion leaders in their societies. In this sense, the 9/11 attacks represent a failure of 
American public diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim world (ibid.). In an effort to address this 
lapse, the Bush administration launched a number of public diplomacy initiatives in response 
to the attacks. But what was the extent of engagement between the U.S. and the Arab and 
Muslim world prior to 9/11? In the case of the Fulbright Program, American engagement 
with these areas has a mixed record. Exchanges in these countries have faced many 
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challenges, including a shortage of funding and programme suspensions, due to political 
instability and warfare. The programme in Afghanistan was suspended from 1979 to 2003, 
for example, and the programme in Iraq was suspended from 1989 to 2003 (FSB, 2004).
The reports of Board of Foreign Scholarships members on visits to the Near East and 
South Asia reveal a number of challenges that administrators faced in these countries. Some 
programme principles, such as merit-based competitive selection and performance-based 
renewals, were not universally accepted. In 1965, Fulbright administrators faced this problem 
with the United Arab Republic (UAR, a union between modern-day Egypt and Syria). The 
UAR government asked for control over grantee selection and sought the guaranteed renewal 
of grants. The U.S. State Department was unwilling to concede to either of these demands. In 
his report of a visit to the country, Board member John Hope Franklin writes, “A quite 
disturbing variation of this desire for regular budgeting of grantees was the virtual demand by 
the UAR that students going to the United States under the Fulbright Program should be 
selected by the government in the light of the needs of the government. Then the binational 
commission should guarantee the renewals for four years, or until the work for the doctorate 
has been completed. This is so completely out of line with established principles and 
practices that it is already receiving the attention of the Department of State.” (Franklin, 
1965, p. 2). Franklin goes on to suggest that this request may have been inspired by another 
offer that the UAR had received for exchanges. “The Soviet Union has offered the UAR 
government 250 four-year, all-expenses scholarships for graduate study.” (ibid.). In light of 
this offer, we can better understand the dynamics of the situation. The UAR government 
simply sought similar exchange conditions from each of the two competing superpowers.
In Iran, the Fulbright Program had suffered from inadequate funding long before the 
breakdown of the country’s relations with the United States. Exchanges were suspended 
between 1953 and 1957 due to a lack of funds. It also encountered problems in terms of its 
94
coordination with other American educational and cultural activities. John Hope Franklin 
writes of the difficulties caused by overlap and miscommunication between the Fulbright 
Program and the Peace Corps, citing Iran as a particularly challenging case. 
“Even more difficult to coordinate is the educational program undertaken by the 
Peace Corps. Here the lack of coordination has led to a serious weakening of the 
Fulbright Program in some places. The example of Iran is outstanding. In 1964 a 
Fulbright teacher recruited for the University of Isfahan had to be transferred to 
Tehran because Peace Corps volunteers arrived in Isfahan and the University took 
them instead of the Fulbright teacher...A Fulbright English seminar was cancelled by 
the [Iranian] Ministry of Education because the Peace Corps announced it would be 
setting up similar programs in most provincial centers. After Fulbright cancelled its 
plans it became clear that the Peace Corps could not deliver on its promises, by which 
time it was almost too late for the Fulbright Program to be reactivated. When after a 
loss of several months the ministry authorized the Fulbright program to reconstitute 
its seminar it did so. But it was already too late to recruit Fulbright teachers for next 
year’s seminar.” (ibid., p. 8).
Franklin goes on to suggest that the difficulties originate in Washington, where better 
coordination could prevent such problems in the field. Not only do administrative errors 
waste time and resources, but they can also frustrate host country officials and institutions, 
undermining the public diplomacy mission. If working with the U.S. Peace Corps or the 
Fulbright Program becomes difficult, institutions will be less willing to participate in these 
programmes in the future. 
In Afghanistan, the Fulbright Program has served in a development capacity, assisting 
with the building of a higher education infrastructure during the 1960s. Progress was slow, 
however, as financial and staffing resources were limited. According to a report from Board 
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of Foreign Scholarships member James Roach, the Fulbright Foundation was willing to 
invest additional funds in the Afghan programme, but sought first a stronger demonstration of 
commitment by the Afghan university to replace Fulbright lecturers. “The university is 
receiving support and assistance from various foreign and international sources and the 
Foundation could usefully commit some of its efforts here in several fields—journalism, 
nutrition, physical education, geography, social science—provided that the university will 
commit itself to training counterparts to replace the American lecturer after two or three 
years. In the case of journalism this has not been done, although Fulbright lecturers in 
journalism have been teaching at Kabul for several years.” (Roach, 1966, p. 6).
These three examples show the types of challenges that Fulbright Program 
administrators encountered in the Near East, North Africa and South Asia. Such challenges, 
combined with inadequate funding and recurring programme suspensions, may have 
damaged the Fulbright Program’s ability to operate effectively in these countries.
In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, American policymakers prioritised the task of 
promoting mutual understanding between the U.S. and the Arab and Muslim world. 
Educational exchange was seen as an important medium through which the parties could
understand one another. By experiencing life in the United States first-hand, it was hoped that 
they might overcome their Hollywood-crafted images of American immorality and 
materialism. The rhetoric mirrored earlier Cold War era terminology. While false images of 
the U.S. were promoted by Soviet propaganda during the Cold War, in the current conflict the 
U.S. government was fighting against global media’s stylised images of American life, many 
of which originated in America itself. “Only by living in the United States, as foreign 
Fulbrighters do, can they grasp the extent to which media-driven stereotypes falsify the 
underlying reality of life in America.” (FSB, 2001, p. 12). 
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The Bush administration renewed America’s public diplomacy activities as part of its 
‘Global War on Terror.’ Under Secretary of State for Public Affairs and Public Diplomacy 
Charlotte Beers, a former advertising executive, is most remembered for the “Shared Values” 
campaign. It featured the testimonies of Muslim Americans and was intended to show that 
the U.S. was not anti-Islam (Zaharna, 2010, p. 33). The advertising campaign did little to 
improve America’s image in these regions. In many cases, they merely served to reinforce 
ideas about American materialism, because they showed the high standard of living that 
Muslims in America enjoyed. It was clear that the advertising-style methods would not work 
in this context. 
A new strategy of genuine, two-way engagement with the Muslim and Arab world 
was undertaken by Charlotte Beers’ successor, Karen Hughes. One of Hughes’ first actions 
was to visit the Middle East to assess “what is wrong with the U.S. image in this part of the 
world and why U.S. messages are at times misunderstood.” (ibid., p. 65). Her initiatives 
emphasised relationship-building and facilitated dialogue between Muslim Americans and 
Muslim communities abroad. How did the Fulbright Program contribute to this new effort?
First and foremost, the Fulbright Program responded to the 9/11 attacks by increasing 
its exchanges with the Near East and South Asia. The number of grants for students from the 
Near East to come to the U.S. was doubled. While in the academic year 2000-01, there were 
78 foreign student grantees from the region, by 2004-05 this figure had climbed to 158 
grantees (FSB, 2000; FSB, 2004). The total number of U.S. grantees to South Asia also rose 
significantly during this period, from 72 to 123 (ibid.). The mutuality element of educational 
exchange was particularly important in this new conflict. Americans had a great deal to learn 
about the Arab and Muslim worlds—not least the fact that they are not synonymous terms. 
Polling showed that the average American knew little of the geography of the Middle East 
and South Asia, much less the religions, cultures and languages of the regions. The Fulbright 
97
Program was regarded as a means of introducing Americans to all of these topics, either 
through first-hand experience or by meeting foreign visitors.
The Fulbright Program was framed as a means of genuine engagement, the two-way 
conversation side of public diplomacy efforts in Arab and Muslim parts of the world. The 
failures of Charlotte Beers’ media-based public diplomacy efforts serve to emphasise the 
importance of pursuing alternative methods, such as the relationship-building, two-way 
engagement methods of educational and cultural exchange. By 2005, the Bush administration 
had recognised the value of mutuality, of listening as well as speaking to these parts of the 
world. Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice described America’s public diplomacy as a 
conversation with the world in her announcement of Karen Hughes’ nomination as Under 
Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy. “An important part of telling America’s story is 
learning the stories of others. Our interaction with the rest of the world must not be a 
monologue. It must be a conversation. And as we engage in this conversation, America must 
remain open to visitors and workers and students from around the world. While we must 
never compromise our security, we must never close ourselves to the rest of the world..” 
(FSB, 2005, p. 1).
When the Fulbright Program in Iraq celebrated its 60th anniversary in 2012, Assistant 
Secretary of State Ann Stock described it as “one of our biggest successes,” despite its many 
years of suspension (Monsen, 2012). The programme resumed exchanges in 2003 and soon 
became the largest programme in the Middle East. Rawand Abdulkadir Darwesh, an Iraqi 
Kurd studying at Indiana University, was among the first to participate. “We are meeting 
many, many people and I’m telling them what Iraq looks like, not how Iraq was conveyed to 
them by media sources. This bridge of understanding is very important, so that’s why I would 
like very much to thank the government of the United States and the State Department for 
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allowing us to come.” (Wright, 2004, p. 25). Being able to tell Americans he encountered 
about his home country was particularly important during this time of conflict.
Figure 3.3 shows the increase of exchanges with the Near East and South Asia 
between 2004 and 2009. I have displayed the grant data for the Near East and South Asia 
regions against the grant figures for Africa during the same period, which acts as a control. 
These figures are relatively stable over the period, demonstrating that the increase in grant 
numbers for the Near East and South Asia was specific to these regions, and did not reflect a 
general increase for Fulbright grants worldwide.
Figure 3.3 Fulbright Grants in Africa and the Near East and South Asia, 2004-2009
(Source: FSB, 2004-2009)
The events of 9/11 also sparked two new initiatives for the Fulbright Program: the 
Fulbright Critical Language Enhancement Award and the Fulbright Interfaith Community 
Action Program. These programmes addressed two areas, highlighted by the 9/11 attacks, in 
which the American people were ill-equipped: foreign languages and religious studies. Few 
Americans outside of the faith understood Islam, and even fewer were fluent in non-European 
languages. Introduced in January 2006, the critical language award was “designed to increase 
the number of Americans who can speak Arabic, Mandarin, Russian, Hindi, Farsi and 
Turkish, among other languages.” (Strout, 2006). The second programme brought scholars 
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University’s Boniuk Center for the Study and Advancement of Religious Tolerance (Hermes, 
2007). While it was ostensibly open to scholars of all faiths, the participants featured in the 
Chronicle of Higher Education suggest an emphasis on Muslim-Christian and Jewish-
Christian dialogue (ibid.). 
Conclusion
The history of the Fulbright Program reveals a number of interesting lessons about the 
role of educational exchange in American public diplomacy. One of the most prominent 
themes that appears throughout its history is the significance of funding for the programme’s 
success. As is the case with most organisations, money is a vital fuel for the activities of the 
Fulbright Program. The contact scenario described in the analytical framework requires an 
initial expense of travel costs to facilitate contact. In addition to the grants, there are also a 
host of administrative expenses, dependent travel costs, and other financial considerations. 
Quite simply, the Fulbright Program expands when it has funding and contracts when it does 
not. Budget cuts have been the greatest threat to the programme throughout its history. 
Secondly, we can see from the programme’s history the importance of bureaucratic 
shifts. Over the course of the past six decades, the Fulbright Program has been moved 
between the foreign affairs apparatus, the U.S. State Department and the propaganda agency, 
the U.S. Information Agency, and back again. When each of these moves has taken place, 
there has been a great deal of concern over the impact of the reorganisation. If the exchange 
programme is too closely linked to foreign policy, will it be misused for short-term American 
foreign policy goals? If the exchange programme operated by the propagandists, will it lose 
its credibility abroad? There have also been concerns about the impact of these bureaucratic 
shifts on funding levels, executive branch support and prestige. The story of these 
bureaucratic changes can tell us a great deal about the way that exchange diplomacy has been 
perceived and practiced throughout the history of the Fulbright Program. 
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Finally, another important emerging theme is the centrality of the grantee experience 
to programme impacts. The success or failure of the Fulbright Program is inextricably linked 
to the experiences of the individual Fulbright grantee. It is the responsibility of the grantee to 
participate in culture learning activities and represent his or her country well. The grantee 
experience ultimately determines the nature of the impact of the Fulbright Program. This 
raises a number of questions about the grantee’s role. Are Fulbrighters meant to act as 
ambassadors? If so, are they free to express dissenting views and criticise their government? 
If they are not ambassadors, what is the nature of their role? How does the Fulbright 
experience differ from any other exchange experience? These questions, and those of each of 
these emerging themes, are explored in the following chapters.
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Chapter 4
Funding the Fulbright Program
Introduction
Examining the budget of an organisation can reveal a great deal about its nature and 
purpose. Funding sources can tell us about an organisation’s support and accountability, 
while expenditures can reveal the purpose and mission of an organisation. In the case of 
exchange diplomacy, an initial investment of travel costs is required to facilitate the contact 
scenario. The subsequent multiplier effect and impact on public opinion and foreign policy in 
the target nation require no further financial commitment on the part of the sending 
organisation. The multiplier effect and subsequent public opinion effects are by-products of 
the initial intergroup contact that takes place in an exchange-of-persons programme. It is 
perhaps this feature of exchange diplomacy that has led advocates to praise its cost-
effectiveness, particularly when compared with other U.S. government activities. 
Fulbright Program advocates often contrast the exchange budget with America’s 
defence budget in order to emphasise the low cost of exchange activities. During the Vietnam 
War, for example, former Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs 
Charles Frankel compared the cost of the war to recent budget cuts. “The reason given for the 
cuts was the cost of the war in Vietnam. The annual ‘savings’ effected are about equivalent to 
the cost of four hours of that war.” (Frankel, 1969, p. 34). The comparison between 
educational exchange budgets and defence spending remains part of the funding advocacy 
rhetoric today. In a 1996 commencement address, Fulbright Foreign Scholarship Board 
member Harriet Mayor Fulbright called the programme “...one of the most economical efforts 
ever undertaken by the U.S. Government. In fact, 50 years of the Fulbright Program has cost 
the taxpayer less than three days of the Defense Department at today’s spending level.” (FSB, 
1996, p. 20). This comparison makes a compelling argument, but as will be discussed in 
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further detail in this chapter, it is an oversimplification of the U.S. budget. It fails to recognise 
that exchanges and defence do not exist in a zero-sum relationship to each other. 
Despite the relatively low cost of exchanges, Congressional appropriations have not 
always been forthcoming. Public diplomacy activities have been seen as a target for budget 
cuts. The U.S. Office of Management and Budget has often struggled to rate the effectiveness 
of public diplomacy activities, particularly in the case of information programmes, “because 
there is no general strategy to set expectations” (Johnson in Kiehl, 2006, p. 110). As public 
diplomacy activities deal primarily with foreign audiences, they lack a domestic constituency 
to rally to their defence. Exchange diplomacy is unique in this sense, as American exchange 
programme alumni are a domestic constituency for the programmes. They have often lobbied 
Congress in response to proposed budget cuts, along with educators, higher education 
administrators and other stakeholders in international education.
The Fulbright Program’s funding history shows it to be a remarkably resilient and 
adaptable organisation. It has faced a range of financial crises throughout its history, yet it 
has managed to consistently secure enough funding to exchange over 310,000 participants 
over the past six decades (FSB, 2009). What political, economic and structural factors have 
enabled the Fulbright Program to maintain its funding in the face of these challenges? What 
does the funding of the Fulbright Program reveal about the way in which its nature and 
purpose have been conceived throughout the exchange programme’s history?
Funding Structure
Before embarking on an examination of the Fulbright Program’s funding history, it is 
worth noting that the programme’s complex budget structure makes this a difficult 
undertaking. In his study of the programme, Leonard Sussman noted “If the organization of 
the worldwide Fulbright Program is a bureaucratic maze partially so designed to prevent the 
politicization and loss of academic integrity, the financing of the program is even more 
difficult to examine in all its parts.” (Sussman, 1992, p. 107). The programme’s funding and 
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budget structure is largely undocumented, particularly with regards to the Board’s annual 
reports of recent years. Round figures are presented in pie charts with simplified designations 
between public and private, foreign and domestic. International educational exchanges appear 
as a single item line in the U.S. State Department’s annual budgets, with no distinction made 
between Fulbright and other exchange programmes. Outgoings are similarly obscured, with 
no collated figures on grant amounts for the various destinations and award categories. 
Drawing upon a variety of sources, including annual reports, memoranda, federal budgets and 
programme evaluations, we can outline the main features of the Fulbright Program’s budget 
structure.
Firstly, congressional appropriations to the U.S. State Department constitute the 
largest source of Fulbright Program funding. For the academic year 2011-12, $237.7 million 
(61.3%) of its budget came from the State Department (FSB, 2011, p. 60). The Fulbright 
Program is the largest U.S. Government-sponsored educational exchange programme; it 
received 69.5% of the total budget for all State Department academic programmes in the 
fiscal year 2011 (U.S. GPO, 2013). Congressional support has varied throughout the history 
of the Fulbright Program, from a complete absence of appropriation funding at the 
programme’s origins to its peak of $238.4 million in 2010 (FSB, 2010).
Foreign government contributions, the second largest source of funding for the 
Fulbright Program, can vary a great deal between the participating nations. Some countries 
match or surpass U.S. funds, while others do not contribute public funds to the programme. 
In considering the list of foreign government contributions, no clear pattern emerges. 
Developed nations tend to be the largest donors in terms of raw numbers, yet some 
developing nations are proven to be more generous when the smaller relative size of their 
exchange programme is taken into account. In the 2011-12 academic year, the top five 
foreign government contributors were Chile, Spain, Brazil, Germany and South Korea (FSB, 
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2011, p. 53). Foreign government contributions currently represent just over one-fifth 
(21.7%) of the total Fulbright Program budget (ibid., p. 60).
The third largest contribution to the Fulbright Program’s annual budget comes from 
private domestic organisations, such as universities, research councils, private individuals and 
civic groups. Local organisations in American communities were especially important during 
the early days of the Fulbright Program. Not only was their financial support vital for 
international students who held travel-only grants, but it was also a gesture of hospitality and 
international goodwill. Senator Fulbright felt that local assistance from civic groups, churches 
and fraternal organisations contributed to the goals of the exchange programme. Hospitality, 
he argued, was part of generating mutual understanding between hosts and visitors in the host 
academic institution. “The success of the exchange program depends heavily on the 
participation of private groups and individuals, since local patrons are in the best position to 
facilitate the acceptance of foreign students in the American academic community.” 
(Fulbright, 1961a, p. 22). The contribution of domestic private sources has fallen slightly in 
recent years, and this decrease coincides with the 2007 economic downturn (Figure 4.1). 
While private sources are seen as an important contribution, Alice Stone Ilchman and other 
public diplomacy advocates argue that the U.S. government must first set an example for 
other domestic and foreign funding sources to follow (Ilchman in Kiehl, 2006).
Figure 4.1 Funding Sources, 2004-2011 (in $ million)
(Sources: FSB, 2004-2011)
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The fourth category, foreign private sources, includes overseas institutions of higher 
education, civic organisations and private individual donors. They make up a small 
percentage, consistently less than one-fifth, of the total Fulbright Program budget (Figure 
4.1). As with foreign government contributions, the amount of funding varies between 
different participating countries. In the 2011-12 academic year, the top five contributors of 
private funds were the United Kingdom, Finland, France, Colombia and Australia (FSB, 
2011, p. 53). Sponsorship of Fulbright grants is a common practice, either by private 
companies, non-profit organisations or universities. The US-UK Fulbright Commission, for 
example, has fifty-eight private partners which sponsor one or more exchange grant. These 
partners are not exclusively academic in nature; they include medical research charities, 
publishers and international financial services companies (US-UK Fulbright Commission, 
2014). Sponsoring a Fulbright grant can also benefit a company’s reputation, as international 
education is seen as a philanthropic activity. In Japan, for example, corporate sponsors are 
given hyphenated awards, such as Toyota-Fulbright, when they donate above a certain level 
(Shono, 2006). 
As a final note on foreign and domestic private sector contributors, in recent years 
corporate sponsorship has become an increasingly common practice. The MTV-U-Fulbright 
award is the most prominent example. Created in 2007, the grant is designated for projects in 
international contemporary or popular music, and is sponsored by the university 
programming arm of the music television network, MTV. Some corporate funding
arrangements are reciprocated by companies in the binational partner nation. Airline travel 
for American Fulbright grantees to Japan is sponsored by Japanese airline All Nippon 
Airways, while the U.S.-based United Airlines sponsors their Japanese counterparts (Japan-
US Educational Commission, 2014). There are also other private contributions that aim to
enhance the grantee experience. For example, the Royal Oak Foundation provides one-year
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memberships for all American Fulbrighters in the UK, which grants them free admission to 
National Trust tourism sites (US-UK Fulbright Commission, 2014). 
Given the wide range of sources that contribute to the Fulbright Program’s budget, it 
is clear that there are many stakeholders with an interest in its continued success. This 
complexity is both a strength and a weakness of the programme’s budget structure. On the 
positive side, diverse funding sources can help to fill the gap when one source diminishes. On 
the negative side, this arrangement may give contributors a false sense of security, leading 
them to reduce their contributions with an expectation that other sources will compensate. 
The diversity of funding sources also makes long-range programme planning more complex, 
as exchange administrators must consult a range of stakeholders in order to estimate future 
funding levels. 
Surplus War Property and the Private Sector
When Senator Fulbright proposed his exchange programme, he knew that it would 
have to be funded by some means other than a Congressional appropriation. While his 
amendment seems now to have been a creative use of surplus war property, at the time it was 
the only way he was able to justify his proposed scheme to his colleagues in the U.S. 
Congress. “They wouldn’t even give them money to educate them here in those days, much 
less abroad...I said, ‘These bills are all owing to us what you can’t collect.’  I don’t think I 
could have got it enacted any other way.” (quoted in Dudden and Dynes, 1987, p. 1). Using 
surplus war property funds meant that the programme was essentially cost-free, requiring no 
congressional appropriation initially. In his summary of the programme’s origins, Philip 
Coombs called Senator Fulbright’s act a “financially painless measure; it asked no new 
dollars and simply proposed using in a good cause some of the foreign currencies piling up in 
war-torn countries.” (Coombs, 1964, p. 30). Making use of these funds provided an answer to 
the question of surplus property abroad, and allowed Fulbright to proceed with a scheme that 
Congress would have rejected, had it requested new appropriations at the time.
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When the Fulbright Program began, it was funded exclusively by the proceeds 
resulting from the sale of surplus war property. In some countries, surplus war property funds 
were available but political concerns prevented the establishment of an exchange agreement. 
The Board’s first annual report cites the Indonesian National Revolution as a factor in its 
failure to pursue exchanges with that country. “Though proceeds from the sales of surplus 
property may be made available for an educational program in Indonesia, the politico-
military situation in the country makes it inadvisable to initiate negotiations at the present 
time.” (BFS, 1948, p. 3). In other countries, particularly in Latin America, a lack of surplus 
war property prevented exchange participation. In order for these countries to be able to 
participate in the Fulbright Program, new funding sources were needed. 
The funding structure also limited the mutuality of the programme. These surplus war 
property funds were in non-convertible foreign currencies. In practical terms, this meant that 
American exchange participants would receive grants for their tuition and living expenses 
while abroad, but their grants would not cover travel costs. Foreign grantees, on the other 
hand, would receive grants only for their travel expenses. Without an appropriation from 
Congress, foreign grantees in the U.S. could not be supported to the same degree as their 
American counterparts abroad. This made the exchange programme decidedly unequal.
Private American organisations played a vital role in making the Fulbright Program 
more equal for foreign participants by supporting them in the U.S. For example, fraternities 
and sororities at some campuses offered accommodation to foreign Fulbright students. In a 
1951 article promoting the exchange programme, Senator Fulbright quotes a local Arkansas 
newspaper to offer an example of the Greek system’s hospitality, as well as that of other local 
community organisations. “Jerome M. LeMasson of Neuilly-sur-Seine and Germaine Laisne 
of Bruney will receive assistance this coming year from the civic clubs of Siloam Springs, 
Arkansas—Lions, Rotary and Kiwanis. The two French students have Fulbright travel grants 
and will live with fraternities during the academic year. Mr. LeMasson will live at the Sigma 
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Chi house during the fall semester and the Kappa Sigma house in the spring. Miss Laisne will 
be a guest at the Chi Omega house all year.” (Fulbright, 1951, p. 26). Senator Fulbright 
selected this example to illustrate the idea that even a small, rural community like Siloam 
Springs could help the cause of international goodwill. By assisting these students and 
welcoming them into the community, ordinary citizens had an opportunity to give foreign 
visitors a positive impression of America and the American people.
During the early days of the Fulbright Program, private sector assistance was 
essential. Had it not been for the timely cooperation of the Carnegie Corporation and the 
Rockefeller Foundation, the initial progress of the Board of Foreign Scholarships would have 
been significantly delayed. Had it not been for the hospitality of community organisations, 
foreign Fulbright grantees may not have been able to take up their travel-only grants in the 
United States. Private foundations helped establish the fledgling Fulbright Program, and civic 
organisations increased its reciprocity. 
Some exchange advocates have warned against an overreliance on the private sector. 
“Private funds are unlikely to step in where public funds have served so well. They will 
partner; they will add; they will not replace.” (Ilchman in Kiehl, 2006, p. 55). Michael 
Cardozo, likewise, notes that the scale of the Fulbright Program demands strong U.S. 
Government support. “Private foundations, such as Ford, Guggenheim and Rockefeller, make 
magnificent contributions but cannot be expected to provide two-way exchanges on the 
global scale that is required.” (Cardozo, 1959, p. E10). Although private funding still plays an 
important role in the Fulbright Program, congressional appropriations constitute the largest 
proportion of its annual budget (FSB, 2009).
Alternative Funding Sources
The funds resulting from the sale of surplus war property were quickly exhausted in 
the early years of the Fulbright Program. Private sector assistance and foundations, though 
initially vital in terms of establishing the programme, were not a long-term solution to the 
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question of funding. Congressional appropriations were necessary if the exchange 
programme were to become a permanent feature of U.S. international educational and 
cultural affairs. The challenge for Senator Fulbright and other supporters, however, was how 
to make the case for appropriations to Congress. 
During the early years of the programme, advocates often used the Cold War as a 
justification for funding the exchange programme, linking it with other American public 
diplomacy activities such as international broadcasting and overseas libraries. By tying its 
purpose to the ideological battles of the Cold War, public diplomacy supporters were able to 
make the case for Congressional appropriations. “For years USIA and even CU [Bureau of 
Educational and Cultural Affairs] had adopted rhetoric for budgetary purposes by which both 
claimed to be major weapons in the Cold War; even Senator Fulbright would use this 
alternate pleading when he thought it would ‘get us the money.’” (Arndt, 2005, p. 102). 
Although Senator Fulbright would often deny that exchanges could or should be used as Cold 
War weapons, when it came to financing the exchange programme, he was willing to use any 
justification necessary (Fulbright, 1951). Exchange administrators had to be creative in their 
search for funding sources.
One of the most important sources of foreign currencies for the exchange programme 
was created by the 1954 Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act (Public Law 
83-480). During the 1930s, President Roosevelt’s New Deal introduced interventionist 
agricultural policies to support American farmers. These policies remained in place during 
the Second World War, when the industry was regarded as part of the war effort. By the 
1950’s, however, the U.S. had amassed a large surplus of agricultural commodities. Domestic 
disposal was prohibited by price-support measures, still in place from the Great Depression, 
so the U.S. looked to foreign markets as a means of resolving the agricultural surplus 
problem. The 1954 Act expanded U.S. export of its surplus commodities from $449 million 
in 1952 to $1.9 billion by 1957 (Wallerstein, 1980, p. 6). Amongst other measures, the bill 
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allowed proceeds from the sale of these commodities, held by the U.S. in foreign currencies,
to be used for the Fulbright Program. The so-called “P.L. 480” funds were used in the same 
way that local currencies from surplus war property sales had been used to pay for the 
Fulbright Program. The 1954 act not only created a much needed additional form of funding, 
but it also allowed the exchange programme to expand to countries that had not held war 
surplus in the aftermath of the Second World War. Latin America was now opened up to the 
Fulbright Program and exchanges were soon initiated with Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Paraguay. 
Despite the increase of food exports under the 1954 act, agricultural over-production 
continued to be a problem. In 1961, the U.S. experienced its largest ever wheat and feed grain 
surplus, 115.2 metric tons (ibid., p. 7). President Kennedy saw that agricultural surplus 
exports could be used in conjunction with his other new foreign aid activities, such as the 
Peace Corps, and rebranded the law as the “Food for Peace” programme. Kennedy and 
Johnson changed the agricultural surplus exports from being simply a disposal mechanism to 
“a mix of policy objectives that also included humanitarianism, development, and foreign
policy.” (ibid., p. 8). The Fulbright Program continued to benefit from these funds in many 
regions throughout the world. “By 1962, 32 out of 43 country programs were being financed 
with foreign currencies accruing from the sale of agricultural surpluses.” (Johnson and 
Colligan, 1965, p. 95). 
Another important example of alternative funding can be found in the story of 
educational and cultural exchange between the U.S. and Finland. It is a fascinating example 
of the administration’s creativity in seeking out alternative sources of funding and of adapting 
programmes to local political considerations. The exchange programme began with a special 
arrangement that earmarked Finland’s First World War loan repayments for educational 
exchanges and equipment. When the loans were due to be paid in full, the Finnish 
government established a fund that would continue to support exchanges in perpetuity. It is a 
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story that reveals a great deal about the ingenuity of administrators and the Cold War context 
of the Fulbright Program’s early years.
In the aftermath of the First World War, most European countries were in debt to the 
United States for war expenses, food assistance and reconstruction costs. For its part, Finland 
had borrowed $8.3 million in 1919 (Mäkinen, 2001). As head of the American Relief 
Administration, Hoover wrote to President Wilson about the plight of the Finnish people. “If 
ever there was a case for helping people who are making a spirited fight to get on a basis of 
liberal democracy and are asking no charity from the world whatsoever, this is the case.”(U.S. 
Department of State, 1956, p. 8).
During the Great Depression, many countries were unable or unwilling to make 
payments on their war debts to the United States. In 1934, Finland became the only country 
to continue paying its debts. Even during a temporary suspension of relations during the 
Second World War, Finland tried to make its payments to the United States. Finland’s 
tenacity was a conscious decision that was intended to garner favour with the Americans. As 
a relatively young country, having only gained its independence from Russia in 1917, Finland 
sought friendship and trade with the United States.
Repaying their war debts raised Finland’s profile, as newspapers across the U.S. 
praised the small country’s dedication. A piece in the December 7, 1935 issue of The 
Indianapolis Times expressed the gratitude of the American people with Christmas wishes in 
the Finnish language. “Hauskaa Joulua! On December 15th Finland will pay her semi-annual 
war-debt installment of about a quarter of a million dollars--It’s sure nice to think one nation 
will drop a remembrance in the lean old sock this year. In our best Finnish we wish her a 
Merry Christmas! Hauskaa Joulua!” (cited in Salo, 2004). Another article in the New York 
Times announced that the Finnish government was granted permission to operate a tourism 
office in New York, the first time that a foreign government had been permitted to do so. 
“The exceptional measure is regarded as justified because of Finland’s present popularity in 
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the United States as a result of debt payments.” (Finland Seeks Tourists, 1935, p. 37). Some 
3,000 similarly positive newspaper articles appeared in the U.S. during the Great Depression, 
portraying Finland as a reliable debtor and a friend to the United States.
U.S. interest in Finland was also due in part to the country’s strategic position, 
adjacent to the Soviet Union. Although a friendship agreement had been signed between 
Finland and the Soviet Union in 1947, the relationship between the two countries was clearly 
unequal and Finland remained vulnerable. Fears of Soviet aggression towards its neighbour 
led the U.S. Congress to introduce a number of trade and assistance agreements with Finland 
following the Second World War. One such agreement was the idea that loan payments could 
be used to benefit Finland through educational investment and exchange programmes. The 
notion that Finland’s debt payments could be used in this way can be seen as early as 1936. A 
letter to the editor of the New York Times, signed simply “Educator”, proposed the creation of 
a scholarship fund. “If our people and Congress feel that some concession to Finland is 
appropriate and desirable, let Congress designate two or three of the instalments paid by 
Finland as an American-Finnish education fund for the financing, in this country, of the 
studies of properly equipped and selected Finnish students.” (Scholarships for Finns, 1936, p. 
14). 
When the Fulbright Program was created in 1946, Finland was among the first 
countries approached for participation. The Finnish government was reluctant, however, 
fearing that joining the U.S.-sponsored exchange programme might damage Finland’s 
precarious relationship with the Soviet Union (Mäkinen, 2001). The U.S. government, in a 
rather unique move, proposed an alternative exchange programme with Finland, funded by an 
alternative source. By using Finland’s First World War loan repayments, the scheme would 
attain the same goals as the Fulbright Program but allow the U.S. to maintain a lower profile 
(ibid.). 
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The 1949 Finnish Educational Exchange Act earmarked future loan repayments for 
educational purposes. “[A]ny future repayments by the Republic of Finland on the principal 
or interest of its debt of the First World War to the United States shall be used to provide 
educational and technical instruction and training in the U.S. for citizens of Finland and 
American books and technical equipment for the institutions of higher education in Finland, 
and to provide opportunities for American citizens to carry out academic and scientific 
enterprises in Finland.” (Public Law 81-265). The bill cites Finland’s repayment as the 
motivation behind this exceptional piece of legislation. It also refers, indirectly, to Finland’s 
ability to remain independent from its neighbouring Soviet Union. “This program would be 
undertaken as a mark of respect and friendship for a people with a valiant record for 
maintaining their independence and liberty” (ibid., p. 4). This is a reference to the Winter 
War (1939-40), in which a vastly outnumbered Finnish force defeated Soviet troops during 
the Second World War. Given that the Soviets became U.S. allies, while Finland sided with 
the axis powers in the Second World War, this is a curious example for the U.S. Congress to 
include in the legislation. It should be read, therefore, as a statement about America’s hopes 
for the relationship between Finland and the Soviet Union in the Cold War.
The exchange programme, known as ASLA (an acronym for the Finnish name, 
Amerikan Suomen lanian apurahat, or Grants from Finland’s American Loan), significantly 
influenced the development of Finnish higher education in the post-war era (Mäkinen, 2001). 
When Finland’s relationship with the Soviet Union was more decidedly stable in 1952, 
Finland signed a Fulbright exchange executive agreement and the programme’s name became 
hyphenated to ASLA-Fulbright. Despite the new agreement and the new name, the exchange 
programme continued to use Finnish loan repayments as its funding source. Over $650,000 
worth of books and other educational materials were given to Finland’s libraries during the 
first two decades of the programme (ibid.).
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The use of Finland’s loan payments to fund ASLA-Fulbright exchanges had one 
significant drawback: what would happen to the programme when the loan had been repaid in 
full? According to the loan schedule, Finland’s final payment was expected in 1984. What 
had once seemed a distant date in the future had become, by the mid-seventies, a quickly 
approaching reality. Exchange advocates considered a range of funding options. American-
Scandinavian Foundation President Peter Strong wrote to the U.S. State Department 
repeatedly, proposing the creation of a ‘Finnish Fund.’ Under his proposal, a portion of the 
annual ASLA funding would be set aside each year and placed into a fund administered by 
the American-Scandinavian Foundation. The interest from these funds, as it compounded 
over time, would be sufficient to sustain the exchange programme indefinitely (Strong, 
1974).
In 1975, the Finnish Fund was established by an agreement between the United States 
and Finland (Mattila and Austad, 1975). Although it accomplished the same goal of 
maintaining exchanges between the two nations, it differed from Strong’s proposal in two 
significant ways. Firstly, the fund was to be administered by a newly established board of 
trustees, consisting of two Americans and two Finns, rather than by the American-
Scandinavian Foundation (ibid.). Secondly, rather than setting aside part of the funds each 
year for the trust fund until Finland’s payments ceased in 1984, the Finnish government 
agreed to pay the remaining debt in full in 1976, which the U.S. would then put into the trust 
fund. In terms of day-to-day operations, the new funding arrangement did not change the 
nature of the programme. It was still to be administered by the existing binational
organisation, the United States Educational Foundation in Finland. In 1976, Finland paid its 
outstanding balance of $2.8 million in full and the fund was established to finance the 
exchanges in perpetuity (Copeland et al., 1983, p. 12).
The ASLA-Fulbright Program has been successfully maintained for more than sixty 
years. Nearly five thousand Americans and Finns have participated in the exchange 
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programme, a high figure for the relatively small country. Neighbouring Sweden, for 
example, has only had some three thousand participants but has a larger total population 
(FSB, 2010). Finland’s Fulbright programme is among America’s most successful exchange 
diplomacy efforts.
Cost-Sharing and Binationality
The Fulbright-Hays Act of 1961 made provisions for partnering countries to 
contribute financially to their educational and cultural exchanges with the United States. 
Cost-sharing agreements soon became an important component in ensuring the Fulbright 
Program’s financial sustainability. By 1965, ten countries had committed to financial 
contributions: the Federal Republic of Germany, Austria, Sweden, Norway, Iceland, Taiwan, 
Australia, Denmark, France and the United Kingdom (BFS, 1965). This grew substantially 
over the following years and by 1982, 28 countries were contributing the equivalent of $9.5 
million to their Fulbright Program exchanges (Table 4.1). 
Table 4.1 Cost-Sharing Expansion, 1966-1982
Year Contributions (in 1970 constant U.S. dollars) Cost-sharing countries
1966 $1.6 million 10 
1970 $2.0 million 20
1974 $3.36 million 21
1978 $5.3 million 23
1980 $7.5 million 25
1982 $9.5 million 28
(Source: BFS, 1983)
What does the act of cost-sharing tell us about the Fulbright Program and its overseas 
support? Exchange advocates suggest that cost-sharing indicates a strong sense of faith in the 
programme. There may be a range of assumed benefits linked to participation, but countries 
would not invest, presumably, in a scheme that they did not believe was worthwhile in some 
manner. Cost-sharing is also an indication of the binational nature of the Fulbright Program. 
Shared funding implies shared control, to some extent, over programme planning and policy 
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decision-making. It insulates the programme from accusations of U.S. imperialism by giving 
shared control to partner nations. 
Germany is home to the largest Fulbright Program in the world, in part because of 
cost-sharing. The exchange programme began within the context of the U.S. occupation of 
the Federal Republic of Germany. Educational and cultural exchange were part of the U.S. 
State Department’s ‘re-education’ policy, “...intended to bring about a fundamental change in 
the German character. It was to eradicate militarism, chauvinism and National Socialist 
thinking as well as promote the development of democratic principles.”(Junker, 2004, p. 
410). As part of this re-education and occupation, by 1956 the U.S. had sent more than 
14,000 Americans to the Federal Republic of Germany and brought more than 12,000 
Germans to America (ibid.).
Germany has contributed financially to its Fulbright exchanges since the programme 
was established on 18 July 1952, long before cost-sharing was authorised by the Fulbright-
Hays Act of 1961. The original exchange agreement included provisions for the “assumption 
of financial responsibility through voluntary contributions.” (Kellermann, 1978, p. 168). 
Germany’s economic recovery made these contributions possible, both from the Government 
and the private sector. After cost-sharing was authorised as a general practice by the 
Fulbright-Hays Act, a cost-sharing arrangement with the Federal Republic of Germany was 
agreed on 20 November 1962. The terms of the agreement included equal contributions of 
$800,000 from both the United States and Germany (ibid., p. 201). Over time, Germany 
began to contribute more than the U.S. did to its exchange programme. In the early 1970’s, 
when American appropriations for the Fulbright Program had sharply decreased, the Federal 
Republic of Germany more than doubled its contributions to make up the shortfall (Rogers, 
1972, p. 210). 
In 1983, Chancellor Helmut Kohl praised the Fulbright Program during “Fulbright 
Week”, an annual seminar for alumni held in Berlin. “I would like to express to the Fulbright 
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Commission appreciation for its exemplary work. (The Commission) has made an especially 
important contribution toward strengthening German-American relations.” (BFS, 1983, p. 4, 
parentheses as in original). Since 1954, the Commission has hosted an annual Berlin 
Seminar, bringing American and German alumni and their families to the capital city to share 
their ideas and experiences. The programme in Germany has continued to lead the way in 
alumni relations. Barbara Ischinger, executive director of the German-American Fulbright 
Commission, described the Commission’s efforts to build alumni networks. “We are forming 
partnerships with our colleagues in the other 140 Fulbright programs worldwide; we are 
strengthening our ties with the private sector through the Association of Friends and Sponsors 
of the German-American Fulbright Program...We are seeking to build a network of our 
former grantees, the very people who have helped to make our program such a success.” 
(FSB, 1997, p. 18).
In the case of Japan’s Fulbright Program, cost-sharing involves both public and 
private funds. Under the terms of a 1979 bilateral exchange agreement, the Japanese 
government contributes to the Fulbright Program on an equal basis with the United States. 
Former executive director of the Japanese commission Caroline Matano Yang cited the 
agreement as “the only program in any field between the two governments founded and 
administered on a fifty-fifty basis.” (Yang, 1987). Japanese Fulbright alumni have also been 
particularly active fundraisers. In 1982, the occasion of the programme’s thirtieth anniversary 
in Japan was marked by a large-scale alumni fundraising campaign. By 1986, alumni 
contributions made up 15% of the programme’s budget, and were formally institutionalised 
by the creation of the Japan-United States Educational Exchange Promotion Foundation
(ibid., p. 91).
Yang points out a number of political, economic and cultural factors that encouraged 
alumni to take part in the fundraising campaign, including the concept of ‘ongaeshi’ or 
returning a favour. The concept of returning favours and respecting one’s obligation to do so 
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is an important cultural value in Japan. “The fundraising campaign was the perfect vehicle for 
grateful alumni to reciprocate the gift of the Fulbright grant they had received from the 
United States. ‘Ongaeshi’ became a major slogan of the campaign and was readily grasped by 
the alumni and the public. It may have been the strongest single factor in the success of the 
fundraising campaign.” (ibid., p. 88).
Despite the many positive effects of cost-sharing in countries like Germany and 
Japan, the practice has also had some negative impacts in other parts of the world. When the 
Fulbright Program faces budget cuts to its Congressional appropriations, countries which 
participate in cost-sharing can absorb some of the loss in funding. Countries that are unable to 
contribute in-kind, however, are left underfunded when the U.S. side of funding is 
diminished. The cuts of the late 1960s demonstrate this unequal impact of budget cuts.
“Binational commissions or foundations existed in 47 of these countries in 1968-69, although 
not all were fully active. Those in Ethiopia, Ghana and Tunisia were dormant due to a lack of 
finances.” (BFS, 1969, p. 9).
It is also important to note that there are other elements, in addition to cost-sharing, 
that can contribute to a programme’s binational character. One important consideration is the 
amount of local participation in programme planning and execution. On a tour of the Near 
East, Board of Foreign Scholarships member John Hope Franklin found that participation 
was mostly limited to the executive director. “I was interested to discover that the local 
members seem not to participate to any great extent in shaping the program,” Franklin 
observed in his report to fellow Board members. “In answers to direct questions put by me, I 
discovered that the program proposals were largely the work of the executive director, with 
some assistance, here and there, from U.S. government officials. It seems to me that if all 
members were encouraged to contribute ideas and suggestions to the program, not only 
would its binational character be strengthened, but the program itself would doubtless be 
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strengthened.” (Franklin, 1965, p. 3). Binational participation, including but not limited to 
cost-sharing, is a valuable component of the programme’s administration.
Cost-sharing has become a common feature of Fulbright Program participation. In 
1996, Fulbright administrators observed that “today every participating country contributes 
something in kind, and a number of countries—including Germany, Japan, Norway and 
Spain—contribute more than the U.S. to their country’s Fulbright exchange.” (FSB, 1996, p. 
20). In Table 4.2, the top five cost-sharing countries, in terms of government contributions 
and private contributions, are listed. It is interesting to note that the top five contributors in 
each of the two categories give quite a high percentage of the total foreign contributions. Five 
countries give forty percent of the total foreign government contributions, out of some 155 
total participating nations (FSB, 2009).
Table 4.2 Top Five Foreign Contributors, Government and Private, 2009
Top 5 
Foreign 
Government 
Contributors
Amount 
(USD 
equivalent, 
2009)
Share of 
total foreign 
government 
contributions
Top 5 
Foreign 
Private 
Contributors
Amount 
(USD 
equivalent, 
2009)
Share of 
total foreign 
private 
contributions
Spain 7,401,072 9.6% Colombia 1,991,401 10.9%
Chile 7,080,216 9.2% France 1,508,963 8.3%
Germany 6,834,212 8.8% Canada 1,423,423 7.8%
Brazil 5,431,108 7.0% India 885,623 4.9%
Japan 4,456,328 5.8% Mexico 861,868 4.7%
Total 31,202,936 40.4% Total 6,671,278 36.6%
(Source: FSB, 2009, p. 54)
A 1967 article by Olive Reddick, retired director of the US Educational Foundation in 
India, explores the question of whether the Fulbright Program is truly binational. She points 
out that while the structure of the programme features largely equal representation from the 
U.S. and India, the funding of the exchange programme prevents it from being a genuinely 
binational practice. The Fulbright Program, at the time and for more than a decade, was 
funded exclusively in Indian rupees held by the U.S. government. This arrangement 
presented a number of inequalities in the administration of the programme. “There is no 
doubt in my mind that the source of the funds has, at times, inhibited Indians on the board of 
directors from expressing any disagreement with a statement or proposal received from the 
120
Department of State or, on rare occasions, from the American Ambassador in India. They 
know they are receivers of a gift and are very polite about it.” (Reddick, 1967, p. 69). Dr. 
Reddick asserts that as long as the funding comes exclusively from one side of the exchange 
relationship, the programme will not be genuinely binational.
Executive director of the German Fulbright Commission Ulrich Littmann responded 
to Dr. Reddick’s article, challenging her suggestion that cost-sharing would make the 
programme more equal and more genuinely binational. As Dr. Littmann asserted, “In contrast 
to the situation in India, cost-sharing in Germany produced quite a few prospects of strain in 
the relations between the Commission and its two ‘masters’.” (Littmann, 1967, p. iii). The 
implementation of cost-sharing had not resolved questions of equality and binationality 
between the two exchange partners. Rather, cost-sharing had introduced new difficulties. The 
US-German binational commission, in Littmann’s view, was able to navigate these 
challenges successfully because it was “not looking toward genuine binationality but toward 
mutual recognition of opportunities, possibilities and limits.” (ibid., p. iv). 
The source of funding can colour an administrator’s perception of the exchange 
programme. In Reddick’s experience, American funding of the exchanges with India caused 
some commission board members to express a sense of resignation. “It is their money,” Dr. 
Reddick recalls one of the Indian board members saying, “I have no objection to their 
spending it as they wish.” (Reddick, 1967, p. 69). This statement suggests that unilateral 
funding of the binational programme can lead to diminished participation in decision-making. 
This has important implications for the binational character of the Fulbright Program; can the 
exchange programme be a binational joint venture without the implementation of cost-
sharing? To what extent does the funding structure influence binational commission 
members’ participation in decision-making?
Moreover, does the implementation of cost-sharing necessarily lead to more equal 
control and genuine binationality? The case of Germany, according to Littmann’s view, 
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suggests that it does not necessarily resolve these concerns. Although the programme is 
funded on a binational basis, there are still elements of the relationship that are not entirely 
equal. Littmann cites the language of the Terms of Award for American students as an 
example. “I still owe a written explanation to the German Government on the phrase 
‘effectuation of grants (for American students) is in every instance contingent upon stable 
conditions in Germany’ and why a reciprocal phrase is not included in the Terms of Award 
for German students going to the United States.”  (Littmann, 1967, p. iii). Cost-sharing, 
therefore, can be seen to influence the binational character of the exchange programme, but it 
is not the sole determinant of equality between participating nations. 
Exchange Advocacy
Fulbright Program supporters have used a range of arguments to make the case for 
continued or increased Congressional appropriations. One of the most common is to compare 
exchange funding with the nation’s defence budget. Senator Fulbright often used this rhetoric 
in his advocacy for the exchange programme. “During fiscal year 1959, the government spent 
a total of $31.3 million on educational and cultural exchange activities, less than the cost of 
one nuclear-powered submarine.” (Fulbright, 1961a, p. 26). In a more recent example, Public 
Diplomacy Council executive director William P. Kiehl noted that the United States spends 
almost five hundred times as much on defence (nearly $500 billion) as they do on public 
diplomacy ($1.2 billion). “The savings in American blood and treasure from just one 
preventable military adventure would more than make up for the increases in public 
diplomacy budgets.” (Kiehl, 2006, p. 145). 
Of course, this argument depends upon the assumption that an increased public 
diplomacy budget would prevent war. The comparison positions public diplomacy and 
military action as direct alternatives to each other. It is an oversimplification, because the 
budget of the U.S. Government includes a great many expenditures. Appropriations for 
public diplomacy and defence are not in a zero-sum relationship. Spending fewer taxpayer 
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dollars on weapons does not necessarily mean that more will be spent on educational 
exchange, or vice versa. The rhetoric of contrasting public diplomacy spending with defence 
spending is a persuasive argument, based on the assumption that public diplomacy prevents 
war. This rhetoric does not accurately reflect reality, however, because public diplomacy and 
defence are not mutually exclusive. Moreover, these advocates compare public diplomacy 
and defence budgets in order to argue for increased public diplomacy spending. This 
approach neglects the alternative response, however, that defence spending could simply be 
decreased instead. Comparing the budgets of selected indicative U.S. federal government 
departments shows that defence spending is the outlier, not State Department funding. Figure 
4.2 demonstrates this, comparing the fiscal year 2013 budgets for the Department of Defense, 
the Department of Health and Human Services, the Department of Transportation, the 
Department of Education, and the Department of State/U.S. Agency for International 
Development (U.S. GPO, 2013).
Figure 4.2 Selected U.S. Federal Department Budgets, Fiscal Year 2013 (in $ billion)
(Source: U.S. GPO, 2013)
The most significant Fulbright Program budget crisis moments in its history have 
been the drastic cuts of the Vietnam War era and a 1981 proposed budget reduction. These 
two stories can tell us a great deal about the nature of programme funding considerations and 
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advocacy. Who defends the Fulbright Program when it is threatened with budget cuts, and 
how do they make the case for continued funding?
The first large scale budget cuts occurred in the late 1960s. As the conflict in Vietnam 
escalated, financial resources were diverted towards the war effort. The budget for 
educational and cultural exchanges was diminished considerably. The 1970 Board of Foreign 
Scholarships Annual Report begins, “In the past year our exchange programs were at their 
lowest point since 1956, as a result of the 33 percent cut in appropriations for fiscal year 
1969. Although the size and suddenness of the cut was deeply discouraging here and abroad 
to many persons associated with the administration of these programs, most of them 
responded with sincere efforts to reduce other costs and to keep as many openings for 
grantees as possible.” (BFS, 1970, p. iv). Grants were reduced from 4,556 in the academic 
year 1968-69 to 3,046 in the academic year 1969-70 (ibid., p. 5).
Senator Fulbright took the matter quite personally, attributing the cuts to his feud 
with President Lyndon Johnson over the Vietnam War (Woods, 1995; Sussman, 1992). As 
budgets are determined two years in advance, the effects of the Johnson feud were carried 
over into the Nixon years. Though Johnson and Fulbright had once been on good terms, 
Fulbright’s Senate speech denouncing U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic was a 
turning point in their relationship. “After that, Lyndon didn’t have anything more to do with 
me...He struck me from the White House guest list, and I felt he was making a personal issue 
of our differences over policy.” (Fulbright, 1989, pp. 115-116).
It has also been suggested that another personal conflict was responsible for the 
programme’s diminished funding. Representative John J. Rooney of New York and CU 
director Charles Frankel had a “highly personalized feud” that Richard Arndt believes led to 
the cuts (Arndt and Rubin, 1993, p. 177). A 1970 editorial also suggests that Rooney was 
“heavily responsible for slashing the Fulbright appropriation by more than forty percent.” 
(Reviving Fulbright Program, 1970, p. 40). Representative Rooney was quoted in the New 
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York Times, justifying the cuts as a reduction of wasteful spending. “It seems we have too 
many of these leeches who have attached themselves to the Federal payroll under this 
[Fulbright] program who are living on it...It does not mean a darn thing because our relations 
with countries abroad are worse than they ever were.” (Scholarship Plan is Hard Hit Again, 
1970, p. 13). Representative Rooney, like other critics of exchange diplomacy, demanded 
proof of the programme’s effectiveness. Without this proof, he argued, the exchange 
programme administrators were parasites, living off of the American taxpayer while failing to 
serve American interests.
Whether the cuts were related to personal feuds, or should be considered as part of a 
general retrenchment policy, the impact on the exchange programme was severe and long-
lasting. The Fulbright Program took several years to recover from the budget cuts enacted 
during the Vietnam War. Figure 4.3 shows the programme’s recovery, from a low point in the 
1969-70 academic year to a nearly restored level in the 1975-76 academic year.
Figure 4.3 Fulbright Program Funding, 1968-1976 ($ million)
(Sources: BFS, 1968-1975).
Another important crisis moment, the story of the proposed budget cuts of 1981, 
demonstrates the importance of lobbying and advocacy. When President Ronald Reagan took 
office in 1981, his administration called for spending decreases across the board, and the 
Fulbright Program was no exception to these cuts. The Board’s annual report describes the 
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scale of the proposed budget reductions. “In October 1981 the board and many others 
associated with the Fulbright Program here and abroad were startled by the news that the 
Administration had proposed, subject to Congressional approval, a 66% reduction in 
educational and cultural exchanges for 1982. ICA, like other Governmental departments, had 
been directed by the President to reduce its fiscal year 1982 budget request an additional 12% 
across the board…”(BFS, 1981, p. 2).
Media coverage of the proposed cuts outlined the threat to American interests posed 
by the cuts to the U.S. exchange programme. Cold War arguments were used to justify 
continued funding of exchanges. “The Soviet leadership appears to have placed its greatest 
hope for ultimate success in the academic exchange program,” some argued, and the United 
States must be equipped to compete in the field of educational exchange (Kole, 1981, p. 3). A 
New York Times article featured statements from politicians and academics, including the 
Presidents of Harvard, American University and the University of Minnesota, who disagreed 
with the proposed cuts (Crossette, 1981). It also included details of how the cuts would be 
implemented: “Grants would be reduced by 40% and the current exchange with 120 nations 
would be cut to 59, ending most programs in the third world…” (ibid., p. 3).
Advocates of the Fulbright Program took action, writing letters to newspaper editors 
and lobbying Congress to oppose the budget cuts. The Board’s annual report describes the 
wide range of support for the programme. “This threatened reduction was sufficient to 
galvanize the Board, Fulbright alumni, the academic community, assisting private 
organizations and institutions, participating governments, the media, a number of American 
Ambassadors and countless others. They quickly made their concerns known to 
administration officials and to the Congress.” (BFS, 1981, p. 2). The decision was reversed, 
and the Fulbright Program saw budget increases approved for the following fiscal year.
This budget crisis moment highlights the importance of the advocacy role played by 
alumni and those involved in international education. During the thirty years of J. William 
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Fulbright’s tenure in the U.S. Senate, he was the programme’s chief advocate and defender. 
As a 1965 article described his involvement with the exchange programme, “Fulbright 
conceived it, pushed it through Congress, sold the doubters in the executive branch, schemed 
and pleaded for the money to support it and materialized like a guardian angel each time 
some new threat to it appeared.” (Oberdorfer, 1965, p. 80). When Senator Fulbright lost his 
seat in 1974, his advocacy role was taken up, not by one of his colleagues in the Senate, but 
by those who saw value in the exchange programme: Fulbright alumni, educators, and 
academics.   
Conclusion
The funding history of the Fulbright Program reveals the programme’s adaptability 
and the determination of exchange administrators and advocates. The story of its modest 
beginnings as a surplus war property disposal scheme illustrates the importance of private 
sector support and marks the start of a near-constant search for Congressional appropriations. 
The case of the 1954 Agricultural Trade and Development Act demonstrates the creativity 
applied by administrators in the search for additional funds. When surplus war property funds 
were exhausted, agricultural surplus exports became another vital source of U.S.-held foreign 
currencies for the exchange programme. 
The story of the U.S.-Finnish ASLA-Fulbright Program also illustrates the flexibility 
of the programme, both in terms of its ability to designate new funding sources and its 
capacity to adapt to local political concerns. The geographic proximity of Finland to the 
Soviet Union made the Finnish exchange programme strategically important for the U.S., but 
it also made the exchange agreement more difficult to negotiate. The 1949 Finnish 
Educational Exchange Act demonstrates flexibility and creativity on the part of 
administrators and policy-makers, as the exchange programme was adapted to meet the 
demands of the Cold War context. The experiences of cost-sharing in the German and 
Japanese programmes raise important questions about the binational nature of the programme 
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and the way in which the exchange programme is perceived in participating countries. 
Maintaining exchange programme funding has required a flexible, pragmatic approach on the 
part of administrators. 
Finally, the advocacy and lobbying efforts of Fulbright Program supporters have been 
shown to be an invaluable means of sustaining financial support for the programme. Alumni 
have been shown to be willing to participate in fundraising campaigns and donate directly to 
the programme. At an early Fulbright Association gathering, an alumnus made a rather 
ambitious proposal: “Fulbrighters themselves could support the program by each contributing 
one dollar a month, thereby providing an additional $1.38 million annually.” (Armbruster, 
1976, p. 10). Though there is no evidence to suggest this proposal was taken forward, it 
shows the enthusiasm held by alumni in some quarters for the programme. In countries such 
as Japan, alumni donate to the programme through formal Fulbright Foundations. In the U.S., 
alumni can demonstrate their support by lobbying Congress for continued appropriations. 
While other American public diplomacy activities lack a domestic constituency to defend 
them against Congressional budget cuts, the Fulbright Program has an active domestic 
constituency in its alumni and other stakeholders who support international education. The 
Fulbright Program has taken a pragmatic and creative approach to its budget, seeking funding 
from a variety of sources, public and private, foreign and domestic.
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Chapter 5
The Fulbright Program in American Bureaucracy
Introduction
The administrative home of exchange diplomacy activities within the U.S. 
government has changed a number of times throughout the history of the Fulbright Program. 
The reasons behind each restructuring reflect the ways in which America’s overseas 
information, educational and cultural activities have been viewed by different 
administrations. Some have regarded the Fulbright Program as an exchange diplomacy tool 
that can be used to engage, inform and influence foreign publics. They believe that it should 
contribute to American interests overseas, if it is to be supported by public funds. Others have 
viewed the Fulbright Program as a strictly educational endeavour, and one which needs to be 
protected from political influence and attempts at strategic use. This debate over the true 
purpose of the Fulbright Program has shaped the bureaucratic history of the Fulbright 
Program, moving it from the State Department to the U.S. Information Agency and back 
again. The story of these developments reveals a great deal about prevailing contemporary 
attitudes and how the role of exchange diplomacy was conceived at various times. 
This chapter considers the causes and impacts of these shifts in the Fulbright 
Program’s bureaucratic history. When restructuring has been proposed, concerns have been 
raised about how the move might impact the exchange programme. Exchange advocates have 
feared that the programme would lose its prestige, become a propaganda tool, or simply lose 
funding due to the change in bureaucratic organisation. With the benefit of hindsight, 
however, this study has found that such fears are often unrealised. The Fulbright Program has 
been largely unaffected by these reorganisations, and in some cases, exchanges have even 
benefitted and expanded. This section will examine key transitional moments, asking how, 
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and to what extent, has the bureaucratic structure of American public diplomacy influenced 
the development of the Fulbright Program?
Throughout each of the bureaucratic reorganisations, the Fulbright Program’s main 
administrative body has remained the Board of Foreign Scholarships, known since 1991 as 
the J. William Fulbright Foreign Scholarship Board. The Board was established by the 
original 1946 Fulbright Act as a protective measure that would guard the programme against 
political interference. As the members of the Board are appointed by the President, the 
composition of the Board can give us valuable insights into each President’s attitude towards 
educational and cultural exchanges. The latter section of this chapter will examine how the 
Board has changed throughout the history of the Fulbright Program, and what its composition 
reveals about each Presidential administration.
Since the establishment of American educational and cultural exchange activities, 
there has been a recurring debate over the appropriate bureaucratic home for exchange 
diplomacy in Washington. Do international educational and cultural exchanges belong in the 
department that deals with foreign affairs, or the department that deals with international 
communication? Or perhaps exchanges should be kept out of the federal government 
altogether, becoming the responsibility of an independent institution, such as the Library of 
Congress or the Smithsonian Institute. How will the exchange programme be perceived if it is 
conducted alongside information, or propaganda, activities? As Charles Frankel asserts, “...an 
information program tends to embarrass and compromise an educational and cultural 
program when it is too closely and visibly associated with it.” (Frankel, 1965, p. 33). Time 
and time again, committees have been formed, experts have been consulted, 
recommendations have been considered and compromises have been made in an attempt to 
settle the debate. Resolution has often been temporary, however, and questions of the true 
purpose of the Fulbright Program continue to be discussed.
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Information and Educational-Cultural Perspectives
The debate over where educational exchange activities belong in Washington involves 
many different viewpoints and stakeholders, which can be broken down into two opposing 
camps: the information perspective and the educational-cultural perspective. The information 
perspective sees the Fulbright Program as part of America’s public diplomacy toolbox. 
Exchanges are considered to be one among many different public diplomacy resources, such 
as Voice of America broadcasting, American-sponsored schools and libraries abroad, and the 
International Visitor Leader Program exchanges. In this line of thought, Fulbright grantees 
become another type of ‘media’ through which the government can communicate with target 
foreign audiences. As Fulbright participants are sponsored by the U.S. government, those 
who agree with the information perspective would expect the participants to act as 
ambassadors while abroad. “International educational and cultural activities would have little 
legitimacy to receive Congress’s support unless they were put in political service.” (Bu, 1999, 
p. 415). Due to the fact that participants are supported by U.S. taxpayer dollars, the 
information camp argues, it is only right that the American public should reap some tangible 
benefit from their investment. The mechanism of sponsorship suggests that a grant has some 
strings attached, whether they are implied or explicit. 
The opposing point of view argues that educational and cultural exchange activities 
ought to be conducted for their own sake and should remain free from the influence of 
America’s foreign policy agenda. They are inherently valuable activities and do not have to 
be strategic. Indeed, using them strategically may actually undermine their purpose and 
compromise the program’s academic integrity. If exchange students came to be viewed as 
government mouthpieces or spies, they would no longer be effective practitioners of public 
diplomacy. The strongest advocates for this position are the academics themselves. Amongst 
educators, “exchanges are seen as private people-to-people transactions that should not be 
attached directly to the immediacies of day-to-day formal policy considerations or efforts to 
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restore a nation’s image in a host country or region.” (Snow in Snow and Taylor, 2009, p. 
236). Some advocates of the educational-cultural approach look to the models of other 
nations, such as Germany or the United Kingdom, as models of best practice. “Academics, in 
particular, have expressed their preference for foreign mediation through autonomous bodies 
such as the DAAD [Deutscher Akademischer Austausch Dienst, German Academic Exchange 
Service] and the British Council rather than through ministries or embassies.” (Mitchell, 
1986, p. 68). Bureaucratic autonomy is thought to protect educational and cultural exchange 
activities from undue political influence.
This preference for autonomy has been reflected in a number of policy 
recommendations throughout the Fulbright Program’s history. A 1953 Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee report kept educational and cultural activities out of the newly 
established United States Information Agency (USIA). In 1975, a panel review of American 
public diplomacy recommended that both information and educational and cultural activities 
be placed in a new agency “under, but not in” the State Department. In 1987, Senator 
Claiborne Pell made a proposal to dismantle the USIA and move the Fulbright Program into 
the Smithsonian Institute (Snow, 2010, p. 89). These examples represent a few of the ways 
that policy-makers have approached the matter of autonomy in the past, addressing the matter 
of foreign policy influence with varying degrees of success. 
For his part, the programme’s founder and strongest advocate Senator J. William 
Fulbright was adamant that exchanges be conducted independently from America’s foreign 
policy agenda. “I utterly reject any suggestion that our educational and cultural programs are 
weapons or instruments with which to do combat...There is no room, and there must not be 
any room, for an interpretation of these programs as propaganda, even recognizing that the 
term covers some very worthwhile and respectable activities.” (quoted in Coombs, 1964, p. 
52). For Senator Fulbright, the programme was primarily an instrument of international 
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goodwill. He often spoke about the potential for educational and cultural exchange to 
‘humanise’ America’s foreign relations. 
In the earliest days of the Fulbright Program, many observers did not fully understand 
the nature of exchange diplomacy and the purpose of the programme. Some members of 
Congress and publicity officers expressed their concerns about the long-term nature of the 
programme, and asked instead for more immediate observable effects. The slow, long-range 
process of education does not make for good headlines that will impress constituents. One 
proposal asked the Board of Foreign Scholarships to “require that all American student 
grantees in France conduct a weekly public opinion poll to ascertain reactions to the Voice of 
America.” (Johnson and Colligan, 1965, p. 75). This proposal, like others demanding similar 
output, was rejected by the Executive Committee of the Board. Members of the Board of 
Foreign Scholarships agreed that the Fulbright Program should certainly contribute to the 
national interest, but feared that if it were to evolve into a ‘propaganda’ program, it “would 
become self-defeating and should be abandoned.” (ibid., p. 72). Administrators struggled to 
strike the appropriate balance between supporting U.S. foreign policy interests and 
maintaining academic integrity and credibility.
In the more than 155 countries that have participated in the Fulbright Program, 
exchanges are carried out by binational commissions, or by the local U.S. Embassy in 
countries that have not established a commission with the U.S. These overseas counterparts 
to the programme’s Washington-based administrators have generally supported the 
educational-cultural approach rather than information (propaganda) applications of the 
program. As many members of the binational commissions are university lecturers, 
professors and administrators, the preference for an academic emphasis is not surprising. For 
their part, the binational commissions have seen academic integrity as a prerequisite for any 
further diplomatic gains that might be sought by the Fulbright Program’s administrators in 
Washington. Without the solid foundation of academic integrity, the programme would fail to 
133
be respected or valued by partner nations and institutions of higher education. The 
commission in the United Kingdom, for example, saw academic prestige as an important 
factor in the development of mutual respect and understanding. “As a general policy the 
Commission has supported and will continue to support all measures that enhance the 
academic prestige of the scheme, not because it believes that academic success is in itself the 
entire justification for an international educational exchange program, but because from it 
alone will grow the respect both here and in America that will produce broader results in the 
sphere of mutual understanding.” (US-UK Fulbright Commission, 1951, p. 6). 
The history of the Fulbright Program is troubled by what Richard Arndt succinctly 
calls a “built-in tension” between the cultural and the propagandistic aims of exchange 
diplomacy (Thompson, 1987, p. 88). In the following section, three crisis moments will serve 
to illustrate this tension and examine how it has been resolved in the past. Firstly, the early 
days of the Cold War show how the creation of the United States Information Agency 
brought the purposes of the budding exchanges into question. The Cold War provided an 
excellent opportunity for exchanges, as they could be utilised in an attempt to persuade 
foreign audiences to favour capitalism over communism in the ideological struggle. The Cold 
War also presented a challenge, however, as exchanges might be misused for political 
purposes by the U.S. or a partnering nation. Secondly, the story moves ahead two decades to 
a moment of Cold War thaw, when the question of the appropriate bureaucratic home for 
exchanges came under scrutiny. A panel at Georgetown University’s Center for Strategic and 
International Studies reviewed the state of affairs and issued its 1975 report International 
Information, Education and Cultural Relations: Recommendations for the Future, more 
commonly known as the Stanton Report for the panel’s chairman, Frank Stanton. The panel’s 
recommendations were not followed, however, during the subsequent reorganization under 
President Jimmy Carter. His short-lived United States International Communication Agency 
(ICA) directed both information and educational-cultural activities. When the Agency’s name 
134
and purpose was reverted to its former state, the exchange programme remained in the US 
Information Agency. Finally, the state of the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs in 
the first decade of the twenty-first century deserves special attention in view of the closure of 
the USIA in 1999. During each of these illustrative transitional periods, we can see the 
various institutional factors at play and take note of the underlying determinants behind 
bureaucratic developments in the history of the Fulbright Program.
The USIA and the Fulbright Program
The advent of the Cold War caused Fulbright Program administrators to examine the 
potential role of educational and cultural exchange in the new international conflict. Chief of 
the Division of Exchange of Persons and member of the Board of Foreign Scholarships 
Francis J. Colligan observed a wariness of propaganda on a 1951 tour of participating nations 
in Europe, the Middle East, and the Far East. The impressions from this trip convinced him 
that in order to accomplish the programme’s objectives, administrators must guard against 
giving the impression of propagandising. In a report to the Board of Foreign Scholarships 
following the tour, Colligan warns his colleagues about foreign perceptions of information 
activities. “An indirect, subtle approach is required. This is because of a general sensitivity in 
all the countries visited to out-and-out foreign propaganda in the popular sense, especially in 
an educational program established by executive agreement on a long-term and relatively 
large-scale basis.” (Colligan, 1951, p. 2). Recognising this sensitivity, Colligan goes on to 
suggest how the program might reach its goals while avoiding accusations of propaganda. 
“This objective can best be accomplished:
1. by including a maximum number of well thought out projects,
2. by providing for efficient selection, orientation, guidance and follow-up,
3. by making maximum use of grantees in terms of the fields of specialization which 
they represent and in terms of personality, personal contacts and incidental activities, 
and 
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4. by streamlining policies and procedures, for example, by awarding short-term 
grants and recruiting senior personnel directly. In so doing we shall help increase the 
number of friends of the United States in key circles in foreign countries. This is our 
basic ultimate objective.” (ibid., p. 3). 
There is a distinct emphasis on quantity and competition in this plan—maximum numbers, 
maximum personal contacts, more short-term grants rather than fewer long-term grants. 
These priorities reflect the competitive Cold War mindset of contemporary policy-makers 
and program administrators. It illustrates the widely held belief that the world consisted of 
potential Democratic allies of the U.S. and potential Communist allies of the Soviet Union. 
Colligan and other administrators of the Fulbright Program viewed engaging with opinion 
leaders in key circles as a means of translating personal friendships into geopolitical 
alliances.
Overseas, binational commission members were also concerned about the perception 
of their exchange programme. The Australian commission had a number of staunchly anti-
Communist, prominent individuals amongst its members, including former Chief Justice Sir 
John Latham. Despite his anti-Communist views, he was cautious about the development of 
American studies under the Fulbright Program in Australia, as it might be perceived as 
propagandistic. “It might do grave harm if the Fulbright scheme were to run the risk of being 
charged with passing from the field of general assistance to education as a means of 
promoting understanding between the USA and other peoples into that of propaganda.” 
(quoted in Garner and Kirkby, 2013, pp. 130-131). 
The explicit application of the Fulbright Program as a tool in the early days of the
Cold War was relatively limited in scope. The use of surplus war property funds meant that 
exchanges were conducted only in the two theatres of the Second World War: the North 
Atlantic and the Pacific. Exchanges were also limited to the so-called free world, the 
community of non-Communist, democratic nations. In 1948, the Board of Foreign 
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Scholarships wanted to conduct cultural exchanges in Eastern Europe, but the State 
Department was unable to support them, as cultural relations activities soon ceased to operate 
in the region (Ninkovich, 1995, p. 147). Exchange agreements with these countries were 
eventually reached during the 1960s and 1970s, a period of Cold War thaw and programme 
expansion. During the early years of the Cold War, however, the Fulbright Program was 
unable to reach beyond the Iron Curtain. It focused instead upon creating strong relationships 
with allies and the non-aligned countries. Administrators felt the exchange program had an 
important role to play in the Cold War, namely “to bulwark the free and democratic areas 
against the erosion of revolution and totalitarianism.” (ibid., p. 148). Thus, educational 
exchange played a largely indirect role in the conflict, underscoring alliances rather than 
confronting ideological foes. 
When the United States Information Agency was established in 1953, the question 
arose as to whether educational and cultural exchanges should remain within the Department 
of State or if they should instead be moved to the USIA, the new home of other public 
diplomacy activities such as broadcasting. Senator Fulbright was adamant that his namesake 
program be kept separate from information activities, or as he referred to them, propaganda. 
Speaking to a Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee on Overseas Information Programs, 
Senator Fulbright argued against any interference with the exchange programme. He had 
originally made provisions for the Board of Foreign Scholarships in order to ensure that an 
autonomous, apolitical body would administer the exchange program. Placing the Board 
under the USIA’s remit, he told the subcommittee, would defeat the purpose entirely. “If you 
seek to coordinate them in any degree—make them subordinate or direct them as part of a 
government propaganda agency—I think that by that act you will have destroyed their 
principal usefulness, and destroyed their incentive to function.” (quoted in Frankel, 1965, p. 
27). The usefulness of the Board was their independence and autonomy, features which lent 
the members of the Board a degree of credibility and integrity. If it were to be placed under 
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the USIA, there was a risk that the program would be adversely influenced by the 
propaganda-dominated environment. 
In terms of the theoretical framework, keeping the exchange programme separate 
from the USIA can be read as a means of managing the way it is perceived by target nations. 
If the exchange programme were to be conducted by the USIA, foreign publics might 
perceive it as propaganda. This would undermine the exchange activities at the contact level: 
grantees would be perceived as less credible if they were sponsored by a propaganda agency. 
As each stage in the framework relies on its previous stage, undermining the contact scenario 
diminishes the multiplier effect and prevents the desired impact from taking place on a target 
nation’s public opinion and foreign policy.
Senator Fulbright and his like-minded colleagues managed to keep the Fulbright 
Program in the State Department, for the time being. A compromise was reached which 
distributed educational and cultural activities between the newly formed USIA and the State 
Department. “Books, libraries, cultural centers, English-teaching and exhibits went to USIA, 
while exchange-of-persons programs, support of American-sponsored schools, the UNESCO 
National Commission secretariat and a few odds and ends were left behind in the State 
Department.” (Coombs, 1964, pp. 33-34). The two categories were labelled “cultural 
information” and “cultural relations,” though Coombs notes that this was “regarded by some 
at the time as a distinction without a difference.” (ibid., p. 34). The new arrangement meant 
that officials in the field, such as cultural attachés and public affairs officers working in U.S. 
Embassies, would now have to answer to both the State Department and the USIA in the 
conduct of their work. While in Washington cultural information and cultural relations were 
now the responsibilities of two separate agencies, they were still carried out in the field by the 
same officials.
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The Stanton Report
Ten years later, concerns about the bureaucratic organisation of America’s overseas 
information, education and cultural activities were revisited. In 1975, an independent Panel 
on International Information, Education and Cultural Relations was established to analyse the 
field and seek out recommendations for its improvement. The idea for a panel review was the 
result of a chance meeting between Leo Cherne, a member of the Advisory Commission on 
Educational and Cultural Affairs, and CBS broadcasting executive Frank Stanton. Seated 
next to each other on a flight, they discussed the state of American public diplomacy and its 
organization (Thompson, 1987, p. 55). Stanton agreed to chair a panel that would examine 
the matter further. The members of the panel represented both the information perspective 
and the education and cultural perspective, with academics and members of advisory bodies. 
The panel consisted of Peter Krogh and Walter R. Roberts of Georgetown University; W. 
Phillips Davison of Columbia University; Leo Cherne, Thomas Curtis, David Derge, Harry 
Flemming, Lawrence U. Goldberg, Rita Hanser, Hobart Lewis, and William French Smith, 
members of the U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural 
Affairs; James Michener, J. Leonard Reinsch, John Shaheen and George Gallup, members of 
the U.S. Advisory Commission on Information; Andrew Berding of the USIA and Kenneth 
Thompson of the International Council for Educational Development. Edmund A. Gullion of 
Tufts University was unable to participate, due to other commitments, though his dissenting 
remarks are included in the panel’s final report. Leonard Marks participated in discussions 
but abstained from the final report and William C. Turner resigned from the panel when he 
was appointed as US ambassador to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD).
The panel’s findings, known as the Stanton Report, emphasized the long-term nature 
of exchanges and recommended that they be conducted with long-term objectives rather than 
short-term foreign policy goals in mind. A short-term strategy, for example, might be the 
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desire to gain favour with promising pro-Western political leaders in strategically-selected 
countries, while a long-term strategy would be to build relationships with people in non-
aligned countries, on a basis of mutuality and respect, in the hope that they might choose to 
align themselves with the United States in the future. Indeed, the concepts of friendship and 
mutual understanding appear frequently throughout the Stanton Report. The report contended 
that these “programs, both cultural and educational, support the ultimate goals of U.S. policy 
by promoting the exposure of Americans and people of other nationalities and cultures to 
each other. Their objectives are thus to build mutual understanding in areas most important to 
preserving friendly and peaceful U.S. relations worldwide and to help develop a reservoir of 
people who can exchange ideas easily, can identify common objectives, and can work 
together in achieving these objectives. Their operations should, therefore, be directed with 
careful attention to long range policy interests. Close connection with the day-to-day policy 
process is not required.” (Stanton, 1975, p. 6). Neither the USIA nor the State Department, 
home to the day-to-day policy-making process, were judged to be an appropriate site for the 
programme.
The panel proposed the creation of a new entity, combining overseas information and 
exchange-of-persons activities in an autonomous position under the State Department, rather 
than the existing state of separation between USIA and the State Department. Uniting the two 
activities was a controversial step, defying Senator Fulbright’s express wishes to keep 
exchanges away from the influence of America’s overseas information activities. The 
commission arrived at this decision, however, because they felt that the fear of USIA 
influence in exchanges was unfounded. In practice, exchanges were already potentially 
politicised in their current home at the State Department. Exchange-of-persons programmes 
were administered overseas by officials who answered to both the State Department and the 
USIA. In Washington, the Fulbright Program operated out of the State Department, but in the 
field, it became the responsibility of the Cultural Affairs Officer (CAO) of each U.S. 
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Embassy. The CAO answered to both State and USIA, as their responsibilities also included 
information activities that were under the remit of USIA.
This state of affairs undermined the debate between the information perspective and 
the educational-cultural perspective. The report notes this in its argument for their 
consolidation into a single entity. “The separation never made much sense, since both 
programs were executed in the field by the same agency, and educational and cultural 
exchange remained subject to political currents flowing through the Department of State.” 
(ibid., p. 15). The proposal to combine information activities with educational and cultural 
affairs would have streamlined the CAO role. The officer in the field would have received 
instructions from a single entity in Washington. Such changes would have, according to the 
report, increased efficiency and decreased instances of miscommunication.
The Information and Cultural Affairs Agency proposed in the Stanton Report was to 
be autonomous, located under the State Department but operating with its own budget and 
administration (ibid.). The panel acknowledged the challenges inherent in striking the right 
balance between maintaining information & cultural affairs’ relevance to the national interest 
and protecting these activities from undue, short-term political influence. “It must be close 
enough to policy makers to respond to long-range policy needs and the national interest 
without being so close that it is subject to pressures of diplomatic crises or political 
expediency. The distinction drawn here is admittedly a fine one, failure to draw it, however, 
leaves only the alternatives of a program that is irrelevant to the national interest in foreign 
policy and unworthy of government support, or one consisting of a blatant propaganda and 
politicized culture which has almost no chance of effectiveness.” (ibid., p. 17). The panel’s 
proposed Information and Cultural Affairs Agency was an attempt to find the right balance 
between these two extremes. In order to remain both relevant and effective, exchanges must 
not be too far removed from, nor too closely tied to, the foreign policy apparatus.
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The story of the Stanton panel, however, had a disappointing ending for its members, 
as their recommendations failed to be fully implemented. Their recommendation to 
coordinate activities by bringing information and educational-cultural affairs together in the 
same bureaucratic department was followed, but not under the terms that the Stanton panel 
had suggested. While the panel had advised moving information activities into the State 
Department, the reorganisation moved educational and cultural activities into the USIA. As 
panel member Walter R. Roberts described the Stanton Report’s reception, “...intellectually 
and philosophically it made a lot of sense. It just organizationally didn’t catch on, and again 
those of us who would like to make the changes will have to overcome the organizational 
problem rather than the philosophical problem.” (Roberts in Thompson, 1987, p. 49). 
Officials in Washington were concerned with the day-to-day practicalities of conducting 
information and educational-cultural activities. Organizational feasibility was seen as a more 
pressing matter than the intellectual and philosophical arguments for the proposed plan.   
The 1976 election of President Jimmy Carter brought with it a new approach towards 
information activities and educational and cultural affairs. Carter and his administration 
emphasised mutuality in their ‘two-way mandate,’ believing that the U.S. had as much to 
gain from other nations as they had to gain from the U.S. (Cull, 2008a, p. 361). This was a 
departure from the one-way communication practice of the information approach, which 
included broadcasting activities such as Voice of America, Radio Liberty, Radio Free 
Europe, as well as other one-way mass media tools. It reflected President Carter’s personal 
approach towards international affairs, which were formed in part by his own experiences on 
a cultural exchange to Latin America while serving as Governor of the state of Georgia 
(ibid.). As an alumnus of exchange, President Carter felt that “it is in our national interest to 
encourage sharing of ideas and cultural activities among the people of the United States and 
the peoples of other nations.” (Tuch, 1990, p. 32). Believing strongly in the possibilities of 
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educational exchange and public diplomacy, President Carter took an interest in restructuring 
the country’s activities in that area.
Under the Carter administration, the USIA was re-branded as the United States 
International Communication Agency (USICA or ICA). Information was replaced by 
communication, a move which emphasises the concept of two-way engagement across 
borders rather than a unidirectional flow of propaganda. Instead of telling the world 
‘America’s story,’ the new agency’s mission was “to tell the world about our society and 
policies in particular our commitment to cultural diversity and individual liberty. To tell 
ourselves about the world, so as to enrich our own culture as well as give us the 
understanding to deal effectively with problems among nations.” (Carter, 1977). The 
language of the new mission statement, known as the ‘two-way mandate’, is very much in 
line with the rhetoric that Senator Fulbright used when speaking about his exchange 
programme. Fulbright often linked cultural understanding to conflict resolution in the same 
way (Fulbright, 1951; 1976).
Restructuring America’s information, educational and cultural affairs was a complex 
task and many changes were made in the process of moving the Bureau of Educational and 
Cultural Affairs from its home at the State Department to the newly rebranded USICA. It was 
a large undertaking, involving thousands of staff members and posts around the world. 
According to Richard Arndt, some feared that the USIA’s propagandists would overpower 
their new colleagues from educational and cultural affairs. “A small bureau of the 
Department of State, employing approximately 270, was to be swallowed by an agency of 
5,000, with admonitions to the shark to behave.” (Arndt in Thompson, 1987, p. 94). This 
discrepancy in size between the two put the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs at a 
disadvantage. While other various program cuts and consolidations took place, however, the 
Fulbright Program was less affected by the move to USICA. Arndt asserts that the Fulbright 
Program was viewed as off-limits. “Only the Office of Academic Programs stood roughly as 
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it was, suggesting that the Fulbright Program’s sacrosanctity still exerted a protective screen.” 
(ibid., p. 96). Given the fact that Senator Fulbright had left Congress in 1975, I would argue 
that this sacrosanctity came in part from the programme’s domestic constituency of alumni, 
educators and other supporters, rather than from its association with its founder.
Senator Fulbright lamented the move of the Bureau of Educational and Cultural 
Affairs. Although he had retired by the time the reorganisation took place, in his memoir 
account Fulbright seemed offended that the exchange programme had been moved without 
his prior knowledge. “Without consulting me, or giving me advance notice, he transferred the 
administration of the program from the State Department to the U.S. Information Agency. I 
couldn’t stop it and I still feel it was a great mistake. Carter, I think, didn’t know anything 
about it; he only had some theoretical idea of simplifying the bureaucracy. It wasn’t that he 
had anything against the program.” (Fulbright 1989, p. 65). Senator Fulbright’s antipathy 
towards the U. S. Information Agency, which he considered to be a propaganda agency, made 
him disregard the USICA entirely. The educational exchange programme did not suffer from 
the move, however, as Senator Fulbright feared it would.
During the years of the ICA (1978-1981), exchanges and cultural activities were 
actively promoted and expanded with the establishment of several new bilateral agreements. 
The ICA made significant progress in Hungary, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, China and the Middle 
East during the late 1970s (Cull, 2008a). Despite being heavily outnumbered by former USIA 
staff, employees of the former Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs managed to 
achieve a great deal in their new home at ICA. The Hubert H. Humphrey Program was 
launched to bring mid-level public sector professionals to the United States for one year of 
study. Its stated aim was to support “career development of the next leadership generation in 
the developing nations.” (BFS, 1979, p. 7). A new private sector agreement was created with 
Spain’s Bank of Bilbao to sponsor forty new Fulbright grants, resulting in the first privately-
funded scholarship program in post-Franco Spain (ibid., p. 3). In addition to these 
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achievements, Fulbright Student grants also rose significantly over the period. The number of 
grants increased by nearly one-third between 1978 and 1980, from 4,081 to 5,248 (BFS, 
1978; BFS, 1980).
The Fulbright Program fared well under the ICA because the respective missions of 
the Fulbright exchanges and the new agency were both centred upon the concept of mutual 
understanding. President Carter’s ‘second mandate’ emphasised the importance of listening, a 
key concept that had been absent from the USIA’s mission of ‘Telling America’s Story to the 
World.’ Exchange diplomacy also values listening, through its emphasis on mutual 
understanding and culture learning. Engagement between people from different nations, as 
explained by Allport’s contact hypothesis, requires listening by both parties. The ICA had the 
potential to be an ideal bureaucratic home for exchange diplomacy activities like the 
Fulbright Program.
The ICA was short-lived, however. Just as President Carter had changed the USIA to 
reflect his worldview, his successor Ronald Reagan was quick to make his mark on the 
country’s public diplomacy activities. Under the Reagan administration, the ICA’s name and 
mission soon reverted back to its previous state as the USIA. The motto ‘Telling America’s 
Story to the World’ was restored and the agency now had a strongly anti-Communist agenda. 
President Reagan appointed his friend Charles Z. Wick as USIA director, and Wick’s 
broadcasting background meant that information activities dominated the administration’s 
vision of U.S. public diplomacy. Wick secured increased funding for the agency, but the
funds were channelled towards Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty and the 
newly founded Radio Martí, a broadcasting service directed towards Cuban audience (Arndt, 
2005). Despite the renewed emphasis on information activities at the US Information 
Agency, the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs was not moved back to the State 
Department. The Fulbright Program remained in the USIA for another eighteen years, until 
the agency was closed and reintegrated into the State Department in 1999.
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The End of the USIA
After the end of the Cold War, the American public diplomacy community struggled 
to remain relevant in the eyes of policy-makers. The task of “Telling America’s Story to the 
World” no longer seemed to be necessary after the end of the ideological struggle. Many of 
the themes and symbols used in American public diplomacy were now irrelevant. What 
would happen to the USIA without the Berlin Wall, the Iron Curtain and the Soviet Union? 
How would its mission and its activities change, now that they had lost the context of the 
Cold War?
Amongst the educational and cultural exchange community, the end of the Cold War 
was not seen to diminish the importance of the Fulbright Program. Hoyt Purvis, who was 
appointed to the Fulbright Foreign Scholarship Board by President Clinton in 1993, rejected 
the idea that the programme had lost its relevance. “Well, to me, there was never any 
question—there was ample rationale. That is, the basic goals of mutual understanding, of 
giving people an opportunity to develop a perspective from another country, to learn to 
understand and appreciate other cultures…those goals didn’t diminish…in some ways they 
became even more important than ever because we were in a situation where we weren’t sort 
of limited by the Cold War.” (Appendix A, p. 269). The original goals of the Fulbright 
Program remained relevant in the post-Cold War era, and exchange administrators saw new 
possibilities for engagement with newly independent states. 
American public diplomacy as a whole, however, was struggling to make the case for 
itself in Congress in the new environment. Historian Nicholas Cull points out how the 
success of U.S. public diplomacy also contributed, ironically, to its demise. “Success in the 
Cold War and in broadcasting to China lifted the self-confidence of the always independently 
minded VOA to an all-time high, while the same victory prompted Congress to search for the 
peace dividend by pressing hard on the budget.” (Cull, 2010, p. 65). The ‘peace dividend’ 
came in the form of discontinuing any programmes that were no longer deemed important in 
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the post-Cold War world. Cutting back public diplomacy activities was seen as an easy way 
to make savings. 
Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina was among those most determined to secure 
the peace dividend. A fiscally conservative Republican, Senator Helms served as Chairman 
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, where he argued for a reform of America’s 
foreign affairs structure. Observers in the media noted that he was an unlikely member of the 
committee, as his background does not suggest an interest in foreign relations. As a piece in 
Foreign Policy described the Senator, “Helms has seemed miscast as a leading figure in 
international affairs. By his own admission, he doesn’t like to travel abroad, and he has little 
faith in international institutions. He is openly disdainful of an American diplomatic 
community that he sees as dominated by the Eastern Establishment.” (Kitfield, 1997, p. 
1886). This disdain extended to the bureaucratic structure of foreign affairs in Washington. 
Senator Helms felt that there was too much wasteful spending, caused by an overlap of duties 
across the various independent agencies. He sponsored the Foreign Affairs Reform and 
Restructuring Act of 1997, which proposed consolidating the activities of USIA, US Agency 
for International Development (USAID) and the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 
(ACDA) into the State Department. During a debate on the bill, he laid out to his colleagues 
that “the responsibilities of just one of these agencies is [sic] duplicated by about 42 other 
entities in the Federal Government.” (Helms, 1998, p. 3563). Consolidating foreign affairs 
would eliminate the problem of duplication by placing all such responsibilities under the 
remit of the State Department.
The reform bill also contained provisions for repayment of American debts to the 
United Nations, a feature that made Secretary of State Madeleine Albright support the 
reforms in her hopes to gain favour with the UN. Helms felt that the UN had become a 
“bureaucratic nightmare,” and made UN reform the condition for America’s repayment of 
funds owed to the UN (ibid.). The repayment and its conditions represented compromise 
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between the Republicans and Democrats that seemed promising for the bill’s success. When 
the bill was sent to the Republican-controlled House of Representatives, however, a small 
conservative faction attached a controversial amendment. They added a measure which 
prevented American foreign aid funds from being used to lobby foreign governments on the 
issue of abortion. The bill’s Democratic co-sponsor Senator Joe Biden lamented that the bill 
had been derailed for the sake of this unrelated and extremely divisive issue. Senator Patrick 
Leahy’s comments summarised the Democratic position succinctly: “This bill is about how 
many Assistant Secretaries of State there will be, the bureaus, how they are set up, and so on. 
It is not about running Planned Parenthood. The House saw things differently. Unfortunately,
a minority in the House saw yet another opportunity to hold hostage important foreign policy 
legislation, and they did, like funding for the United Nations and the reorganization of the 
State Department.” (ibid., p. 3570). The bill had become a political football, passed between 
the Republicans in the House and the Democratic Clinton administration. “The USIA merger 
with [the Department of] State was not about policy but politics,” and the future of American 
public diplomacy activities was almost an afterthought (Snow, 2010, p. 63).
When the USIA was dismantled by the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act 
of 1998, the bureaucratic home of the Fulbright Program once again had to be renegotiated. 
Prior to the reorganisation, the USIA included two distinct offices for information and 
educational-cultural affairs. The Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs managed the 
Fulbright Program and other exchanges, while the Information Bureau handled media and 
information activities. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright initially planned to merge the 
two divisions into a single entity, to be known as the Bureau of Information Programs and 
International Exchanges. Academics and exchange advocates, such as the Association of 
International Educators and the Alliance for International Educational and Cultural 
Exchange, lobbied Congress to reject this proposed merger. Following consultation with 
these groups and their allies in Congress, Secretary Albright modified the plan to reflect their 
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views. After the move to the State Department, exchanges remained in the Bureau of 
Educational and Cultural Affairs, while information activities were placed in a dedicated 
Office of International Information Programs. 
The initial plan to combine the two divisions into the Bureau of Information Programs 
and International Exchanges had been motivated by a desire to make savings by streamlining 
public diplomacy activities that were seen as less vital in the post-Cold War environment. 
The new arrangement agreed upon after consultation was still intended to make savings, but 
only through “consolidating personnel and payroll activities and other back-room functions.” 
(Desruisseaux, 1999). Funding for the exchanges themselves was not diminished by the 
move, as some had feared. Over the three year span before and after the reorganisation, 
funding for the Fulbright Program rose from $202.2 million to $219.8 million (FSB, 1997; 
FSB, 2000). Fulbright grants in the student category also rose substantially, from 2,266 in the 
1997-98 academic year to 3,265 in the 2000-01 academic year (ibid.). On the whole, the 
move from USIA back to the State Department had positive effects for the Fulbright 
Program. 
In his reflections on the reorganisation, former Fulbright Foreign Scholarship Board 
chairman Hoyt Purvis emphasised the importance of President Clinton’s personal support of 
the Fulbright Program. “I think that if Clinton hadn’t been President, that the program might 
have run on really hard times because of the pressure that was there to eliminate programs 
and cut back spending, etc. I’m not suggesting the program was going to be done away with 
but at the same time, it was a time of real pressure.” (Appendix A, p. 272). President 
Clinton’s background as Senator Fulbright’s mentee gave him a unique affection for the 
programme. Other Presidents may not have been so attentive to the Board’s concerns for the 
welfare of the Fulbright Program.
The exchange community and Fulbright Program administrators were generally 
pleased with the reorganisation’s outcome, and the lobbying effort demonstrated broad 
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support for exchanges, both in academia and in Congress. In an interview for the Chronicle of 
Higher Education, former USIA Educational and Cultural Affairs associate director William 
B. Bader observed, in the restructuring effort, “it is not the address of the organization that 
matters, it is the attitude of the landlord.” (Desruisseaux, 1999). The new landlords at the 
Department of State had a high regard for international educational exchange. The 1999 
restructuring did not have the negative impact that some in the exchange community had 
feared, at least in terms of the Fulbright Program’s activities. Public diplomacy in general, 
however, did suffer during this period. “It is difficult to overestimate what was lost with the 
merger of the USIA into State. Agency hands with decades of field experience took early 
retirement, young people with an eye to career prospects avoided public diplomacy work; 
budgets withered and skills grew rusty.” (Cull, 2008a, p. 484).
The Board of Foreign Scholarships
The composition of the Board of Foreign Scholarships has changed a great deal since 
its first appointments in 1947. This section will examine how it has changed, and what these 
appointments can tell us about the attitude of each President towards exchange diplomacy. 
Figure 5.1 depicts the composition of the Board, according to the institutional affiliations of 
each member and organised by the President who appointed each member. The professional 
affiliation and hometown of each appointee are typically listed in Board annual reports, 
White House press releases and news articles about the appointments. I have collected these 
details to create a table of all Board members from 1947 to 2013 (Appendix B), and used this 
data to inform the present analysis. Professional affiliations of Board members have been 
organised into five categories: Academic, Government, Law, Business, and Other.
Academic (1): The category to which most Board members belong includes universities, 
colleges and other educational institutions. It does not include government administrative 
posts in the field of education, such as a board of supervisors or a superintendent, as these are 
listed under the ‘government’ category. It also does not include education policy research 
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organisations, non-profit educational foundations or education consultants, as these are 
included under the ‘business’ category.
Government (2): This category includes government affiliations, such as former White 
House officials and advisors, USIA officials, Governors and Secretaries. It also includes the 
post of US Commissioner for Education and Veterans Administration representatives, who 
were originally required to serve on the Board. 
Law (3): Many of those in the ‘law’ category are attorneys who are somehow politically 
affiliated with the President or his party. I have chosen to refer to them by their listed 
affiliation rather than link them to the government on the basis of my own judgment, 
however.
Business (4): The business category includes a number of CEOs and Presidents of publicly 
and privately owned businesses, as well as consultants, policy think tanks, and non-profit 
organisations. It also includes one former US Ambassador to the World Trade Organisation 
who was also a businesswoman.
Other (5): Amongst the 175 Board members analysed, just four did not have affiliations that 
fit into the above categories. President Carter was the first to appoint anyone outside of the 
categories, and he appointed two of them: Lia Triff Belli and Harrison E. Salisbury. In the 
White House press release of her appointment, no occupation is given for Belli; rather, she is 
described as “active in civic and community affairs” (White House, 1980). Harrison E. 
Salisbury, a Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist, was a very interesting choice. He is known for 
reporting from behind the Iron Curtain during the Cold War, as the New York Times Moscow 
correspondent. He was also the first American journalist to cover the Vietnam War from 
Hanoi, North Vietnam, and happened to be filming a documentary in Beijing during the 
Tiananmen Square protest (Pace, 1993).
President Clinton’s appointment of Harriet Mayor Fulbright is also difficult to 
categorise. On the one hand, she does have an institutional affiliation. She is listed as the 
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President of the Center for Arts in Basic Curriculum, a policy organisation that promotes arts 
education in Washington, D.C. On the other hand, she was married to Senator J. William 
Fulbright and appointed to the Board by his protégé. I would argue that it is more likely that 
she was appointed because of her personal affiliation, rather than her professional one. She 
was an excellent choice, however, as she was a former head of the Fulbright Association and 
had frequently travelled with, or on behalf of, her husband to Fulbright commission 
anniversaries and other events.
The most curious unaffiliated board member, perhaps, is Jan O’Neill. When she was 
appointed to the Board by President George W. Bush, there was no affiliation of any kind 
listed. She appears in press releases and the annual report as “Mrs. Jan O’Neill, Midland, 
TX” (White House, 2001; FSB, 2004, p. 6). A biography of George W. Bush explains her 
connection to the President: in 1977, Jan and Joe O’Neill acted as matchmakers for their 
friends George W. Bush and Laura Welch (Minutaglio, 2001). She was a childhood friend of 
his future wife. Another of Bush’s appointments, Anita McBride, also has a connection to the 
First Lady, as McBride was formerly Mrs. Bush’s Chief of Staff.
Some members of the board have multiple affiliations, and could potentially fit into 
multiple categories. Tom Healy, for example, is a poet and writer who taught at New York 
University at the time of his appointment in 2011. During the Clinton administration, he 
served as an advisor on HIV/AIDS issues. His affiliations could place him with academia or 
the government, but in such cases I have chosen to categorise members according to their 
affiliation at the time of appointment. On the other hand, in the cases of Shirley Moore Green 
and Thomas T. Lyons, who were retired at the time of appointment to the board, I have 
chosen to use their listed prior affiliation.
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Figure 5.1 Composition of the Board, by Affiliation and Appointing President
(Sources: Annual Reports, White House Press Releases)
The terms of the original 1946 Fulbright Act established general guidelines for its 
membership. The ten members of the Board would be appointed by the President and would 
be drawn from a variety of fields to represent academia, educational administration, and 
veterans interests (Public Law 79-584). The first Board members, appointed by President 
Truman on 17 July 1947, represented each of these fields (BFS, 1948). Six of the ten 
members were professors or University presidents, and three were affiliated with educational 
administration: the director of the Institute for International Education, the New York State 
Commissioner of Education, and the U.S. Commissioner of Education. General Omar N. 
Bradley, head of the Veterans’ Administration and later five-star General, represented 
veterans’ interests on the Board.
During the Eisenhower administration, Board appointments continued to follow the 
guidelines of the Fulbright Act legislation, with representation from the Veterans’ 
Administration and the U.S. Commissioner of Education. The only departure from the 
original formula is Eisenhower’s appointment of Philip Willkie, an attorney and politician 
from Indiana, and the son of the 1940 Republican Presidential candidate Wendell Willkie. It 
is also worth noting that Eisenhower appointed the first African-Americans to the Board, 
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President of Lincoln University Dr. Sherman D. Scruggs in 1954 and President of Southern 
University Dr. Felton G. Clark in 1956. The appointments of Presidents of historically black 
institutions are quite progressive for this era, considering that it was only in 1954 that Brown 
vs. Board of Education ruled that segregation was unconstitutional. In U.S. politics, the 
Democratic Party is traditionally associated with minority issues, so it is interesting to note 
that Eisenhower, a Republican, appointed African-Americans and women to the Board.
The Kennedy administration drew its members primarily from academia and 
educational administration. Amongst Kennedy’s appointees were two from the private sector 
of educational activities: Francis X. Sutton, executive associate of the Ford Foundation and 
John M. Stalnaker, president of the National Merit Scholarship Corporation. President 
Kennedy also appointed John Hope Franklin, professor of American History at the University 
of Chicago, a prominent figure in African-American history.
President Johnson was the first President to appoint former members of his own staff 
to the Board. Former advisers Jack Valenti and Walt Rostow and former deputy press 
secretary Wyatt Thomas Johnson Jr. were among the President’s appointments. He was also 
the first to appoint a member of the business community, with his appointment of Edward A. 
Booher, president of McGraw-Hill publishing. President Johnson’s long career in the U.S. 
Senate gave him many connections to Washington insiders, and a reputation for using his 
long-standing friendships to get bills through the legislative process (Woods, 1998). It is 
therefore somewhat surprising that Johnson’s appointees did not include more Washington 
insiders, as well as more minorities and women. Johnson and Ford are the only Presidents to 
not appoint any female members to the Board (Figure 5.2).
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Figure 5.2 Male versus Female Board Members, by Appointing President
(Sources: Annual Reports, White House Press Releases)
President Nixon’s appointments represent a marked departure from the original 
format. Nixon did not include a representative from the Veterans’ Administration. The 
programme’s original inclusion of veterans’ interests was made with Second World War 
veterans in mind, not the men then returning from the conflict in Vietnam. Nixon appointed 
three attorneys to the Board, John H. Carley and Bernard Katzen of New York, NY; and 
Donald S. Lowitz of Chicago, IL. Two of Nixon’s appointments were drawn from policy 
think-tanks: William Kintner, Director of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, and  J. 
Archie Hargraves, President of the Institute for International Development. Nixon also 
appointed his former USAID director Lane Dwinell, bringing an international development 
perspective to the Board. One of Nixon’s academic appointments, John E. Dolibois, was an 
administrator at Miami University in charge of alumni relations. In his memoirs, he writes of 
his initial proposal to create a Fulbright Alumni Association. “Its members would become a 
powerful voice in lobbying Congress. Organized on a geographical basis, they could 
interview candidates for grants, and promote educational and cultural exchange. The 
possibilities were endless.” (Dolibois, 1989, p. 226).
President Gerald Ford appointed only eight members to the Board, fewer than any 
other president. During Ford’s brief presidency, many of the Board of Foreign Scholarships 
members were reappointments carried over from the Nixon years. Ford’s appointees were 
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primarily drawn from academia, as five out of eight were professors and deans at universities. 
Following the example set by Nixon, two appointees were affiliated with think-tanks and the 
remaining Board member was an attorney.
The Carter administration’s reorganisation of public diplomacy activities is reflected 
in his Board appointments. The emphasis on communication can be seen in his three 
appointments drawn from the media: The Anniston Star newspaper publisher H. Brandt 
Ayers, the president of Firehouse magazine and novelist Bartle Bull, and Pulitzer Prize 
winning journalist Harrison Salisbury. Bull also had long-standing connections to the 
Democratic party, working on Robert F. Kennedy’s presidential campaign in 1968. Carter’s 
appointments also included the first African-American woman, Adelaide Cromwell Gulliver 
of Boston University, and the first Hispanic member of the Board, Mario Anglada, executive 
director of Aspira, a non-profit organisation that promotes education and leadership 
development for Latino youth.
President Ronald Reagan drew two of his Board members, Jeffrey B. Gayner and 
Philip N. Marcus, from the Heritage Foundation, a conservative think-tank. Think-tank 
affiliations suggest a blend of partisanship and academic credentials, as many members are 
former or retired academics. Reagan appointed more members from the business world than 
any of his predecessors, but he also appointed more academics than any of his successors. 
Reagan’s appointments represent a balance of affiliations, though in terms of demographics 
they are primarily white and male. 
President George H. W. Bush drew on a variety of sources for his appointments, 
including five academics and two from think-tanks. Like President Johnson, Bush appointed 
two of his White House staff, Katherine Super and Rose Zamaria. Just before leaving office 
in 1993, Bush appointed Mark N. Blitz, former associate director for educational and cultural 
affairs at USIA, to the Board. It is also worth noting that the elder Bush did not appoint any 
members from the business community to the Board. The Republican Party and the Bush 
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family are often associated with business, so it is interesting that Bush did not draw on these 
relationships for Board appointments.
As Bill Clinton was mentored by Senator Fulbright, it is interesting to note that he 
was the only President to appoint Board members who were in some way connected with the 
programme’s founder. He appointed the Senator’s wife, Harriet Mayor Fulbright, as well as 
two former staff members, Fulbright’s chief of staff Lee Williams and his press secretary and 
special assistant Hoyt Purvis. His other appointments, however, were primarily from the 
world of business. Clinton appointed eight businesspeople, more than any other President, 
and only three academics, fewer than any other President (Figure 5.1). Clinton’s choices 
reflect his personal background and the nature of the economically driven U.S. foreign policy 
agenda of the 1990s. In the post-Cold War environment, international trade became the most 
important issue on America’s foreign policy agenda, and Clinton’s appointments from the 
business world reflect this state of affairs.
George W. Bush’s appointments to the Board reflect his background and personal life 
perhaps more than any other President. He appointed his former roommate at Yale, Robert D. 
McCallum Jr., as well as the First Lady’s former chief of staff Anita McBride. He appointed 
six Texans, including his father’s former chief of staff Jean Becker and the aforementioned 
Jan O’Neill, a family friend. Figure 5.3 shows that a higher percentage of George W. Bush’s 
appointees were from his home state than any other President. Truman, Eisenhower and 
Carter did not appoint anyone from their home states and, to date, Barack Obama has not 
appointed anyone from either Hawaii or Illinois.
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Figure 5.3 Percentage of Appointees from the President’s Home State
(Sources: Annual Reports, White House Press Releases)
President Barack Obama appointed the first former Fulbright grantees to the Board: 
Mark Brzezkinski (Poland, 1991), Christie Gilson (China, 2006) and Gabrielle Giffords 
(Mexico, 1993). With a balance of seven women to five men, he is the first and only 
president to appoint more women than men to the Board. He also appointed the first openly 
gay member of the Board, author and New York University professor Tom Healy. As 
Chairman of the Board, Healy writes about the Fulbright Program for online news aggregator 
and blog site, The Huffington Post (Healy, 2013). He has raised the profile of the position of 
Board chair in his advocacy for exchanges and his work offers a thought-provoking 
consideration of soft power and its applications.
Conclusion
Over sixty-five years after the Fulbright Program’s establishment, there is still some 
disagreement over the true purpose of the programme and its appropriate home in 
Washington bureaucracy. The record of administrative changes and reorganisations can tell 
us a great deal about how the purpose of the Fulbright Program has been perceived, and how 
the role of exchange diplomacy has been conceptualised. Until 1978, the programme was 
kept at the State Department because Senator Fulbright and other exchange diplomacy 
advocates were concerned about the programme’s reception abroad. If the programme were 
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to be directed by a propaganda agency like the USIA, they feared, this would diminish its 
credibility and effectiveness. Observers like Richard Arndt have argued that America’s 
cultural diplomacy suffered greatly after the integration of the Bureau of Educational and 
Cultural Affairs and the Information Agency (Arndt, 2005; Arndt in Thompson, 1987). 
However, for the Fulbright Program at least, the move did not have the negative impacts that 
Senator Fulbright had feared. This suggests that the exchange programme was remarkably 
adaptable and resilient. 
The Board has alternately been composed of academics and politicians, business 
people and lawyers, friends of the President and alumni of the exchange programme. The 
Board simultaneously protected the Fulbright Program from political influence and 
represented the most direct means for the President to influence the direction of programme. 
The appointment of Board members with think-tank affiliations is a particularly interesting 
phenomenon. Think-tanks offer a means of legitimising partisan appointments, as members 
of think-tanks are often former or current academics. As members of the Board of Foreign 
Scholarships, those drawn from partisan think-tanks have both political affiliations and 
academic credentials. The fact that these partisan appointments did not result in the 
politicisation of the programme suggests that the multiple levels of insulation did prevent the 
programme from being misused for political purposes. Senator Fulbright’s plan included 
measures such as binational administration and private partnerships, and they managed to 
protect his exchange programme. According to his biographer, Senator Fulbright “believed 
that the Board ought to be mainly scholars and veterans of the exchange program. But he 
didn’t see any way around presidential appointment. And his attitude was, the program’s a 
hell of a lot stronger than they are. I mean, it’s gonna survive.” (Appendix A, p. 266). 
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Chapter 6
The Fulbright Grantee Experience
Introduction
The nature of the Fulbright grantee experience is central to questions of the 
programme’s purpose, impacts, and reputation. Fulbright grantees are ‘the human element’ 
discussed in exchange diplomacy literature (Scott-Smith, 2009). The students, researchers, 
lecturers and other participants determine the programme’s success. As a USICA evaluative 
study asserted, “The impact and value of exchanges ultimately rest with the promotion of the 
exchanges themselves and the resulting benefits that are derived in mutual understanding 
between the two countries.” (Staats, 1979, p. 48). Grantees are seen as the agents who 
promote mutual understanding in their daily interactions abroad with hosts and locals. They 
are often thought to act as ‘citizen diplomats’ or ‘unofficial ambassadors’ during their 
academic travels. As described in the theoretical framework of this study, they are thought to 
share their culture with others abroad, and then to pass this knowledge on to their 
communities when they return home. Long after the end of the grant period, it is assumed, 
they will continue to contribute to the Fulbright Program’s activities. 
Alumni often go on to serve the programme as fundraisers, lobbyists, volunteers and 
selection panellists. Senator Fulbright believed that participation did not end with the grant 
period. Rather, according to his conceptualisation of the program, Fulbrighters would use 
their experiences to benefit society for the rest of their lives. He envisioned his programme’s 
alumni “scattered throughout the world, acting as knowledgeable interpreters of their own 
and others’ societies; as persons equipped and willing to deal with conflict or conflict-
producing situations on the basis of an informed determination to solve them peacefully, and 
as opinion leaders communicating their appreciation of the societies which they visited to 
others in their own society.” (Fulbright, 1976, p. 3).
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Due to the centrality of the individual participant, evaluative studies of the Fulbright 
Program have tended to focus on the grantee experience. The personal and professional 
impacts of the Fulbright experience are well documented in the literature (Mendelsohn and 
Orenstein, 1955; Dudden and Dynes, 1987; Arndt and Rubin, 1993). Most accounts, 
however, are descriptive rather than analytical. Returned participants frequently attest that the 
experience was life-changing, and researchers rarely ask further questions to discern the 
nature of these changes. In what way was it life-changing? Did it influence your career 
trajectory or shape your political views? These would both be significant and life-changing 
outcomes, but with very different implications for the practice of exchange diplomacy.
Influencing a foreign grantee’s political views in a pro-US direction, for example, would 
fulfil the assumptions of exchange diplomacy much more than a grantee’s decision to pursue 
a new line of research would.
In the State Department’s official evaluations of educational exchange programmes, 
the satisfaction of returned grantees is often used as proof of effectiveness (SRI, 2005a). A 
high satisfaction rate does little to explain how or whether the programme is successful in 
meeting its objectives. Grantees might reasonably be expected to be satisfied, as the grateful 
recipients of travel grants, research costs and living expenses. Their gratitude tells us nothing 
about the programme’s foreign policy impacts, however, or its ability to foster international 
goodwill. Effectiveness ought to be measured in terms of the programme’s stated goals, the 
increase of mutual understanding between people of the United States and the people of other 
nations.
This chapter seeks to examine the role of the Fulbright grantee’s experience in the 
context of American public diplomacy activities. It considers the third research question: how 
does the grantee experience fulfil public diplomacy objectives? The first section examines 
who the grantees are, where they come from and travel to, and what they do during the 
sojourn. These basic demographics provide a foundation for the second, more analytical 
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section of this chapter, in which the impacts of the programme are discussed. Programme 
evaluations, which rely on the grantee experience to demonstrate effectiveness, will be 
reviewed. The long-term impacts of the Fulbright experience will be discussed in relation to 
the activities of the Fulbright Association, the programme’s alumni organisation. Finally, the 
elite nature of the programme’s alumni will be discussed in relation to the theoretical 
framework. Elite Fulbright alumni are an example of the opinion leader concept in practice, 
with all of the expectations that this implies. The chapter closes with a brief summary of the 
differences between the experiences of Fulbright grantees and those of other international 
students. Fulbrighters receive both financial and practical support from programme 
administrators, and often have access to resources that others may not have. By comparing 
and contrasting them with other academic sojourners, we can better understand the Fulbright 
experience and its impacts.
The Task of Selecting Fulbrighters
During the first six decades of the Fulbright Program, more than 334,000 individuals 
were exchanged between the United States and 155 other countries (FSB, 2009). Of course, 
in addition to this figure, many others have applied to take part in the programme. What 
distinguishes successful applicants from those who are not selected? How are Fulbright 
grantees chosen? Competitive scholarship selection processes have often been overlooked in 
the literature (Ilchman, Ilchman and Tolar, 2004). The awards are often simply described as 
merit-based, with little elaboration. The selection process is often taken for granted by those 
who assess the programmes, acting as an invisible preface to the grantee experience. 
Examining the process, however, can tell us a great deal about the purposes and factors that 
Fulbright administrators consider as they choose the next generation of grantees.
The selection process begins in marketing and recruitment, as one must first be aware 
of the award in order to apply. Early publicity consisted of programme competition 
announcements, sent across the US and abroad to “...faculty Fulbright Advisers, screening 
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committee members, editors of professional journals, officers of professional associations, 
libraries, medical schools, etc.” (Conference Board of Associated Research Councils, 1957). 
The awards were not publicised to a mass audience but limited to ‘those in the know.’
Information about grant opportunities was sent to carefully targeted stakeholders, people and 
institutions that would be in a position to advise potential applicants. 
The Fulbright Program has relied largely on word-of-mouth advertising. When U.S. 
Fulbright student participants were asked how they had learned about the programme, 49% 
identified an academic advisor or other professor and 35% responded ‘word of mouth.’ (SRI, 
2005a, p. 34). Prospective grantees are often advised to apply for a grant by a friend, a 
relative, or an instructor or colleague at their home institution. In some countries, Fulbright 
Commission representatives host information sessions at universities. These sessions are 
meant to encourage students to consider the Fulbright Program, as well as other educational 
opportunities in the United States. Fulbright binational commissions often act in this advisory 
capacity, providing information about other federal programmes, as well as private-sector 
grants and scholarships. In countries which have no binational commission, the publicity of 
Fulbright and other opportunities are part of the local U.S. Embassy’s administrative 
responsibilities. Fulbright alumni play an important role in recruitment, advising students and 
colleagues and sharing their experiences at public talks or through publications.
Although the Fulbright Program has depended upon word-of-mouth marketing for 
much of its history, that may be changing. In recent years there has been an effort to use 
social media to raise awareness of the programme. Facebook pages and Twitter accounts for 
the Fulbright Program and individual country programmes are active recruitment tools. They 
share links to the online application, post information about eligibility requirements and 
submission deadlines, and announce new awards. They also give users a forum in which to 
ask questions about the application process or share stories about their experiences abroad 
(Fulbright Program, 2014a). Similarly, the Fulbright Program’s YouTube channel hosts over 
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100 videos, primarily consisting of interviews with grantees speaking about their experiences 
(Fulbright Program, 2014b). The use of social media by the Fulbright Program has important 
implications for its selection process, broadening its applicant pool. In the past, personal 
recommendations were the primary route of advertising. This likely skewed selection towards 
the elite, as those attending or working in elite institutions would be most likely to come into 
contact with the aforementioned stakeholders who received competition announcements. 
Today, social media enables the Fulbright Program to engage, potentially, with a wider 
section of the public in its recruitment.
Selection criteria are determined by the Board of Foreign Scholarships, the 
administrative body of the Fulbright Program which ultimately awards the grants. In practical 
terms, however, the task of selecting grantees falls to the thousands who are involved in 
screening at the institutional, regional and national levels. Most work as volunteers, and many 
are Fulbright alumni themselves. A special report published for the Fulbright Program’s 
twentieth anniversary praised the volunteers who screen applications, and gives us an insight 
into the scale involved in screening.
“Volunteer professionals do the initial screening of every application for an exchange 
grant, both in the United States and overseas. Across the United States in some 800 
separate committees, over 2,800 school, college and university teachers, professors 
and administrators, and men and women otherwise distinguished in the academic, 
professional and cultural world, contribute their time and expertise to this job. Each 
country overseas also has its volunteer screening committees. In all, to choose the 
grantees in the 1965-66 exchange program required the volunteered expertise and 
devoted hours of an estimated 4,800 men and women in the United States and 
abroad.” (BFS, 1966, p. 18).
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This large undertaking has changed little over the Fulbright Program’s history, as applicants 
are still screened by selection committees before the final decision is taken by the Board of 
foreign scholarships.
The decision-making process is relatively opaque, as it is the policy of the Board of 
Foreign Scholarships not to disclose their reasons for selecting or rejecting any given 
candidate. We can, however, gain some insight into the priorities of the Board through their 
published statements on selection criteria. 
The primary consideration is the applicant’s proposed research project. The merit of 
the proposal is judged upon a number of considerations, including its originality, feasibility, 
impact and contribution to knowledge. A 1964 magazine article about the programme 
suggested that Fulbrighters should, first and foremost, be talented academically and 
professionally. “The impression I get from hearing the experiences of many young 
Americans like these is that the ability to do something really well is more important than 
words in leaving behind a good impression, of both the scholar and America. For the 
brightest glows of all are those left by Fulbrighters whose competence won them respect that 
overflowed into respect for America…Abroad, as at home, a person who knows how to do a 
first-class job talks with the loudest voice even before he opens his mouth.” (Cerami, 1964, p. 
78). This concluding sentence offers a succinct justification for the programme’s merit-based 
selection criteria. 
The programme’s founder disagreed with this approach, however. He felt that 
candidate selection should be more holistic, taking an applicant’s character into account. 
Writing at the fifth anniversary of his exchange programme, Senator Fulbright emphasised 
the importance of personal qualities over academic achievement. “High academic standards 
are important, of course. But the purpose of the program is not the advancement of science 
nor the promotion of scholarship. These are by-products of a program whose primary aim is 
international understanding. To this end, it is important that candidates for awards are 
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generally well informed about their country, have emotional stability and common sense.” 
(Fulbright, 1951, p. 18). Here, Senator Fulbright touches on three important personal qualities 
that have a strong bearing on a grantee’s experience abroad. Participants who are well 
informed about their home country are better equipped to share its culture with those they 
meet during the grant period. Emotionally stable grantees will be able to cope with the culture 
shock of living and working in unfamiliar surroundings. Finally, common sense helps
grantees in all aspects of living and studying or working abroad, as they adapt to their new 
environments. 
In an effort to strike the right balance between scholar and diplomat, therefore, 
Fulbright Program selection committees also consider the candidate’s personal qualities. 
They try to predict the scale of an applicant’s future achievements, in a sense. Will this 
candidate become a leader in his or her field? Over time, administrators learn to recognise the 
qualities that indicate future achievement. In their work on competitive scholarships, 
Sternberg and Grigorenko propose that future leaders demonstrate a synthesis of wisdom, 
intelligence and creativity. These qualities, they argue, are better predictors of a candidate’s 
leadership potential than academic transcripts or standardised test scores (Sternberg and 
Grigorenko in Ilchman, Ilchman and Tolar, 2004). These personality characteristics are 
valuable metrics for selection committees, and can be observed in a candidate’s interviews 
and essays.
Leadership qualities have long been considered an important feature of the Fulbright 
grantee profile. The following early statement on selection appeared in a March 11, 1957 
Foreign Service Educational Exchange Circular, issued by the Department of State.
Candidates preferably should be persons who show promise of attaining, or who 
actually occupy, positions of responsibility and influence in their respective spheres of 
activity. Leadership—including leadership among youth and student groups—or 
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potential leadership in particular fields or professions which are important to country 
program objectives should be an important factor...(U.S. Dept. of State, 1957, p. 7)
It is important to note, however, that the Board of Foreign Scholarships does make changes to 
its selection criteria. In the most recent statement of guiding principles for grantee selection, 
there is no such emphasis on leadership. Rather, administrators are advised to “Recognize 
and reward academic, artistic, and professional excellence…[and] Select grantees who 
demonstrate dynamism and flexibility for active involvement in the host culture.” (Bureau of 
Educational and Cultural Affairs, 2013). This suggests that the programme currently 
emphasises merit and cultural engagement.
As they result from careful, multiple-stage screening and collaborative decision-
making, Fulbright application decisions are rarely contested. One exception is the 
Loewenberg case, a controversial episode that questioned the politics behind Fulbright grant 
selection. In 1959, Professor Bert J. Loewenberg applied for a Fulbright grant after being 
invited by the University of Leeds to lecture in American history. His application was 
recommended by two screening committees, but turned down by the Board of Foreign 
Scholarships. Several prominent professors alleged that Loewenberg had been rejected 
because the Board had doubts about his loyalty as an American citizen (Joughlin, 1960). The 
matter was taken to the American Association of University Professors and appeared in the 
press across the country. The New York Times reported that the eight members of one 
screening committee that had recommended Loewenberg had all threatened to resign unless 
the Board agreed to review his case and, if his loyalty had been questioned, provide Professor 
Loewenberg with an opportunity to respond to any allegations (Kenworthy, 1959, p. 81).
Due to the controversy and resulting media attention, the Board made an exception to 
its policy of giving no reasons for its decisions, and chose to defend its process with a public 
statement. “For the 1959-60 academic year, twenty-four awards were available for American 
professors to lecture or conduct research in the United Kingdom. Two-hundred and thirty-
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seven American scholars applied…the Board chose the candidates it considered best 
qualified to receive the available awards.” (Storey, 1959, p. 2). The Board reaffirmed its 
decision and refuted the claim that Loewenberg’s loyalty had been a factor in their 
consideration of his application. They asserted, instead, that it had been simply a matter of 
competition. “The regrettable fact is that so many qualified candidates applying each year 
simply cannot be accommodated.” (ibid.). The Board makes an effort to distribute grants 
geographically, as well. The fact that Loewenberg’s home institution was located in New 
York state, which has many prestigious universities, may have made this a particularly 
competitive case. In the interest of fair geographical distribution, the number of awards given 
to candidates from New York state may have been limited. Preference is also given to 
applicants who had not previously had an opportunity to live and work; Professor 
Loewenberg had significant overseas experience. The following year, however, Loewenberg 
was awarded a Fulbright grant for the lectureship at the University of Leeds. The Board, 
adhering to its original policy, did not publicly state a reason for this decision.
As with any competitive scholarship, the number of applications exceeds the number 
of available awards each year. In 2009, there were 5,155 applications for 1,024 U.S. Student 
Program grants, indicating an overall acceptance rate of 19.9%, or just under 1 in 5 (U.S. 
Fulbright Program, 2011). Table 6.1 illustrates the distribution of these applications and 
awards by grantee destination in 2011. Europe is by far the most popular region, receiving 
more applications than East Asia, Africa, the Near East and South and Central Asia 
combined. Europe is also particularly well-funded, as discussed in chapter four, with many 
European countries contributing equally, or more than the United States, to their Fulbright 
exchanges. Due to the high number of awards available in Europe then, the acceptance rate 
for this popular region is near average (18.2%).
The lowest acceptance rate is found amongst applicants to Africa (11.5%), while the 
highest acceptance rate is in South and Central Asia, where 28.2% of applications are 
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successful (ibid.). This pattern may be related to discrepancies in funding and cost-sharing. 
There are fewer cost-sharing arrangements in place between the U.S. and its African partner 
nations than there are in South and Central Asia. During the 2009-10 academic year, for 
example, 18 out of 48 African Fulbright participating nations contributed financially to the 
exchanges (FSB, 2009, p. 54). Amongst these, Morocco, Botswana and Egypt were the only 
countries to contribute more than $100,000 (ibid.). In South and Central Asia, by contrast, 
India contributed over $3 million and Pakistan nearly $6 million to their Fulbright exchanges 
with the United States. While other factors such as language teaching, application quality and 
individual preferences of potential grantees will contribute to the differences in acceptance 
rates and popularity, the cost-sharing discrepancies across regions are noteworthy. Funding, 
as discussed in chapter five, inevitably influences many aspects of the Fulbright Program.
Table 6.1 U.S. Fulbright Program Applications and Awards, 2011
Region Applications Awards Acceptance Rate
Europe 2209 403 18.2%
East Asia and Pacific 846 184 21.7%
Western Hemisphere 806 186 23.0%
Africa 582 67 11.5%
Near East/North Africa 404 97 24.0%
South and Central Asia 308 87 28.2%
World Total 5155 1024 19.8%
(Source: U.S. Fulbright Program, 2011).
It could be argued that the relatively low acceptance rates across all regions are an 
indication that the programme’s selection procedures are truly merit-based. In some cases, 
countries do not accept any of their applicants, despite the availability of award funds. In 
2009, this occurred amongst American student applications to Slovakia (5 applicants), 
Gambia (1), Gabon (1), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (2), Macao (2) and Yemen (1)
when no candidates were successful. This phenomenon suggests that the awards are granted 
on the basis of merit, as being the sole applicant for a country with available awards does not 
guarantee acceptance.
As a final note on the topic of selection, it is important to recognise that Fulbrighters 
are a self-selected group. They are not nominated by their government or other officials; 
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applicants put themselves forward for consideration on their own initiative. Self-selection has 
significant implications, as noted by a UNESCO study of international educational exchange 
programmes. “It requires a certain amount of enterprise to take this step and face the 
adventure that it is hoped will result, especially for those coming from families whose 
members have not been accustomed to foreign travel in the past. It is very important that 
scope should exist for self-selection of this kind as distinct from the ‘drafting’ of students by 
governments or education authorities.” (Eide, 1970, p. 12). The very fact that they have 
chosen to apply for a Fulbright grant tells selection committees something about a 
candidate’s personality, initiative and ambition. In her work on self-efficacy and study 
abroad, Tema Milstein suggests that the act of self-selection indicates a strong belief in one’s 
own capabilities. “People who choose to sojourn, a generally daunting task, may need high 
degrees of self-efficacy in order to make the initial decision to do so.” (Milstein, 2005, p. 
233). Self-selection ensures that grantees are motivated and willing participants, and insulates 
the programme from the political misuse that might result from the involvement of the state 
or other authorities in ‘nominating’ candidates.
Fulbright Categories and Distribution
Grant categories determine the capacity in which a grantee goes abroad. They vary 
according to the purpose and the duration of the grant: for teaching or research, for a two-
week lecture series, an academic term, or a year-long stay. The Fulbright Program umbrella 
includes a wide range of different grant categories. Fulbrighters can be students, researchers, 
lecturers, artists, film-makers, librarians—essentially, anyone involved in educational or 
cultural activities. There are eleven core grant categories, seven for visiting (foreign) grantees 
and four for American citizens. These include Students (U.S. and Visiting), Research 
Scholars (U.S. and Visiting), Lecturing Scholars (U.S. and Visiting), Teacher Exchange or 
Seminars (U.S. and Visiting), Practical Experience or Training (Visiting only), Study of the 
U.S. (Visiting only), and Hubert H. Humphrey Fellowships (Visiting only).
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Over the course of the programme’s history, grant categories have fluctuated in 
popularity and in funding. The number of English-language teaching assistantship grants, for 
example, has increased dramatically over the past decade, due to rising demand from other 
nations for English instructors (Wilhelm, 2010). In 2000, there were 109 Fulbright English 
teaching assistants working in five countries. In 2010, the programme had expanded to 725 
grantees across 66 countries (U.S. Fulbright Program, 2014). The list of destination countries 
includes many smaller states that might not otherwise participate in the Fulbright Program. 
The principality of Andorra, for example, hosted five English teaching assistants, while 
Luxembourg had two. In both countries, these teaching assistants were the only American 
grantees for that year. The dramatic increase of English teaching assistantships suggests that 
the Fulbright Program has become more responsive to the needs of its partnering nations.
Figures 6.1 and 6.2 depict the distribution of grantees across the different award 
categories, based on total figures from the first sixty years of the programme, 1949-2009 
(FSB, 2009). Visiting grantees have been predominantly students (60.8%) and research 
scholars (18.5%), while only 3.8% of visiting grantees have lectured at U.S. universities and 
colleges (Figure 6.1). American grantees have been more evenly distributed across the range 
of categories, with students constituting less than half of the total number of grantees 
(42.8%). Significantly, research scholars are the smallest group (12.4%). The figures suggest 
that Americans go abroad to lecture and teach, rather than to engage in research. Conversely, 
foreign grantees come to the U.S. to study, rather than to lecture or teach. 
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Figure 6.1 Visiting Fulbright Grantees, by Category (1949-2009)
(Source: FSB, 2009)
Figure 6.2 U.S. Fulbright Grantees, by Category (1949-2009)
(Source: FSB, 2009).
This pattern of unequal distribution has important implications for the ways in which we 
think about the Fulbright Program’s declared mutuality. If one side of the exchange equation 
participates in different activities than the other side does, how mutual is the exchange 
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relationship? On the basis of these figures, increasing the size of the visiting lecturer 
programme would help to bring balance to the exchange relationship.
American Grantee Destinations
Europe has been by far the most popular destination for American Fulbright grantees. 
It has also been, not coincidentally, the most popular study abroad destination for U.S. 
undergraduates more generally (IIE, 2014). The Fulbright Program in Germany is a 
particularly large programme, which explains in part the large number of American grantees 
who have sojourned in Europe. With over 46,000 American and German alumni, more 
Fulbright grantees have been exchanged with Germany than with any other country in the 
world (FSB, 2010). There are a number of explanations for American students’ partiality 
towards European destinations. The most compelling reason might be that the U.S. public 
education system prepares students to study in Europe. The history taught in U.S. schools is 
typically entitled ‘Western Civilization,’ consisting of modern European history. The foreign 
languages most commonly taught in American schools are all of European origin: Spanish, 
French and German. It is difficult for American students to find instruction in Arabic or 
Mandarin, for example, and to do so would require the use of private resources. It could be 
argued that American students are ill-prepared by their curriculum to study outside of Europe.
Critics might question the need for so many Fulbright exchanges between the U.S. 
and Europe. There exist strong political, economic and cultural ties between the American 
and European people. In terms of public diplomacy goals of fostering mutual understanding 
and goodwill, the practice does seem redundant. Perhaps it is unnecessary to actively promote 
and fund exchange-of-persons programmes between societies that already know each other 
well, trade with each other and act as allies in many international conflicts. Exchange 
advocates, however, see the value in continued exchanges between allies. Former Assistant 
Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs Charles Frankel argued that, far from 
making them redundant, friendship justified continued exchanges between the U.S. and 
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Europe. “Precisely because the peoples of the Atlantic area hear so much and see so much of 
each other, there is a strong necessity for systematic programs of educational and cultural 
exchange across the Atlantic.” (Frankel, 1968, p. 16).
At the opposite end of the spectrum, Africa has received the fewest American 
Fulbright grantees and is the least popular study abroad destination for U.S. students (FSB, 
2010; IIE, 2014). Even before the Fulbright Program was established, American educational 
exchanges routinely ignored African countries. The first annual report of the Institute for 
International Education discusses the increased interest in studying in the U.S. after the First 
World War. Notably, it mentions every region apart from Africa. “The War has aroused a 
great interest in the United States in every country of Europe, and large numbers of students 
are anxious to come here to study, but have not the funds. This is also true of Latin America, 
the Far East and the Near East.” (Duggan, 1920, p. 7). Africa, unfortunately, has been a 
neglected continent in America’s international educational exchange activities.
Although Africa has produced and hosted fewer Fulbright grantees than other regions, 
there are a number of success stories involving the continent. John Atta Mills, the late 
President of Ghana (2009-2012), was a Fulbright Scholar at Stanford Law School in 1971. He 
was the first Fulbrighter to become a President of any republic in the world (FSB, 2009). A 
study of American Fulbright Senior Scholars in Africa found that the programme had been 
generally successful, meeting both general Fulbright Program aims, such as increased mutual 
understanding, and goals that are more localised, such as institutional development. Alumni 
reported that their experiences in Africa had led to “provision of a network of African peer 
and student contacts which, for a substantial segment of returned Fulbrighters, builds over 
time.” (Sunal and Sunal, 1991, p. 117). Personal contacts such as these help to develop and 
maintain ties between African and American universities, research networks and grant 
programmes. They play an important role in supporting the local higher education 
infrastructure.
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The domestic infrastructure of African universities, shaped in many places by colonial 
powers and interests, may have hampered the expansion of the Fulbright Program on the 
continent. The legacy of French and Portuguese colonialism in Africa meant that in many 
countries, these languages were preferred over English as a second language. Board of 
Foreign Scholarships member G. Homer Durham encountered this preference on a tour of 
educational exchange posts in Africa. “The Liberian and Ghanaian Commissions have the 
benefit of the English language. The Tunisian Commission I found to be virtually non-
operative. It was viewed as a costly, time-consuming, awkward and ineffective organization 
by the PAO [Public Affairs Officer] and CAO [Cultural Affairs Officer],” Durham told his 
colleagues in the Board. “I nevertheless received the impression that despite the Tunisian 
penchant for the prestige of the French educational system, the complications of the French 
and Arabic languages and transcriptions of records in English as well, that the Commission 
should be retained and used whenever and wherever possible.” (Durham, 1966, p. 3). These 
examples illustrate some of the linguistic and cultural challenges that Fulbright administrators 
have faced in the region. These challenges, and the aforementioned funding concerns, go 
some way towards explaining the low grantee numbers, both to and from Africa.
American grantee destination choices are also limited by the state of U.S. foreign 
relations. The case of the Fulbright Program in China offers a clear example of how 
educational exchanges can be employed as a reward or punishment, a ‘carrot’ or ‘stick’, in 
international relations. The first suspension of the Fulbright Program in China was initiated 
by the United States in 1949, in response to the Communist Revolution. America’s Cold War 
anti-Communist foreign policy stance was the cause behind this suspension. When the Nixon 
administration re-established relations with China, this opened the door for educational and 
cultural exchanges, including Fulbright, to be renewed in later years under President Carter. 
America’s engagement with China through exchanges signified a move towards normalised 
relations between the two countries. When China suspended the programme in 1989, 
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however, it was in retaliation over American criticism of the Tiananmen Square incident. 
Although both countries, of course, have an equal say in participation, this was the first case 
in which a partnering country, rather than the United States, initiated the suspension of 
Fulbright Program exchanges. Although exchanges were resumed the following year, China’s 
suspension triggered bilateral negotiations and reduced the size of the programme. The 
suspensions and renewals of the U.S.-China exchange programme illustrate the varied 
political factors involved in this allegedly ‘apolitical’ activity.
Women and the Fulbright Program
Women have played an important but often overlooked role in the Fulbright Program, 
both as grantees and as accompanying dependents of grantees. Unlike many educational 
institutions, the Fulbright Program has always been open to women. The Ivy League was not 
fully co-educational until 1983, while Rhodes Scholarships were only made available to 
women through a 1974 parliamentary amendment (Ilchman, Ilchman and Tolar, 2004). The 
Fulbright Program has had female grantees, as well as women on the Board of Foreign 
Scholarships, since its establishment in 1946. There have been many prominent female 
Fulbright alumni throughout its history, including National Public Radio host Melissa Block, 
neuroscientist Nancy Andreasen, Italian journalist Loretta Napoleoni, opera singers Anna 
Moffo and Renée Fleming, and U.S. Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords. In a less prominent 
and largely overlooked capacity, women have contributed to the culture learning experience 
as wives of Fulbright grantees. Both roles will be explored in this section.
Throughout the history of American public diplomacy activities, women have often 
been given less attention than their male counterparts. Early U.S. Information Agency 
documents explain that the prioritisation of male audiences was due to a general lack of 
female leaders. Any efforts to reach out to women were not expected to produce a significant 
impact, because women did not hold leadership positions. As men hold leadership positions, 
they are more valuable public diplomacy targets. Following this logic, the reports suggest that 
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targeting women would simply reduce the resources available for targeting male audiences. A 
1959 USIA report on women’s activities explained that the changing status of women in 
some countries was a further complicating factor in planning its overseas information 
activities. “We are working in the dark. Where women themselves do not know what their 
new roles are; where their men are perceiving change with unease and anger, the official 
information program of the United States Government can proceed only with utmost 
caution.” (Geiger, 1959, p. 12). The report had been prepared for Senator Fulbright; his 
request for information on women’s activities suggests that he appreciated the changing role 
of women in these countries.
The recommendation that more emphasis be placed on the selection of women has 
appeared in a number of reports over the history of the Fulbright Program. The 1963 report, A 
Beacon of Hope, noted that women leaders were especially needed in the case of the 
developing world. “In the past, although about a fifth of all foreign grantees coming to the 
United States have been women, very few of these have been leaders. In 1962, for example, 
only 43 women were chosen as grantees from the whole of Africa, and only 15 of these were 
leaders. From all the Near East and South Asia in 1962, there were only 11 women leader 
grantees, and from the Far East only 13.” (Gardner, 1963, p. 36).
On the whole, it can be difficult to assess the number of female grantees over the 
programme’s history. No study has been undertaken, to date, to examine the role of women in 
the Fulbright Program, and demographic information is limited in the archival material. The 
Fulbright Program’s annual reports, for example, do not contain figures on age, race or sex. 
Some evaluative studies, however, do include this information in their reports. The figures in 
the following analysis are taken from such studies, both academic and those undertaken by 
programme officials.
The distribution of male and female grantees has become more equal over time, 
though the balance is still decidedly in favour of male grantees. In the student category, the 
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U.S. grantees are nearly equally divided: 52% male and 48% female (SRI, 2005b). Amongst 
visiting students, however, women are outnumbered: 65% male and 35% female (SRI, 
2005a). Women have also been found to be outnumbered by men in the lecturer and research 
scholar grant categories. Statistics from the 1957-58 research and lecturing grant competition 
show that women constituted 13% of applicants and 8% of awards (Conference Board of 
Associated Research Councils, 1957). In their study of American Fulbright lecturers in 
Africa, Sunal and Sunal found that although the percentage of female lecturers increased over 
time, the distribution of male and female grantees in this category remained significantly 
uneven. In the 1972-73 academic year, women compromised just 3% of the lecturer grants to 
Africa. Ten years later, in the 1982-83 academic year, the balance had shifted to 22% female 
and 78% male (Sunal and Sunal, 1991, p. 115). While these figures reflect a substantial 
increase over the ten year period, they also illustrate the disparity between male and female 
Fulbright lecturers.
Female Fulbright grantees have also been outnumbered by their male counterparts in 
terms of receiving prestigious awards and holding leadership positions. Amongst the fifty-
four Fulbright alumni who are also Nobel laureates, Rosalyn Yalow is the only woman (U.S. 
Department of State, 2014). Likewise, just three women are amongst the twenty-nine 
Fulbrighters who have gone on to serve as heads of state or government (Fulbright 
Association, 2013). In academia, the most noteworthy example of leadership is former Brown 
University president Dr. Ruth J. Simmons, the first African-American president of an Ivy 
League institution. 
Among the most famous female Fulbright alumni is American poet Sylvia Plath, who 
studied English literature at Newnham College, Cambridge University from 1955 to 1957. 
Her diaries and letters reveal Plath’s motivations for applying for a Fulbright grant, her first 
impressions of England, and her goals for her Fulbright experience. Her earliest mentions of 
Fulbright appear in her diaries, going back to 1952. Fulbright appears listed among many 
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other aspirations, much like one of the figs from Plath’s fig tree analogy in The Bell Jar. It is 
one of many paths that she might choose, and she finds the decision overwhelming. In 
January 1953, she mentions a destination country for the potential grant for the first time. “Of 
course, there is always the ambitious project of trying for a Fulbright to England (only a 
million people want them, no competition, really).” (Kukil, 2000, p. 166).
Plath’s plans become more concrete during her final term at Smith College, when she 
begins to apply for graduate school and grant opportunities. In a letter to her mother dated 27 
September 1954, Plath describes the Fulbright grant application process in detail. The 
previous year, she had been treated for depression at McLean Hospital for six months 
following a suicide attempt. In the letter, she expresses her fear that this history of mental 
illness might count against her, and she considers how that might be addressed with the right 
letters of recommendation.
“My main bother this month is my Fulbright application. I’ve had numerous 
interviews with the head of the graduate office and all my former professors, all of 
which have at least resulted in most gratifying results: Elizabeth Drew, Newton Arvin, 
and Mary Ellen Chase have agreed to write my letters of recommendation, and as they 
are all very big names in their field internationally, I should have an advantage there 
that might compensate for my mental hospital record. I think I definitely am going to 
write Dr. B [Plath’s therapist Ruth Beuscher] for my personal reference as I have to 
tell about McLean anyway, and a letter from her would serve the double purpose of 
eloquent recommendation and also of leaving no doubt as to the completeness of my 
cure.” (Plath, 1975, p. 141).
Over the following months, Plath was accepted under separate applications to 
Cambridge and Oxford, hedging her bets with another funding opportunity from the 
American Association of University Women. She accepted the offer of a Fulbright grant for 
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study at Cambridge in May 1955, and wrote enthusiastic letters home upon her arrival in 
England that September.
“Where to begin! I feel almost smothered when I start to write this, my first letter! I 
feel that I am walking in a dream,” Sylvia wrote to her mother from London, while en route 
to Cambridge for the first time (ibid., p. 181). While Plath certainly enjoyed her time at 
Cambridge and renewed her Fulbright grant for a second year in March of 1956, her tone in 
these letters changed, showing that she became less infatuated with England over time. On 20 
March, 1956, Plath tells her mother “I must say, too, I am happier every day to be an 
American! For all the golden ‘atmosphere’ of England, there is an oppressive ugliness about 
even the upper-middle class homes, an ancient, threadbare dirtiness which at first shocked 
me. Our little white house is a gem of light and color compared to the dwellings here.” (ibid., 
p. 231). Plath’s reaction may be read as a mix of homesickness and culture shock.
Sylvia Plath met English poet Ted Hughes at a party in April 1956, and the two were 
secretly married just two months later. Her mother was visiting Sylvia at the time, and was 
the only family member in attendance at the surprise ceremony. In letters over the following 
months, the reason for Plath’s secrecy is explained. “At first, I thought I could study better 
away from him [Ted] and domestic cares and that the Fulbright might cancel my grant if I 
were married and Newnham disown me...[but then] I looked up the Fulbright lists, and they 
have three married women on grants.” (ibid., p. 279). When Plath informed the Commission 
of her marriage, she learned that her fears of grant cancellation were unfounded. The 
Fulbright Commission in London congratulated Plath on her marriage. “One of their main 
qualifications of the grant, I discovered, is that you take back your cultural experience to 
America, and they were enchanted at my suggestion that I was taking back double in the form 
of Ted as a teacher and writer.” (ibid., pp. 282-283). The couple did fulfil this qualification of 
the grant, however briefly, before settling in the UK permanently. Plath and Hughes spent the 
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academic year following her grant experience in the U.S. at Smith College, where she held 
her first teaching position.
         Women have also played an important role as accompanying dependents of 
Fulbrighters. The experiences of dependents have been largely overlooked in the literature, 
yet they often figure prominently in the anecdotes of returned grantees. Many Fulbrighters 
attest to the added value of having their partners and families with them during the academic 
sojourn. Dependents can serve to widen the social circle of local contacts, as accompanying 
spouses and children make local friends through work, school and social organisations. An 
evaluative study on the exchange programme’s thirtieth-anniversary supports this 
observation. “Several groups noted that among the most lasting and significant contacts made 
while abroad were those of the spouses and children.” (Armbruster, 1976, p. 15). I have 
elected to frame this discussion in terms of accompanying wives, because although there 
certainly have been cases of female Fulbright grantees bringing their husbands with them, the 
archival material available largely consisted of cases in which male Fulbright grantees were 
accompanied by their wives and children. There is a great deal of scope for further research 
in this area, but for the purposes of the present study, this discussion will be limited to the 
experiences of women as Fulbright dependents.
Spouses of Fulbright grantees can contribute in their own way to the multiplier effect, 
acting as cultural mediators between the home and host nations. A 1962 study of American 
Fulbright scholars in India found that grantees’ wives often worked or volunteered outside 
the home and made their own impact on the local community. “Several American wives 
undertook almost full-time activity as public lecturers, classroom teachers, or consultants in 
educational work. Others joined charitable or church organizations or served in the welfare 
programs of village development organizations. Reports from the educational foundations 
highly commend the influence of these women on the Indian community,” the report asserts. 
“The record of these wives and the depth of their understanding of India leads to the 
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conclusion that grantees’ wives are not only an asset or a handicap [to the grantees]. Their 
contributions to communities of countries like India can become highly significant.” 
(MacGregor, 1962, p. 40). 
This has been true of the dependents of visiting Fulbright grantees in America, as 
well. The story of Indian grantee Dawoodbhai Ghanchi and his wife was featured in the 1993 
essay collection, The Fulbright Difference. Throughout his career, Dr. Ghanchi held three 
Fulbright awards, serving as an exchange teacher, a visiting lecturer and a research scholar in 
the United States. He was accompanied by his wife only during the last of these grant 
periods, but he found that having her with him improved his grant experience. “My wife’s 
presence made everything the richer...She gave presentations, organized exhibits of Indian 
artifacts and demonstrated various skills of cooking and dress. To her amazement, she 
learned that American women shared the important things with her: a desire for a stable, 
satisfying and safe home life in a world free from war, want and division.” (Arndt and Rubin, 
1993, p. 231).
Despite the enthusiastic testimonies of these grantees, there are some critics who 
consider the presence of families during the grant period an unnecessary cost. During one 
particularly stringent cost-cutting effort in 1965, Congress slashed $300,000 from the 
Fulbright Program budget by refusing to allocate funding for the travel costs of grantee 
dependents. Representative John J. Rooney, chairman of the House appropriations 
committee, referred to dependent travel as “a luxury the American taxpayer cannot afford.” 
(Oberdorfer, 1965, p. 87). The view that it was unnecessary for dependents to travel with a 
Fulbright grantee, or at least for them to do so with public funds, was shared by the 
programme’s founder. Although Senator Fulbright disagreed with Representative Rooney on 
many occasions, this was a point upon which they had the same opinion. For his part, 
Fulbright simply did not believe in the funding of dependent travel. In an interview with 
former Fulbright Association President Leonard Sussman, Fulbright cited the cost of 
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dependent travel as one of the problems that had arisen in the exchange programme. “The 
original idea, which is still sound, I think, is to take your best American graduate students, 
not their families...Too much is spent on sending professors and their families over.” 
(Sussman, 1992, p. 56). It is worth noting that travel is the only element of dependent 
support; living expense grants are not increased for Fulbrighters who are accompanied by 
dependents. Indeed, this can be a barrier to some grantees, as one critic points out. “For a 
scholar with a family, the situation is nearly intolerable, because most countries legally forbid 
him or his spouse from taking a job that requires a working permit.” (Kostelanetz, 1966, p. 
725).
The Academic Sojourn
After the chosen candidates have accepted their Fulbright grants and all of the 
necessary travel and sponsorship arrangements have been made, the Fulbright experience 
begins in earnest. The following section examines the behaviour and activities of Fulbright 
grantees during their academic sojourn. It begins with a discussion of culture shock, the 
psychological problems that can arise during a grantee’s period of adjustment upon arriving 
in the host country. For many grantees, particularly during the early years of the programme, 
the Fulbright grant afforded their first overseas experience. Adjusting to new surroundings 
can be especially difficult for those who have never lived abroad previously. Regardless of 
prior experience, however the demands of establishing a temporary home overseas can be 
overwhelming. Grantees not only have to study or teach in a new atmosphere, but they must 
also cope with the practical aspects of living abroad, such as finding accommodation and 
managing finances. Culture shock is a commonly reported aspect of the Fulbright experience. 
The discussion will then turn to the empirical question of what grantees actually do 
during the sojourn. Their proposed research project is, of course, the primary concern of 
grantees. The academic fields of Fulbright grantees will be examined and compared across 
grant categories and over time. Culture learning is also an essential part of the Fulbright 
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experience, however, and the ways in which grantees learn about their host country and its 
culture will be discussed in detail. The non-academic activities of Fulbrighters, where a great 
deal of culture learning takes place, will be included in the subsequent section. 
When grantees first arrive in their host country, they may experience symptoms of 
culture shock, a term describing the “stresses and strains which stem from being forced to 
meet one’s everyday needs (e.g. food, cleanliness, companionship) in unfamiliar ways.” 
(Brislin, 1981, p. 13). The degree to which a Fulbrighter experiences culture shock depends 
upon a grantee’s personal qualities, of course, but research has also shown that it can vary 
depending upon the respective cultures of the home and host countries. According to 
psychologist Stephen Bochner’s work on culture shock, the degree of cultural distance 
determines a students’ likelihood to struggle with culture shock. Students who study in 
countries of greater cultural distance are more likely to experience problems coping with 
these changes than students who study in countries that are more similar to their own (Ward, 
Bochner and Furnham, 2001, p. 95). On a visit to Fulbright offices in Afghanistan, Pakistan 
and Nepal, Board of Foreign Scholarships member James R. Roach found that as the 
programme expanded beyond the Western world, more Fulbrighters reported experiencing 
culture shock. “Many grantees waste considerable time, are frustrated and even embittered as 
they struggle to settle themselves and their families into unfamiliar surroundings, and they are 
often greatly disappointed by the gap between their own professional standards and 
expectations and those existing in the host institution.” (Roach, 1966, pp. 1-2). Pre-departure 
orientation sessions in the home country have been found to be an effective means of 
managing participant expectations and easing the grantee’s adjustment upon arrival in the 
host country.
This is not to say that grantees who participate in exchanges between culturally 
similar countries do not experience culture shock. Rather, the impact of culture shock may be 
less pronounced, and a grantee’s behaviour and academic performance may be less affected. 
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In such a case, the more subtle cultural differences may be an interesting discovery and 
learning experience for the grantee, one which might produce mild homesickness rather than 
disruptive culture shock.
Although the degree to which culture shock affects a grantee’s behaviour depends 
upon a range of personal and contextual factors, there is no doubt that culture shock is a 
common problem for Fulbright participants. Anecdotes from grantees attest to this, 
demonstrating how they might experience culture shock in both extra-curricular and 
academic settings. Fulbright Program administrators have also recognised the problem and 
sought to address and alleviate culture shock wherever possible, through orientation 
activities, personal mentoring and other forms of support.
For some fortunate grantees, culture shock is minimal. The thrill of being in new, 
stimulating surroundings can outweigh any difficulties that might arise. They are enamoured 
with their adopted home, even to the point where they are unaffected by negative factors that 
might normally result in culture shock. As one American Fulbrighter in France put it, “I was 
living in a storybook romance which glorified all things French. Therefore, I explained away 
what would otherwise have upset me.” (Arndt and Rubin, 1993, p. 83). The length of this 
‘honeymoon period’ varies from one grantee to another, if it exists at all. But statements like 
the above attest to the enthusiasm for host country culture that is typical of Fulbright 
participants, who are a self-selected group. They have chosen to study or teach in the host 
country on their own initiative. They have likely had to become proficient in a foreign 
language, a commitment that demonstrates an interest in the host country culture. It is 
therefore unsurprising that, for some grantees at least, culture shock may be outweighed by 
more positive sentiments.
Culture Learning
During the grant period, Fulbrighters are expected to share their culture with others 
and to learn about the host country culture. This has been called their ‘ambassadorial’ or 
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‘culture mediator’ role in the literature, and previous studies have found that Fulbrighters are 
generally successful in carrying out this role. They have been found to accomplish many of 
the goals of culture mediation, with returned grantees reporting an increased knowledge of 
the host culture, the establishment of close friendships with host country nationals, and an 
increased competence in intercultural communication (Snow, 1992). Studies have also noted 
that exchange participants can correct certain misconceptions that hosts might hold about 
their home country. In Gullahorn and Gullahorn’s study, American tourists were cited as a 
factor which had strongly contributed to a negative image of the United States abroad. 
According to a French interviewee, “The exchanges between French and American students 
are of great importance because they show that the United States is interested not only in 
force but that it has need of culture and of other values which it lacks. Besides, this helps 
suppress in France a part of the false image which is given us by the American tourists who 
are quite detestable.” (Gullahorn and Gullahorn, 1966, p. 57).
Grantees learn about their host country from their peers and colleagues, both host 
country nationals and fellow foreigners. In Nancy Snow’s study of the cultural mediator role 
played by visiting Fulbright students, her conceptual framework relied on the culture-learning 
model put forward by psychology scholar Stephen Bochner (Snow, 1992, pp. 13-17). A more 
recently updated version of the model emphasises the importance of contact with host 
nationals, a view supported by a number of observed sojourner outcomes. “Frequent contact 
with host students has been associated with greater sojourn satisfaction; social integration and 
having local friends have been linked to lower levels of stress; spending more time with host 
national students is related to having fewer psychological adjustment problems; and 
satisfaction with host national relations predicts better psychological adjustment among 
international students.” (Ward, Bochner and Furnham, 2001, p. 149). As Snow’s study 
demonstrates, this model has important implications for the Fulbright experience. 
Fulbrighters who interact primarily with host country nationals will not only contribute to the 
186
public diplomacy goal of increasing mutual understanding, they will also have a more 
positive experience overall.
Education research has also confirmed the importance of exchange participants’ 
friendships with locals. The Study Abroad Evaluation Project found that interpersonal 
communication with host country nationals was more valuable in terms of culture learning 
than any other activity. “The students reported that the most significant forum for becoming 
familiar with their host country was through group discussions and talking with host 
nationals. Host country nonfiction, journals, television programs and lectures were viewed as 
contributing only marginally to the students’ general understanding and appreciation of the 
culture and society in which they lived.” (Carlson et al, 1990, p. 42). This suggests that 
culture learning and friendship networks are inextricably linked. As the Fulbright Program’s 
mission is to promote culture learning and increase mutual understanding, the friendship 
networks of Fulbright grantees play a vital role in accomplishing its mission.
According to Bochner’s functional friendship model, students abroad tend to have 
three friendship groups within their social spheres: host nationals, other international 
students, and fellow compatriots. Each of these groups, he argues, plays a distinct but equally 
important role in a student’s social life (Ward, Bochner and Furnham, 2001, pp. 147-148). 
Each of these friendship groups is utilised in the culture learning process. Locals are valuable 
in terms of language acquisition, as well as providing ‘insider’ information about the host 
country culture. Compatriots often mediate culture more effectively than host nationals, 
however, because they have a shared knowledge base of culture to reference. There has been 
little research on the role of other international students in the social network of student 
sojourners, but some studies suggest that their role is largely recreational, and that they can 
provide social support (ibid., pp. 149-150).
In a study of American and European study abroad participants, it was noted that 
Americans tended to be the group most likely to utilise both host national and compatriot 
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friendship networks in the culture learning process. “Asking host nationals about their 
country was notably pronounced among the Americans, whose responses interestingly also 
indicated they had conferred comparatively more extensively with fellow Americans abroad, 
to become more knowledgeable about the host country.” (Opper et al, 1990, pp. 45-46). This 
finding confirms the importance of the friendship groups outlined in Bochner’s model, but 
differs with respect to their roles. It supports the idea that both host nationals and compatriots 
play valuable roles in the culture learning process.
However, students themselves can perceive contact with compatriots as a negative 
aspect of the study abroad experience. “The great importance attached by students to 
integration into the life of the host country becomes apparent in that their most common 
complaint, given a list of various potential difficulties, was that too much time was spent with 
students or other people from one’s own country.” (ibid., p. 206). Excessive time spent with 
compatriots may be seen as a lost opportunity for culture learning, but it can happen easily, as 
friendship network models suggest that the social support of compatriots is also important. 
Taking the two concepts of culture shock and the friendship model together, we can 
see how cultural distance might relate to a grantee’s friendship networks. Participants who 
are exchanged between culturally dissimilar countries may be expected to experience more 
culture shock and therefore rely more heavily on the social and practical support of 
compatriot friends. Fulbrighters who are exchanged between more culturally similar 
countries, on the other hand, may experience less culture shock and feel more confident about 
forming friendships with host country nationals. These concepts relate strongly to the first of 
the assumptions in the theoretical framework, the contact hypothesis. They explain, to some 
extent, how the desired interpersonal contact with target groups may be encouraged or 
inhibited by cultural factors and psychological effects. This has important implications for 
our understanding of the contact that takes place in the Fulbright experience.
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Research and Extra-Curricular Activities
What do Fulbright Program grantees do while abroad? First and foremost, they carry 
out academic research and teaching work as proposed in their applications. In terms of 
academic fields, there has long been a significant difference between the fields of study for 
U.S. and Visiting Fulbright grantees. American grantees tend to be primarily in the 
humanities, while Visiting grantees are more evenly disbursed across the social sciences, the 
humanities, and physical and natural sciences (Figure 6.3). These trends were consistent for 
much of the history of the Fulbright Program. In the 1979-80 academic year, 68% of U.S. 
grantees were in the humanities, while amongst Visiting grantees, 35% were in the social 
sciences and 21% were in the humanities (FSB, 1980, pp. 38-45).
Figure 6.3 Fields of Study, US and Visiting Grantees, 1956-1966
(Joyce, 1966, pp. 15-17)
The marked difference between U.S. and Visiting grantees may be changing in more 
recent years, however. While Fulbright grantee subject area data has not been collated and 
reported since the 1982 annual report, the IIE’s Open Doors data suggests that American and 
international study abroad participants are becoming more similar. While Americans still lean 
towards the humanities and international students are still more likely to pursue the sciences, 
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21% of both American and international students studied business and management (IIE, 
2012).
A great deal of a Fulbright grantee’s time will be spent on research and teaching, and 
this may act as a barrier to socialising and culture learning. In our interview, a Fulbright 
student estimated that she spent 7-8 hours each day, six days a week working in the lab. 
“Water polo is pretty much the only social activity I have time for.” (Appendix A, p. 282).
She suggested that the team sport was also the only way she was able to meet locals.
Of course, not all Fulbright grantees are as studious. Upon his retirement from the 
Binational Commission in Germany, former executive secretary John F. Mead wrote a report 
to the Board of Foreign Scholarships expressing his concerns about a tendency for American 
grantees to travel excessively during their grant period. “...[A] goodly number of American 
students yield to the temptation to travel and loaf during scheduled sessions of their 
universities...This ‘tourist’ attitude is also a source of embarrassment to conscientious 
American study grantees in Germany.” (Mead, 1958, p.1). He cites examples of grantees 
travelling to England and Spain without the Commission’s knowledge or approval. In his 
report, Mead included an unsolicited letter that he had received from University of Munich’s 
Professor Rolf Huisgen. He had observed this tendency amongst those assigned to his 
chemistry laboratory. “The danger of ‘bumming around’ is much greater with the post-
doctoral fellows than with (pre-doctoral) exchange students. Perhaps in the future one ought 
to point out the obligation to maintain normal work schedules with more emphasis. I always 
deplore if the limited number of work places are not fully used. After all, we want to take 
care that a distinguished organization like the Fulbright Commission is not being abused and 
degraded to an ‘American Vacation Organization’; this term circulated among our German 
doctoral candidates two years ago.” (ibid., Addendum A, p. 2).
In terms of their choice of extra-curricular activities, Fulbright grantees behave like 
others would when studying or working abroad. Research has shown that Fulbrighters and 
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other study abroad participants engage in different leisure time activities while they are 
abroad compared with when they are at home. The Study Abroad Evaluation Project students 
reported engaging in a range of sightseeing activities during their time overseas (Opper et al, 
1990). Amongst Fulbright grantees, 95% reported visiting museums or historical sites, and 
94% reported attending concerts, plays, sporting events or cultural events (SRI, 2005a, p. 19). 
It was also found that study abroad participants played sports less frequently while abroad. 
“The American students’ participation in sports dropped approximately the same amount that 
their museum and concert attendance increased while abroad.” (Opper et al, 1990, p. 49). 
While pre-departure figures are not included in the Fulbright evaluation, it is clear that 
Fulbright participants have a similar preference for sightseeing over sports: only 16% 
reported participating in team sports during their academic sojourn (SRI, 2005a, p. 19).
In some ways, Fulbright grantees may see more of a host country than the locals do, 
as they seek out different aspects of local culture and life. A 1953 study of Indian Fulbright 
grantees found that most grantees had visited a broad range of American political and social 
institutions during their time in the U.S. (Langley, 1953).
Table 6.2 American Institutions Visited by Indian Fulbright Grantees
Type of Institution Percentage of Fulbright Grantees Who 
Visited the Type of Institution
Administrative Departments of Government 54
Church Activity 76
Small Town 78
Recreation Center 69
Farm Run by Family 70
Slum Area 71
School 62
Congress and Legislature 37
Citizen Action Group 47
Court 33
Parent Teacher Association 38
Labor Union 13
(Langley, 1953, p. 64)
Some of these figures are quite surprising; it is doubtful that a vast majority (70-71%) of 
Americans have visited slum areas or family-run farms. These are remarkably high 
percentages, given the unusual nature of many of the listed activities. It is also interesting to 
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note that some institutions that would traditionally be considered emblematic of American 
democracy—court, citizen action group, parent teacher association—were all visited by a 
minority of grantees. This has interesting implications for the foreign grantee experience and 
the type of America to which visitors are exposed. The grant period represented in this study 
is clearly not a tour of pro-American, pro-democratic institutions, but rather, a ‘warts-and-all’ 
itinerary which includes slums areas.
During the early years of the Fulbright Program, participants were encouraged to 
engage with locals through public speaking and home visits. Justin Zulu, a visiting Fulbright 
Student at the University of Colorado from Northern Rhodesia (present day Zambia), shared 
an impressive list of extra-curricular activities in the Board of Foreign Scholarships 1964 
annual report. He appeared on local television twice, was a guest in the homes of three 
American families, and spoke to eight groups that ranged from Sunday schools to women’s 
organisations (BFS, 1964, p. 15). Today, grantees share their experiences with a more limited 
audience than Justin Zulu did. In the 2005 annual report Sody Munsaka, a Zambian student at 
the University of Hawaii, shared his experience of volunteering with a local ministry outreach 
team at the Manoa Senior Care Center. “It is such a wonderful ambassadorial work that we 
are doing here. We are adequately representing Zambia to a people some of whom have never 
heard about our country.” (FSB, 2005, p. 20). The difference between the outreach 
opportunities of these two students, from the same country and forty years apart, is striking. 
Today, volunteerism seems to have taken the place of public speaking engagements. It 
represents culture learning on a smaller scale than public speaking, emphasising quality over 
quantity of communication.
Fulbrighters are largely free to engage in any of their interests, but they are warned 
against participating in one particular extra-curricular activity: political activism. While on 
the one hand, grantees are expected to act as ‘unofficial ambassadors,’ on the other hand, they 
are also asked to “protect the non-political character of the program.” (BFS, 1968a). Grantees 
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must strike a careful balance between honest expression and respectful neutrality. This 
became especially important in the context of the Vietnam War, when American military 
actions were the subject of large-scale protests at university campuses across the United 
States and abroad. In 1968, the Board of Foreign Scholarships issued a statement to American 
grantees about their conduct in light of the political situation. 
“Whether they agree or disagree with government policies, they should be aware that 
public political utterances or activity while abroad can in certain circumstances draw 
the Fulbright-Hays program into the political arena…The holding of a Fulbright-Hays 
grant is incompatible with engaging in activities that are part of the domestic political 
processes of other countries, and when behaviour of grantees shows a deliberate 
intention to engage in such activities or unreasonable negligence in considering the 
implications of one’s conduct, this may be reason for revocation of the grant.” (ibid.)
Revocation is not a common occurrence in the Fulbright Program, but it can happen. A recent 
example is the case of an English Language Teaching Assistant in India, who travelled to 
Kashmir as a tourist during her Fulbright year (Carlan, 2012). The U.S. State Department 
advises against travelling to Kashmir, as it is an area of political unrest that may be unsafe for 
foreigners. In an unfortunate turn of events, her visit happened to coincide with an outbreak 
of anti-U.S. protests in September 2012, relating to an anti-Islam YouTube video. When the 
local Fulbright administration in India heard of her visit, she was called in for questioning, 
her grant was revoked and she was sent back to the United States within days (ibid.). 
Although she was not involved in political activities during the visit, this case demonstrates 
that the administration is sensitive to the aforementioned “negligence in considering the 
implications of one’s conduct” while holding a Fulbright grant.
The concept of the contact hypothesis and its impact on foreign policy is illustrated 
well in the following excerpt from a 1951 special Fulbright issue of The Record, a U.S. 
Department of State. A 21-year old U.S. veteran who had spent his Fulbright year at 
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Cambridge University wrote of his contact experiences abroad. He conceptualised this 
contact as an opportunity to counter Russian propaganda during these early days of the Cold 
War.
“There is no better antidote to the European conception of Americans than a normal 
decent American. There is nothing more damaging to Russian propaganda about 
America than an normal American ready and competent to fairly analyze and answer 
it...I have found that frank, honest discussions on the pros and cons have had no little 
effect...You can explain Marshall Aid, how it doesn’t consist of Cocoa-Cola [sic], 
how it comes out of Americans’ pockets and is an act of good will rather than 
imperialism...It is also impressive to these people when you point out that the United 
States thinks enough of the cultures of foreign nations to send students abroad to 
study, and is sufficiently proud of its own institutions to allow foreign students to 
study in the United States in obvious contrast to Russia. These facts tend to make 
Russophiles, who have never seen a Russian face-to-face, think. Intelligent 
discussion, not phrase-throwing, seems most effective.” (U.S. Department of State, 
1951, p. 6).
After the Fulbright
There is a great deal of evidence to show that the Fulbright Program has long-lasting 
effects on its participants. It can alter the direction of one’s career and personal life, spark a 
new academic interest, or simply change one’s perspective on life. Many Fulbrighters report 
a heightened sense of awareness of international issues, and a desire to share their 
experiences with others. For teachers and lecturers, the potential multiplier effect is 
particularly strong, as their career provides an outlet for them to share their stories and 
cultural knowledge gains. This was expressed by an American couple who taught dance in 
Zimbabwe under Fulbright auspices. “When we returned, we had been enriched and that 
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enrichment could be passed on to our American students.” (Dudden and Dynes, 1987, p. 
143). By the same token, a Fulbright professor’s experiences behind the Iron Curtain in then-
Czechoslovakia greatly influenced his teaching and shaped his worldview. “My Fulbright 
experiences, and surely those of other Fulbright professors, have taught lessons that we 
cannot help but translate anew for American students every time we enter our classrooms.” 
(Arndt and Rubin, 1993, p. 295). The lessons and experiences gained during the Fulbright 
grant period inspired this professor, and many others, to pass them on to future students. His 
knowledge of life behind the Iron Curtain also taught him a great deal about his life in 
America, another common theme among the accounts of returned Fulbright grantees.
“I began to know my own country better.” (Dudden and Dynes, 1987, p. 119).
“My commitment to American traditions and institutions has been strengthened by the 
Fulbright experience.” (ibid., p. 172).
“As each Fulbright experience required me to see more in a different culture, I am 
now disposed to see more in my own culture.” (Arndt and Rubin, 1993, p. 299).
“...we now have a more intense wonder about, a sense of strangeness concerning, 
ourselves, Americans, as a people.” (ibid., p. 383).     
The cliché phrase “it changed my life” appears frequently throughout the educational 
exchange literature. Countless students, scholars and other Fulbright grantees have reflected 
on their academic sojourns and drawn the same conclusion: it was a life-changing experience 
with both personal and professional impacts. In a survey of American Fulbright students, 
93% agreed that the Fulbright had been a life-changing experience (SRI, 2005a, p. 14). For 
some, the Fulbright experience changed the direction of a grantee’s career permanently. In 
her contribution to The Fulbright Difference, Georgie Anne Geyer tells of how her time in 
Vienna, where she had intended to study history, led her to pursue a career in journalism. 
When discussing her reasons for the change, she writes “...I did it because it was fun—so 
much fun, indeed that it should have been illegal or immoral, by my youthful value system. 
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Fulbright was in fact for many of us a kind of moral relief. It made discovery respectable, 
even noble. It showed us that this kind of joyous ‘fun’ of discovering, learning and enjoying 
is what life is—or ought to be—all about.” (Arndt and Rubin, 1993, p. 128).
For other grantees, the effects of the Fulbright sojourn have been personal rather than 
professional. A number of Fulbrighters have met their future partners during their time 
abroad. Gerard Dietemann, a French Fulbright student, met his wife Margaret, an American, 
while studying at Syracuse University in New York. She undertook a Fulbright grant to study 
at the Sorbonne the following year, and the two married. In their contribution to The 
Fulbright Difference, they discuss the cultural lessons learned and challenges they have faced 
throughout their four decades of international living. The chapter ends with remarks about 
another legacy of their Fulbright experience, their four children. “Our children are quite 
simply the result of the Fulbright Program. Without it, we never would have met and married. 
They have always been aware of that. In their early years Senator Fulbright ranked with Santa 
Claus and the Easter Bunny.” (ibid., p. 86).
The study abroad experience can have a particularly strong impact upon a 
participant’s worldview, how they think the world is or how it should be. This is perhaps the 
least tangible or measurable result, but one that is quite widely reported by returned grantees.
“From beginning to end, that Fulbright year taught lessons that have made me see the 
world differently.” (ibid., p. 288).
“As I see it, the Fulbright opportunity extends to each of its beneficiaries an unspoken 
invitation to risk abandoning some part of his or her vision of the way the world 
works, or ought to work, and to replace it, permanently, with a fragment of a 
worldview shaped by another culture in another place.” (ibid., p. 260).
For some, their worldview becomes fixated upon continued travel and the initial Fulbright 
sojourn became the first of many international living experiences in a grantee’s life. After a 
Fulbright scholarship brought him to New Zealand in 1952, Robin W. Winks spent the rest of 
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his career replicating this experience with research grants; visiting scholar positions in Beirut, 
Sierra Leone, and South Africa; university tours in India, the Pacific Islands and East Africa; 
a visiting professorship in Sydney, and a two-year position as cultural attaché at the 
American Embassy in London (Dudden and Dynes, 1987, pp. 40-41). Winks also held a 
second Fulbright as a professor at the University of Malaya. Other grantees, such as the 
aforementioned Dr. Ghachi and Nancy Snow, have also held multiple Fulbright grants. 
During the early years of the Fulbright Program, there was little interest in 
maintaining contact with former grantees. Some annual reports would include contact 
information for alumni in a directory appendix, but this was limited to country-specific 
programmes. It did not include all participants in a single directory, or feature any other signs 
of central organisation. The Board of Foreign Scholarships began to take an interest in 
Fulbright alumni in the early 1970’s. “One of the most difficult tasks that the Board 
undertook in the course of the year was the attempt to begin a systematic alumni list of 
former American grantees with a view toward drawing on their ideas and enlisting some of 
their demonstrated energies and enthusiasms on behalf of the ongoing exchange 
programs...Unfortunately no central directory exists with current addresses and positions of 
the more than 100,000 individuals here and abroad who have been the recipients of 
grants...The board is giving a high priority to a systematic expansion and maintenance of a 
basic alumni directory.” (BFS, 1972, p. 8).
The Fulbright Association was founded in 1977, after more than thirty years of 
exchanges had already taken place. Its establishment coincided with a low point in 
Congressional support for the programme, as Senator Fulbright had left Congress in 1974 and 
no one had replaced him as the advocate for exchanges. Involving alumni at this time was 
seen as a means of establishing a constituency for the Fulbright Program, a group of 
concerned citizens who would rescue the programme in times of need. Just four years after its 
founding, the Fulbright Association was faced with such a moment. The substantial cuts 
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proposed for the 1981 budget were thwarted by the lobbying efforts of Fulbright advocates, 
including the alumni association. Another crisis moment occurred with the 1999 foreign 
affairs restructuring and closure of USIA. Fulbright advocates lobbied against proposed plans 
to merge the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA) with the Information Bureau. 
Alumni were amongst the advocates, along with educators, international education 
organisations, and some members of Congressional foreign affairs committees. When 
Secretary of State Madeline Albright changed course and decided to keep ECA separate 
within the State Department, advocates applauded her choice. They welcomed the move to 
State, suggesting that it could help boost the profile of educational exchanges. “It’s a more 
powerful and prestigious institution than USIA, and better known overseas.” (Desruisseaux, 
1999). Thus, the prestige of the Fulbright Program was enhanced by an affiliation with State, 
rather than compromised by an alliance with information activities.
Lobbying remains a primary activity for the Fulbright Association. Although it 
represents only some 6% of all American alumni, it provides the constituency for the 
Fulbright Program. “The association, with alumni in every congressional district, is an 
important advocate for sustained public funding.” (Ilchman, Ilchman and Tolar, 2004, p. 21). 
The organisation’s website includes a section entitled ‘Take Action,’ which encourages 
American alumni to contact Congress when the programme’s budget is being decided. 
“When urgent and rapid action is needed to prevent Fulbright Program cuts, Fulbright alumni 
are strongly encouraged to call their members of Congress.” (Fulbright Association, 2012). 
The website provides alumni with a sample telephone script to use when calling their member 
of Congress:
“Hello, my name is___ and I am a constituent and an active proponent of the 
Fulbright Program. I am calling today to urge Senator/Representative ___to support 
our most important foreign policy objectives by funding State Department exchange 
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programs for the rest of Fiscal Year 2011 at the 2010 level of $635 million and within 
that amount, fund the Fulbright Program at $254 million.
I also urge Senator/Representative ___to support Fiscal Year 2012 funding for State 
Department exchange programs at the $637 million level and the Fulbright Program at 
$253 million.” (ibid.). 
The site also includes links to a directory that enables these constituents to find the contact 
information of their Congressperson and make the above phone call. 
In addition to their lobbying for continued public funding, Fulbright alumni are also 
active in private fundraising efforts. The Japanese Fulbright Alumni Association reported its 
fundraising activities to its US counterpart as part of a discussion of best practice. One of
their major events was the 31st Annual Japan-US Fulbright Charity Golf Tournament. With a 
$340 entry fee, the tournament’s 160 players donated some $60,000 in all. The alumni 
association also solicits corporate sponsorship and creates new, jointly-funded scholarships. 
“The $43,000 (¥5 million) donors will enjoy their name being hyphenated with Fulbright 
Crown Scholarship as Toyota-Fulbright, Mitsubishi-Fulbright and YKK-Fulbright 
Scholarship. The news of this fundraising was widely reported by various media.” (Shono, 
2006, p. 2). Such cooperation with prestigious companies also benefits the Fulbright 
Program’s reputation, as indicated by a note that “well-known corporate names are 
desirable.” (ibid.) In times of budgetary constraint, fundraisers have chosen to embrace 
private sector involvement and celebrate it with prestigious, named co-sponsored awards.
It is worth noting that the Fulbright Alumni Association was founded and operated 
exclusively by individual alumni, not by the Board of Foreign Scholarships or the State 
Department. Although the Board believed in the value of communicating with alumni and 
made it a matter of policy, a report on the programme’s administration abroad found that 
officials made little to no effort to do so. “Field officials are supposed to maintain contact 
with former foreign grantees—for the most part, this is virtually ignored in all countries.” 
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(Staats, 1979, p. 11). The Fulbright Program administration has not consistently followed up 
with alumni after the end of the grant period. This observation was supported by former J. 
William Fulbright Foreign Scholarship Board chairman and Fulbright Association President 
Hoyt Purvis. In our interview, Professor Purvis noted that the lack of alumni involvement was 
not due to a lack of interest; rather, the former grantees simply hadn’t been asked. “One of 
the things that we discovered was that most Fulbright alumni, of course many of them were 
academics, had not really been called upon to rally on behalf of the program. A lot of them 
were quite willing to do that if they were asked, you know. They hadn’t really thought about 
it...[the Fulbright Program] really had not done enough to foster that kind of continuing 
involvement by people who had been the beneficiaries of the grants.” (Appendix A, p. 273).
Elites and Elitism
There is some hesitation amongst exchange diplomacy scholars to use the term ‘elite’, 
as it carries negative connotations of classism and discrimination. I would argue, however, 
that it accurately describes the Fulbright Program and its participants. Elitism is an inherent 
quality of the Fulbright Program. A full 90% of U.S. and Visiting Fulbright Students 
considered the ‘prestige of a Fulbright grant’ a ‘somewhat or very important’ factor in their 
decision to apply (SRI, 2005a, p. 35; SRI, 2005b, p. 37). International higher education is, by 
its very nature, an elite activity. The traditional ‘grand tour,’ in which privileged young men 
travelled around Europe as a capstone of their education, has been replaced by the semester 
abroad today (Goodwin and Nacht, 1988). International study is a financially demanding 
undertaking, requiring overseas travel on top of the tuition, books and living expenses 
incurred by all postgraduate students. It also demands, as prerequisite, an undergraduate 
degree or its equivalent. Elite status of participants is implied, therefore, by the eligibility 
requirements. The Fulbright Program application also requires the ability to interview well, 
which is a skill associated with elite admissions. In most cases, applicants must also possess 
foreign language fluency, another prerequisite that often suggests elite status. Taken together, 
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the requirements of financial resources, degree holder status, interview skills and language 
fluency demonstrate that in order to be eligible for a Fulbright grant, applicants must already 
possess many markers of elite status. 
The Fulbright grantee experience can be understood as the process by which elites 
gain international expertise. This is consistent with the stated mission of the programme, as 
elites are well-positioned in their societies to influence others’ views of foreign countries. 
They are expected to become opinion leaders, future elites who will use the knowledge 
gained during their exchange experience to act as cultural mediators in their careers. When 
exchange alumni are later involved in foreign policy matters, they represent fulfilment of the 
opinion leader concept. Lee Hamilton, former chairman of the House Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, mentioned this phenomenon at the 2001 Fulbright Award ceremony. “I recall scores 
of times when foreign policy challenges were made easier because key actors were 
beneficiaries of exchange programs that helped them to understand the world and other 
countries better.” (Fineberg, 2001).
Senator Fulbright was responsible, in part, for the elite nature of his exchange 
programme. According to his biographer Randall Bennett Woods, Fulbright was an elitist 
(Appendix A). Despite his attempts at a ‘folksy’ communication style that he employed to 
connect with working-class Arkansans, J. William Fulbright came from a wealthy, well-
connected family. His status as a Rhodes Scholar classifies him as an elite, but even more 
tellingly, his family already had social connections in the UK prior to his Rhodes experience. 
“Through their circle of university and banking friends, the Fulbrights knew a number of 
people who traveled to Europe regularly.” (Woods, 1995, p. 21). When Fulbright arrived in 
London, he spent two days sightseeing with family friend Vivian Lemon before he continued 
on to Oxford to take up his Rhodes Scholarship (ibid.). His background predisposed J. 
William Fulbright to elitist views which can be seen throughout his later career. 
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In addition to his educational exchange programme and his dissenting views against 
the Vietnam War, Senator Fulbright is also more infamously known for his opposition to the 
integration of schools and other civil rights acts. Fulbright claimed that he voted according to 
his constituents’ wishes. “In those days in Arkansas my constituents were not about to be 
persuaded on civil rights...against an emotional fear like miscegenation, I don’t think I had a 
real choice.” (Fulbright, 1989, p. 90). Many critics today, however, see his segregationist 
position as being in line with the views of his generation and his Southern background. 
Interestingly, however, this racism did not extend to non-white elites, according to his 
biographer. “His racism had more to do with class than it did with color. If he was dealing 
with the elite of Ghana or Kenya or India, skin color didn’t matter. If you were educated and 
part of the elite, you were acceptable to him, so it wasn’t race prejudice as much as class 
prejudice. But he even moved away from that.” (Appendix A, p. 261). Over time, Senator 
Fulbright approved of various attempts to ‘democratise’ the programme. 
There have been efforts to broaden the pool of applicants and provide grant 
opportunities to underprivileged but gifted individuals. During the second decade of 
exchanges, for example, the Board noted that in some parts of the world, the language 
proficiency requirement prevented many from applying for grants. “Since fluency in English 
tends in many countries abroad to be found chiefly among the socially and economically 
favored groups, efforts are made to draw student grantees from outside these groups by 
providing opportunities for intensive training in English for the grantees before they take up 
studies in the U.S.” (BFS, 1966, p. 36).
Elitism is an inextricable part of the Fulbright Program, and in some ways, it is 
essential for the success of the programme. Manheim’s definition of public diplomacy 
explicitly mentions elites as a target. He defines public diplomacy as the “efforts by the 
government of one nation to influence public or elite opinion in a second nation for the 
purpose of turning the foreign policy of the target nation to advantage.” (Manheim, 1994, p. 
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4). Amongst the various potential elite targets for public diplomacy efforts, students and 
scholars are prime examples of future opinion leaders. Education plays an undeniably 
significant role in the formation of one’s worldview. As Mitchell describes, “...what 
intellectuals are saying and students are believing today will affect the political configuration 
of tomorrow. Friends in high places are perhaps yesterday’s seekers of friendship and 
knowledge.” (Mitchell, 1986, pp. 67-68). The application of educational exchange as a public 
diplomacy tool is based upon the premise that international friendships will lead, in the long-
term, to international cooperation and goodwill between the home and host nations. If such 
friendships are formed amongst the elites, the opinion leaders, then the public diplomacy 
effects are all the more evident. 
The effectiveness of the Fulbright Program is often measured in terms of the elite 
status of its alumni. Fulbright grantees who hold elite status are publicised as evidence of the 
programme’s success; heads of state, cabinet ministers, business leaders and other 
distinguished alumni are celebrated in the Fulbright Program’s annual reports. Further 
achievements of individual grantees are used to indicate the exchange programme’s 
effectiveness. Without the exchange experience, it is assumed, they would not have achieved 
the same levels of success. It is impossible to prove or disprove such counter-factual 
arguments, however. On the one hand, applicants often apply to more than one competitive 
scholarship opportunity. If they are unsuccessful in obtaining a Fulbright grant, they may find 
an alternative scholarship, or even take out an educational loan to pursue their studies. The 
United States federal educational loan system permits the use of its loans for study at 
accredited overseas institutions. On the other hand, many Fulbright grantees claim that the 
experience could not have happened through any other means. Their testimonies cannot be 
dismissed. There are not always other pathways open to Fulbright applicants.
In terms of fundraising, however, elitism may be damaging to the Fulbright Program. 
Randall Bennett Woods suggests that elitism might be off-putting for potential donors who 
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have not been Fulbright grantees. “Fulbrighters don’t have any money. We try to raise funds 
for the college here [the Fulbright Institute at the University of Arkansas], and they just don’t 
have any money. They’re not plugged into people who have money. Very unsuccessful 
fundraisers because, I think, they don’t want to condescend to spend their time with people 
who make money...Fulbrighters are very elitist.” (Appendix A, p. 265).
Evaluation
The Fulbright grantee experience is often the central object of study in programme 
evaluations. Within the field of public diplomacy studies, evaluation is a much debated topic. 
It is difficult to measure the outcomes of programmes which have vague goals, such as 
‘increased mutual understanding.’ As former USIA director and celebrated journalist Edward 
R. Murrow observed, “no cash register rings when a man changes his mind” (Waller, 2007, p. 
395). The impact of public diplomacy is not readily observable. The challenge for public 
diplomacy research is to find a systematic way of turning intangible qualities, such as 
goodwill, into quantifiable data. How can one measure understanding, trust or reputation? Is 
it necessary, or even possible to do so? Should the effectiveness of public diplomacy 
activities simply be taken on faith, as it often is? There have been many attempts, by both
academics and programme officials, to measure the effects of educational exchanges. During 
the early years of the Fulbright Program, when enthusiasm and interest ran high, evaluation 
studies were frequently conducted in order to understand the impact and explore the potential 
of the new programme. As the programme matured, however, academic interest waned. In 
recent years, attempts to assess the practice of educational exchange have been limited in 
scope and, for the most part, conducted under the remit of the U.S. Department of State. 
Moreover, many of the academic contributions to the literature have been undertaken by 
programme alumni; independent assessments are scarce.
Evaluations of the Fulbright Program can be understood to serve two primary 
functions. Firstly, they provide an evidence-based justification for continued practice and 
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funding. When lobbying Congress for further appropriations, advocates of educational 
exchange can point to evaluative research which has judged the programme to be a worthy 
investment. Such evidence can act as a form of oversight, ensuring that taxpayer dollars are 
spent wisely. Without the evidence of effectiveness offered by programme evaluations, 
moreover, the Fulbright Program may be more vulnerable to budget cuts which target 
ineffective or inefficient federal programmes. In the late 1960s, a time when the Fulbright 
Program was subjected to such cuts, the Board of Foreign Scholarships struggled to make the 
case for continued funding levels without demonstrable results. “The [State] Department’s 
primary mission is to protect and advance the interests of the United States abroad. Its 
officers often are inclined to seek ways in which the educational exchange program may be 
utilized to this end alone. Members of Congress see the exchange program as a budgetary and 
administrative responsibility of the Department. They are inclined to ask for evidence of 
specific, quantifiable, and immediate results (in a foreign relations sense) of the program.” 
(BFS, 1968b, p. vi). The Board argued that this was unreasonably, as the nature of 
educational exchange meant that the programmes could not produce the requested 
quantifiable, immediate effects. Education is a long-term investment, yet this is often 
unappreciated by those who insist upon short-term evidence of value for money. The 
Fulbright Program accordingly faced drastic funding reductions. Appropriations dropped 
from $46 million in 1968 to $31 million in fiscal year 1969, a loss of nearly one-third (ibid.).
Secondly, evaluations can also play a valuable role in programme planning and 
policymaking. They provide an opportunity for administrators to better understand both the 
strengths and limitations of the Fulbright Program, and for participants to make their views 
known to administrators. In a study of the first four years of the US-India Fulbright exchange 
programme, for example, several grantees suggested that participants should be older and 
more experienced. One Indian grantee advised that “...no one below 30 should be allowed to
go to America. America is a dangerous place for a young man who falls in love with its 
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glamour and forgets to do serious studies. America, like other countries, has good and bad 
things but a matured person with discriminating judgment can decide what he should do. I 
would not want to make it a hard and fast rule about a man’s age but I feel that a man should 
have at least six to eight years’ experience after his graduation before he can absorb what is 
good and beneficial for himself and to his country.” (Langley, 1953, p. 7). As a more recent 
counterpart to this from a 2005 evaluative study, an American student in India suggested 
“that returning scholars be given more organized opportunities to share their experiences—
personal, not academic—with more Americans: children, seniors, high school children, 
anybody. The Rotary Scholarships do this with returning scholars giving presentations at 
clubs.” (SRI, 2005a, p. 42). Evaluative studies can help guide policy decisions, from 
candidate selection criteria to reimbursement of dependents’ travel expenses. Aspects of the 
programme that are seen to contribute to its goals and enhance the culture learning experience 
can be continued in the future. By identifying the most and least effective elements of 
educational exchange, evaluation research can guide administrators towards a set of definitive 
best practice guidelines.
These two purposes seem to justify the need for evaluative studies, yet some Fulbright 
Program administrators and exchange advocates have argued that such assessments are 
unnecessary. The programme, in their view, is above scrutiny; there is often an implication 
that only the unenlightened would question the value of educational exchange. In his 
contribution to an edited volume of alumni reflections, three-time Fulbright grantee Robin W. 
Winks argued that the educational exchange advocates should not have to bear the burden of 
proof. “The reply that the effectiveness of educational exchange is not so obvious to our 
congressmen is best met by the simple injunction to elect congressmen who understand the 
value.” (Winks in Dudden and Dynes, 1987, p. 44). Those outsiders who take a critical 
approach are thus disregarded by programme insiders. They just don’t ‘get it’ and likely 
never will, according to this view. 
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Some advocates suggest that we shouldn’t attempt to quantify the experience’s effects 
and speak instead of a generalised faith that we should have in the value of this practice. At a 
symposium marking the twentieth anniversary of the Fulbright Program, Herman B. Wells 
described this faith in relation to questions of evaluation. “Our inability to ‘prove’ the value 
of educational exchange suggests an important point: how much we must depend in these 
efforts on our faith in the inherent worth of educational ties that link together the people of 
many countries around the world. Far from diminishing the stature of the Fulbright Program, 
this reliance on faith in the efficacy of educational exchange elevates the entire matter. It is a 
tribute rather than a criticism to observe that the basic rationale of international educational 
cannot be computerized.” (italics as in original, Wells in Michie, 1967, p. 28). Thus, the 
Fulbright Program’s advocates have turned the argument around, using the very lack of 
evidence of effectiveness as proof that it is a worthwhile endeavour. This puts would-be 
critics of the programme in the awkward position of arguing against faith. Understandably, 
few scholars have chosen to challenges the faith of the educational exchange community and 
question the Fulbright Program’s effectiveness.
There have been many attempts to assess the impacts of the Fulbright Program, both 
on its individual participants and on their home and host nations. The original legislation for 
the programme made no provision for evaluation, but during the early years there was a great 
deal of interest in its impacts, as administrators and observers tried to understand the new 
exchange programme. Its purpose was not well understood, making any attempt to judge its 
effectiveness difficult. Early studies often took on a somewhat defensive tone as they argued 
that the programme was effective. When findings did not support the programme’s 
effectiveness, this was explained away. “Although the effect does not appear to be brilliant,” 
one study concludes, “it may in fact be a maximum expectable effect, and therefore a 
reasonably successful realization of a limited potential.” (Riegel, 1953, p. 327). Researchers 
sometimes pointed to their research method as the reason that the expected increase in 
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understanding hadn’t been supported by the findings, while still insisting that it was there. “A 
mail survey among Americans is not the ideal instrument for measuring the extent to which 
international understanding and good-will have been increased, but the vast extent of 
international contact and correspondence which has developed, the books and articles written 
and lectures delivered, the interest stimulated in international activities, and the assistance 
given to other Americans going abroad indicate that the program does indeed have an effect 
in the desired direction.” (Mendelsohn and Orenstein, 1955, p. 407). On the whole, these 
early evaluations seemed eager to demonstrate that the fledgling programme was worthy of 
broad popular and financial support.
Among the earliest of the evaluation studies was a review of U.S. exchange-of-
persons programmes in 1953. The Cultural Contacts Project selected Belgian alumni as a case 
study, due to the long history of exchanges between the U.S. and Belgium under the Belgian-
American Educational Foundation, funded by aid surpluses after the First World War. In the 
study, a number of personal and professional impact areas were assessed, including the 
grantees’ attitudes towards the United States, the prominence achieved by participants in their 
respective careers, and the self-reported usefulness of their experience. The study was 
exclusively interested in the individual grantee and used their reported experiences to 
measure the effectiveness of the programme. Their findings suggested that, at least in the case 
of Belgium, personal and professional successes could not be directly linked to the exchange 
experience. “Former grantees are, on the whole, successful in their vocations and well 
provided with social capital, but little evidence can be found to support the thesis that the 
exchange experience was the crucial or even a major determinant of the course of their lives.” 
(Riegel, 1953, p. 327).
Another early assessment by Niefeld and Mendelsohn (1954) examined America’s 
educational exchange activities that fall under the Smith-Mundt Act. The study consisted of a 
survey of administrators at participating institutions across the United States. While they 
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were nearly unanimous in their praise for the programme, the authors admit that these 
individuals’ views have limited use as evidence of the programme’s effectiveness. “At best, 
the majority of these opinions are based primarily on intelligent observations rather than on 
systematic evaluation. The empirical problem of testing the effectiveness of the educational 
program in ‘creating international understanding and friendship for the United States’ 
remains.” (Niefeld and Mendelsohn, 1954, p. 37). This statement could be applied to other 
studies which rely on participants’ testimonies for evidence, as well. The positive 
assessments of the Fulbright Program are often simply a collection of positive individual 
assessments of the grantee experience.
The first study to assess the Fulbright Program exclusively was a survey by 
Mendelsohn and Orenstein (1955). The post-sojourn questionnaire employed in this study 
considered the effects of the programme on both the individual grantee and on his or her 
community upon returning home. This concern with the home community is unusual in these 
evaluative studies, but it touches upon a vital aspect of assessing the Fulbright Program’s 
overall effectiveness. Impacts in the home community offer an example of the multiplier 
effect in practice. Mendelsohn and Orenstein found that teacher grantees had organised 
international pen-pals for their students through contacts that they had made in the host 
country (Mendelsohn and Oreinstein, 1955, pp. 405-406). The teachers passed their cultural 
knowledge on to their students with this pen-pal initiative. For each individual teacher 
grantee, then, we can see influence reaching out to a classroom of twenty or more students. 
This example offers a compelling argument for the multiplier effect of the Fulbright Program, 
in the case of the teacher exchange grant category. 
The 1961 Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act included provisions for 
annual reports and established the U.S. Advisory Commission on International and Cultural 
Affairs to carry out an evaluative study of American exchange diplomacy activities. The 
study consisted of interviews with several thousand exchange participants, as well as 
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testimonies from U.S. ambassadors, foreign service officers, and educational leaders. The 
resulting report, A Beacon of Hope: The Exchange-of-Persons Program, found a broad 
consensus on the programme’s success. “Testimony is overwhelming from all sources that 
the program as a whole is effective. The evidence is also conclusive that the program has 
proved itself an essential and valuable part of America’s total international effort.” (Gardner, 
1963, p. 1). Recommendations for improvements to the programme included the preferential 
selection of candidates from outside of elite institutions, the improved scrutiny of cultural 
affairs officers, and an increase in funding. Despite the report’s positive assessment of the 
programme, efforts to increase exchange activities over the following years went unfunded 
and the Fulbright Program faced significant budget cuts. In 1969-70, grants for Americans 
dropped from 1,600 to 650, a decline of sixty percent, while the number of foreign grantees 
was reduced by thirty percent, from 4,000 to 2,800 (Young, 1969, p. 4). These cuts 
demonstrate the limitations of evaluative reports. Their recommendations are not always 
adhered to in the face of budget reductions.
When the U.S. International Communication Agency assumed the responsibility of 
educational and cultural exchanges, they undertook an evaluation to assess the current state of 
American exchange diplomacy. Amongst their findings was the observation that grantees 
were not consistently asked for evaluation reports at the end of their experience, and that 
resulting reports were not consistently used across the different country programmes. There 
appears to have been a number of problems with the process of evaluation in the report’s 
findings. “The contracting agencies generally spotcheck the evaluation report for problems 
dealing with their procedural processes. They were not asked to analyze the reports for
program or administrative improvements or identification of common problems. In addition, 
there was no verification to ascertain that all grantees submitted their reports...ICA officials 
do not believe that the reports provide sufficient, meaningful information to require any 
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thorough analysis in view of their limited staff resources.” (Staats, 1979, p. 44). This begs the 
question, why should grantees complete reports if they are not going to be used? 
Many evaluations have focused on the Fulbright Program’s activities in specific 
regions or countries. Narrowing the scope of the study enables researchers to examine 
specific cases in-depth. Sunal and Sunal (1991) conducted a survey of returned American 
Fulbright senior scholars who had carried out their grants in African countries. Their study 
assessed impacts such as the number of publications which had resulted from the scholars’ 
Fulbright experience, the professional skills they had learned abroad, and the perceived 
benefits to the grantees’ home institutions. By limiting the scope of the study to this single 
grant category and regional case study, Sunal and Sunal were able to gain a great deal of in-
depth qualitative and quantitative data from their manageable number of survey respondents. 
Similarly, a study on Turkish Fulbright participants was conducted by Demir, Aksu and 
Paykoç (2000). Their survey covered the academic and extra-curricular activities during the 
sojourn, the lasting effects of the experience on participants’ careers, and grantees’ overall 
satisfaction with the experience. There is a distinct emphasis on the programme’s 
responsiveness to local needs. “Our findings indicate that one of the main objectives of the 
Fulbright Education Committee, to promote the development of Turkish universities and 
colleges, was largely actualized.” (Demir, Aksu and Paykoç, 2000, p. 109). This suggests an 
important point about the programme’s binational structure. Country-specific needs can 
influence the objectives, and therefore also the effectiveness, of individual country 
programmes. Case study research methods are particularly useful for examining the Fulbright 
Program, in which so much is dependent upon its binational character. 
In terms of research design, the vast majority of studies have consisted of surveying 
and interviewing grantees. Other groups, such as host institution contacts, programme 
administrators or members of the grantee’s social network, have rarely been utilised in 
evaluative research. The justification for focusing on the grantee in an evaluative research is 
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because grantees have exclusive first-hand knowledge of the exchange experience. They are 
also relatively accessible subjects, because binational commissions and alumni associations 
retain the contact information of former participants. Exchange alumni are often eager to 
discuss their experiences. Past surveys of Fulbrighters have seen high questionnaire response 
rates, from 86% (Mendelsohn and Orenstein, 1955) to 70% (Burn, 1982). At the student 
grantee level, study abroad participants also have a great deal in common with each other in 
terms of demographics, being roughly the same age and educational attainment level, which 
can enhance the generalisability of a study’s findings. There are a number of challenges 
inherent in the exclusive focus on grantees, however. Their anecdotal evidence to support 
claims of the Fulbright Program’s effectiveness is determined by their own judgment and 
may be of limited use in scientifically rigorous studies.
Participants’ testimonies of their experiences are by nature subjective and highly 
personal. Alumni are understandably grateful for their grants, and can be expected to express 
this when speaking about their experiences. One of the earliest studies of Fulbright grantees 
observed this in a series of interviews. “The investigator must keep in mind the obvious 
gratification and gratitude of persons who have been selected for honorific, subsidized 
foreign travel.” (Riegel, 1953, p. 321). It is entirely reasonable for grant recipients to colour 
their experiences with this gratitude in their interview statements. For the researcher, 
however, it means that their testimony must be considered in light of this gratitude and not 
necessarily taken at face value. Education scholar Dieter Breitenbach queried the impact of 
feelings of indebtedness on such findings, asking “Was it really the effectiveness of the 
programme that was being measured or, to some extent, the politeness of the grantees?” 
(Breitenbach in Eide, 1970, p. 87). Examples of what I call a ‘politeness bias’ are common in 
the literature. Favourable testimonies that claim the experience was ‘life-changing’ are 
reported as findings in many studies. In a 2005 U.S. State Department-sponsored evaluation 
of the Visiting Fulbright Student Program, a South African students superlative praise is 
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quoted: “Fulbright is the most wonderful thing that could ever happen in my life.” (SRI, 
2005b, p. 16). American grantees express similar sentiments. The U.S. Fulbright Student 
report from the same year includes the following quote from a grantee to New Zealand: “The 
Fulbright experience was a magical, enriching, life-changing experience for me.” (SRI, 
2005a, p. 8). These views may certainly be true for the students who express them, of course, 
but they do not offer proof that the programme is effective in achieving its aims. They are 
highly subjective, revealing perhaps more about the personality of the student than about the 
experience offered by the programme. 
The quality of respondents’ answers depends to a large extent on the quality of the 
questions asked. Many evaluators in previous studies have asked satisfaction-level questions, 
simple questions that ask for yes-or-no responses rather than evaluation-level questions, 
which demand more complex answers. In the section regarding overall effects of the 
Fulbright grant, a recent evaluation asked American grantees to rate whether they agreed or 
disagreed with the following statements: “1) Fulbright experiences were valuable; 2) Alumni 
are proud to have been Fulbright students.” (ibid., p. 8). The response was nearly 
unanimously favourable: 99% of respondents agreed that their experiences were valuable and 
that they were proud to have been Fulbright students. These are examples of satisfaction-level 
questions, because they do not invite elaborate responses or permit follow-up questioning. In 
what ways were their experiences valuable? What was the most valuable aspect? Answers to 
such questions would greatly enhance the study’s findings.
Researchers have also identified a semantics problem that can arise during some 
grantees’ post-sojourn interviews. Speaking formally with researchers can lead participants to 
aggrandise their experiences and broaden the definition of the ‘cultural’ to include a wide 
variety of activities. In his study of foreign Fulbright students in the United States, Riegel 
found that students and researchers tended to overstate certain aspects of the exchange 
experience when questioned by researchers. “It is interesting to note that interrogations often 
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revealed that ‘personal cultural enrichment’ can be translated as meaning good times with 
friends, and American hospitality and recreation, including Broadway shows, high-speed 
travel in automobiles, cocktail parties, and girls. This suggests a semantics difficulty in most 
evaluation studies, as both investigators and respondents are inclined to use a much more 
ponderous and pretentious vocabulary than the nature of the experience seems to warrant.” 
(Riegel, 1953, pp.324-325). The participants chose to label these experiences with more 
elevated language than they likely would have used outside of the evaluation context. The 
researchers also encouraged this language, as they asked for evidence of ‘personal cultural 
enrichment’. A more open-ended approach, asking them about their experiences more 
generally, would likely have produced responses that used a more colloquial and less 
pretentious vocabulary.
Researchers assessing the ‘effectiveness’ of the Fulbright Program face the difficult 
task of determining what constitutes effectiveness. Measuring effectiveness requires clear 
goals against which outcomes can be judged. This is made difficult by the fact that the 
Fulbright Program’s goals are unclear and vaguely defined. The programme’s stated goal is
to increase mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the people of 
other nations (Public Law 87-256). The term ‘mutual understanding’ is not elaborated upon, 
however, and evaluators are left to define it for the purposes of their own studies. This 
problem has been cited by education scholars as a challenge that arises in the evaluation of 
scholarship programmes. “The more lofty and abstract the mission (e.g. increasing 
international understanding), the more difficult it is to evaluate what was accomplished by the 
recipients or the program in general.” (Ilchman, Ilchman and Tolar, 2004, p. 10).
If we do not have a clear vision of what the Fulbright Program is meant to 
accomplish, then it is nearly impossible to judge its accomplishments. James M. Davis, 
former Vice President for Foreign Student Programs of the IIE, suggested that this lack of 
clarity presents a barrier to evaluation. “I suppose it is hard to have follow-up studies, 
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utilization of foreign training studies, studies of attitude change, because we are not really 
quite sure what we are after...Perhaps it is so broad in terms of objectives, or our motives are 
so disparate, that we can’t mount an evaluative study.” (Davis in Michie, 1967, p. 71). The 
mission of the programme needs to be clear in order to measure programme outcomes against 
it. Without clearly defined goals, one cannot assess whether goals have been met.
The Fulbright Difference
A 1993 collection of Fulbright grantee essays, The Fulbright Difference, used grantee 
reflections to explore the difference that the grant had made in the lives of its recipients. The 
volume describes personal and professional impacts, however, that could result from other 
forms of international living experience, and which are not necessarily limited to the 
Fulbright Program. Fulbright grantees are a small subsection of the international flow of 
students, researchers, lecturers and other educational travellers. Visiting Fulbright students 
constitute less than one percent of the total number of international students in the United 
States each year (FSB, 2009; IIE, 2012). What are the experiences of the many others who 
are involved in international education, the non-Fulbright academic sojourners? How do they 
differ from that of Fulbright grantees? By comparing and contrasting their experience with 
that of the Fulbright grantee, we can better understand the Fulbright grantee experience and 
its lasting impacts.
The most obvious difference in the experience of Fulbrighters is the financial support 
of the Fulbright grant itself. As discussed in chapter four, the amount and scope of the grant 
has changed over time, but most grants cover travel, living expenses, and in the case of 
students, tuition fees. Some participants have argued that it does not provide enough, that this 
prevents some eligible candidates from applying. Richard Kostelanetz, a Fulbrighter at the 
University of London in 1964-65, claimed that Fulbright grants were insufficient. “The 
biggest threat facing the Fulbright scholar is lack of money. He simply does not receive 
enough to subsist, even alone; and those with families or those assigned to cities with higher 
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standards of living are further disadvantaged, because they receive no supplements for their 
greater burden.” (Kostelanetz, 1966, p. 725). For grantees with dependents, the level of 
support may be too low to make a Fulbright year feasible.
Yet despite complaints about insufficient funding, it is important to recognise that 
most other international students and scholars receive no such financial support. Most are 
self-funded, relying on loans, savings or family resources to cover tuition and living 
expenses. Amongst international students in the U.S. during the 2009-2010 academic year, 
63% were self-funded. In many countries, their student visa status prohibits or limits their 
employment, which further increases the financial challenge of overseas study. Fulbright 
grantees are also given practical support with their finances, as one student explained, 
“There’s a lot of handholding from Fulbright, too, like they set up my bank account for me 
and took care of the housing arrangements with the university before I got here.” (Appendix 
A, p. 280). Other international students might have difficulty making such arrangements on 
arrival, particularly in cases where a language barrier exists.
Another important difference between Fulbright grantees and other international 
scholars is the question of access. The Fulbright status can facilitate research access for grant 
holders. For American grantee Douglas Ramage, his 1991 Fulbright doctoral dissertation 
research award gave him access to essential resources and people. “The grant was to study 
the role of democracy, nationalism and Islam in Indonesia...Everyone told me that I would 
never get permission from the Indonesian government to study that. But it was the respect for 
the Fulbright Program that reassured that government and led to my research permit.” (FSB, 
2010, p. 48). The cache of the Fulbright Program enabled Ramage to research his potentially 
controversial topic. Upon arriving in the country, Ramage found that his grantee status 
continued to play an important role, giving him access to resources that might not be 
available otherwise. “As a Fulbrighter, I could literally go anywhere and see anyone. For two 
full years, I spent countless hours, days and weeks with figures like Abdurrahaman Wahid 
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(‘Gus Dur’) who, in 1999, would become democratic Indonesia’s first President.” (ibid.). Not 
only did the Fulbright grantee status help Ramage to obtain his research permit, but it also 
gave him an unusual degree of access to elites.
Another striking example of access came from one of my interviews. The Fulbright 
student explained to me that his assigned personal mentor was the Vice Chancellor of the 
University, a former Fulbright grantee and member of the US-UK Fulbright Commission. 
While most international students would never meet the Vice Chancellor, this grantee told me 
that “he took me to dinner and a show in town” (Appendix A, p. 280). Socialising with the 
head of the University is certainly not part of the typical study abroad experience. This 
anecdote supports the notion that the Fulbright Program is an elite experience, bringing 
international elites together both professionally and socially.
Conclusion
Fulbright grantees are selected on the basis of merit, and sent to or from the U.S. as 
unofficial representatives of their native countries. During their time abroad, they may 
experience culture shock as they adjust to new surroundings, but they soon establish 
themselves at work and in their communities. In terms of culture learning and adaptation, the 
experience can be as immersive as one decides to make it. Some grantees, like the 
Dietemanns, Robin Winks, Sylvia Plath or Derek Bok marry partners whom they have met 
during the Fulbright grant period—perhaps the ultimate illustration of ‘going native.’ The 
administration does not aim for full assimilation, but rather that grantees might simply return 
to their home countries with a better appreciation of the host country and its people.
In practice, the impacts of studying or teaching abroad as a Fulbright grantee may not 
be so very different from those felt by people who had studied or worked overseas by other 
means. International living can reasonably be expected to change one’s worldview and 
influence one’s career choices. The elite nature of the Fulbright Program, I would argue, is 
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the difference between the Fulbright experience and any other academic sojourn. As one 
student described her motivation to apply to the Fulbright Program, “I liked the idea of doing 
research abroad instead of just spending a semester abroad partying.” (Appendix A, p. 282). 
The Fulbright may be taken more seriously than a junior year or semester abroad, and more 
respected on one’s curriculum vitae. The programme’s prestigious reputation is, arguably, 
‘the Fulbright difference.’ 
218
Chapter 7
Conclusion
Introduction
This study has examined the role of the Fulbright Program within American public 
diplomacy and the context of U.S. foreign policy. By placing the history of the programme 
within the context of global politics, the study has identified connections between significant 
events in America’s foreign relations and the educational exchange activities of the Fulbright 
Program. This study has shown that educational and cultural exchanges have, in most 
participating countries, supported America’s long-term foreign policy goals. Despite its 
avowedly apolitical nature, the Fulbright Program can be seen to contribute to American 
foreign policy objectives. During the Cold War, the programme offered an opportunity for 
foreign grantees to observe the American way of life first-hand, and for American grantees to 
dispel stereotypes overseas. More recently, Fulbright grantees have played a similar role in 
the post-9/11 era by building networks between scholars in the Arab and Muslim world and
scholars in the United States.
The study has brought the history of the Fulbright Program up to date, charting its 
development beyond the Cold War and into the twenty-first century. While previous studies 
have focused primarily on the first two decades of the exchange program, this study 
acknowledges the substantial changes that have taken place more recently. During the Cold 
War era, the Fulbright Program and American public diplomacy activities were directed 
towards a singular, long-term objective. The ideological struggle with Communism 
dominated America’s foreign policy agenda for more than four decades. Much of the existing 
literature links the Fulbright Program, and public diplomacy activities in general, to this 
objective. This approach neglects more recent developments, such as the Fulbright Program’s 
role in newly independent states after the end of the Cold War, or in the Muslim and Arab 
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world after 9/11. The present study has addressed these knowledge gaps and contributed to 
our understanding of the Fulbright Program’s more recent activities.
This chapter will summarise the study’s findings and address the research questions 
set out in the introductory chapter. The discussion of findings identifies the original 
contributions of this study to our understanding of the Fulbright Program, American public 
diplomacy, and the field of public diplomacy as a whole. It applies the theoretical framework 
to this history and determines whether the expectations that guide exchange diplomacy 
practices are fulfilled by the Fulbright Program. It responds to the four research questions, 
connecting them to the findings of archival research and interviews. The policy relevance of 
the findings will be explored, and the chapter will close with a discussion of future research 
directions.
The Fulbright Program and American Public Diplomacy
The archival material has revealed a number of patterns emerging from the history of 
the Fulbright Program. There has been a discernable ebb and flow of enthusiasm for public 
diplomacy and exchange diplomacy amongst American policymakers and U.S. Presidents. 
Interestingly, support is not partisan in nature. On the left, we can see that some Democrats 
like Johnson have cut the programme, while Kennedy, Carter and Obama have actively 
promoted it. On the right, Republicans like Eisenhower, Reagan and George W. Bush have 
supported exchanges and explicitly linked them with America’s foreign policy agenda, while 
Nixon and Ford took little interest in educational and cultural exchanges. The archives have 
also shown that U.S. officials are not necessarily more supportive of the exchange 
programme during war time, as has been argued about public diplomacy activities more 
generally.
Turning to the theoretical framework outlined in chapter two, the study has assessed 
the extent to which the assumptions behind exchange diplomacy practices have been fulfilled 
by the Fulbright Program. The analysis of the archival material and interviews suggest that 
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the exchange programme, in practice, does not always meet the expectations outlined by its 
theoretical framework. Contact often fails to meet the conditions for reduction of prejudice, 
participants selected on the basis of merit are not always opinion leaders, and public opinion 
impacts on foreign policy are, ultimately, difficult to discern and quantify.
The contact hypothesis is widely accepted in the public diplomacy literature, both 
explicitly and implicitly. Nancy Snow’s study of the Fulbright Program tested the contact 
hypothesis and found that foreign Fulbright students do indeed act as cultural mediators 
during their sojourns (Snow, 1992). Most studies do not cite Allport’s hypothesis, but refer 
instead to similar ideas and accept the contact hypothesis implicitly. They express an 
assumption that contact will reduce prejudices and stereotyping. This study has found that the 
rhetoric linking contact with increased understanding is ever-present throughout the Fulbright 
Program’s publicity materials, annual reports, evaluation studies and other relevant works. 
“By bringing carefully selected groups of foreign citizens into personal contact with 
our citizens and their way of life, the educational exchange program has done much to 
convey the truth about the U.S. to the leaders and future leaders of the other nations of 
the world and, through them, to their peoples.” (BFS, 1959).
“A fundamental purpose of the educational exchange program under the Fulbright-
Hays Act is to increase mutual understanding through direct contact between the 
people of the United States and the people of other countries.” (BFS, 1968a).
Senator Fulbright’s speeches about the exchange programme employ similar rhetoric, 
expressing his conviction that contact leads to mutual understanding between people of 
different backgrounds. Though it is rarely explained in Allport’s terms, the contact hypothesis 
is commonly used to justify educational exchange activities. 
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One vital element that is often disregarded in the exchange diplomacy literature, 
however, is the matter of contact conditions. In order for a contact scenario to effectively 
reduce prejudice and improve relations between the two participating groups, they must meet 
a number of conditions. Groups must be of an equal status in the contact scenario; it must be 
sanctioned by institutions; it should encourage the perception of common interests; and 
contact should occur in the pursuit of a common goal (Allport, 1954, p. 281). These 
conditions have been further explored and supported by the psychology literature (Macrae et 
al., 1996; Stangor et al., 1996; Langer at al., 1985). This study has demonstrated that 
Allport’s conditions are rarely met in the Fulbright Program exchange scenario, and do not 
constitute part of the programme design. 
The condition of equal status contact may be met for Fulbright student grantees 
interacting with peers, or for Fulbright scholars or lecturers interacting with colleagues. It 
does not apply to student-teacher interaction, however, and this is a common scenario for 
Fulbright grantees. A survey of visiting Fulbright grantees found that 84% had contact with 
host school faculty after the grant period (SRI, 2005b, p. 33). The contact scenario is 
sanctioned by home and host country institutions under the Fulbright Program; this condition 
can be said to be met. The criteria of common interests and common goals, however, are 
more difficult to judge in the case of the Fulbright Program. Grantees primarily carry out 
independent research, which suggests that this condition is not being met. Extra-curricular 
activities, such as volunteering or playing sports, may offer more opportunities for this 
condition to be met in a contact scenario. These are not, however, part of the exchange 
programme’s design. Administrators, in summary, do not organise opportunities for contact 
which meets the conditions described by the contact hypothesis.
The opinion leader concept, known as the multiplier effect in the exchange diplomacy 
literature, is also nearly universally accepted. It has been used to justify the emphasis on elite 
participation. Elites will go on to become opinion leaders, it is argued, and will be well-
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placed to share their cultural knowledge with others in the target society. Opinion leaders are 
no longer only politicians and activists. Technological advancements in communications 
mean that anyone with access to the web can share opinions with global audiences. This 
development has important implications for the opinion leader concept and its role in 
American public diplomacy. Giles Scott-Smith uses the example of a Saudi blogger who 
participated in the U.S. State Department’s International Visitor Leadership Program to 
illustrate the changing identity of the opinion leader (Scott-Smith, 2008, p. 191). Bloggers 
and social media users who have many subscribers are able to share their views with large, 
complex networks. In a technologically advanced communications environment, highly-
networked individuals are the new opinion leaders.
In terms of the Fulbright Program, the opinion leader concept has been used to justify 
the programme’s emphasis on elite participation. As discussed in chapter six, the programme 
is inherently elite, because postgraduate education and international travel are traditionally 
elite activities. When elites or future elites engage with each other in Fulbright Program 
activities, it is expected that they will become opinion leaders in later life. Of course, it is 
important to recognise that they will likely only be opinion leaders in their own fields. As 
most Fulbright alumni go on to pursue academic careers, their circle of influence in terms of 
public opinion will likely remain relatively small. Some critics of the Fulbright Program have 
questioned the suitability of academics for this purpose. “If the Fulbright Program considers 
itself an adjunct of diplomacy, it should select red-cheeked fraternity presidents rather than 
scholars.” (Kostelanetz, 1966, p. 725). This prompts an important question: are academics 
suited to the task of citizen diplomacy? To put it diplomatically, academics are not known for 
being gregarious people. In addition to their personal qualities, Fulbright grantees also pursue 
demanding research projects during their sojourn and spend a great deal of time working in 
offices and laboratories (Appendix A). This leaves little time for the types of social activities 
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that create mutual understanding, activities which the ‘red-cheeked fraternity presidents’ 
would not only pursue, but actively organise.
The final element of the framework is the assumed influence of public opinion on 
foreign policy. This is a highly contested topic in political theory. Of the three assumptions 
that make up this theoretical framework, it is the most difficult to measure, to prove or 
disprove. Realists, such as Hans Morgenthau, argue that people are more concerned with 
domestic issues than they are with foreign policy issues (Holsti, 1992). Domestic policy 
matters, such as the state of the economy and the unemployment rate, are considered more 
salient than foreign policy matters. Moreover, realists argue that because people are not 
inclined to become adequately informed about foreign affairs, their views on foreign affairs 
are based on emotion rather than reason. These emotional responses can unnecessarily 
restrain policy-makers, according to the realist school of thought. Liberal thinkers such as 
Immanuel Kant, on the other hand, argue that democracies are inherently more peaceful 
because the ‘dove’ public can constrain ‘hawk’ policy-makers (ibid.). Of course, democratic 
states do not always listen to ‘dove’ public opinion when determining foreign policy matters, 
as the case of the Iraq War demonstrates. 15 February 2003 saw the largest anti-war protest in 
British history, as only 26% of the public approved of Prime Minister Tony Blair’s handling 
of Iraq (Gordon and Shapiro, 2004, p. 144). Despite the protests and opinion polls, British 
armed forces participated in the invasion of Baghdad just a few weeks later. 
In terms of the Fulbright Program, this study has found little evidence to support the 
impact of exchanges on public opinion and foreign policy matters. In its discussion of the 
global political context in which the programme operates, however, this study has noted 
substantial changes that support this assumption. For much of the Fulbright Program’s 
history, more of the world’s population lived under authoritarian governments than in 
democracies. Today, the reverse is true. A recent study has found that only 37.1% of the 
world’s population live under authoritarian regimes, and China’s population alone accounts 
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for half of this figure (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2013, p. 2). In the six decades since the 
founding of the Fulbright Program, waves of democratisation have taken place around the 
world (Huntington, 1991). The impact of public opinion on policy-making has become 
stronger as more countries have become democratic.
Looking to the research questions outlined in the introductory chapter, this study has 
offered a multifaceted response in its history and analysis of the Fulbright Program. The first 
question considers the overall role of Fulbright exchanges in American public diplomacy and 
foreign policy since the end of the Second World War. The archival material has shown that 
the role of the exchange programme has changed over time, in accordance with the prevailing 
attitudes of officials towards public diplomacy and with America’s foreign policy agenda. In 
its first two decades of exchanges, the Fulbright Program was closely tied to America’s long-
term foreign policy objectives. In post-war Europe, the programme served as an academic 
adjunct to the Marshall Plan, while in Japan, they mended relations. After a peak of 
expansion and funding in the mid-1960s, however, a distinct drift away from this foreign 
policy connection can be observed. Much of the rhetoric promotes educational exchange for 
its own sake, rather than for its potential contribution to America’s foreign policy objectives.
The academic prestige of the Fulbright brand began to take precedence in the 1980s and 
1990s, with this trend particularly accelerating after the end of the Cold War. 
The second research question asks what the funding history of the Fulbright Program 
reveals about its purpose and practices. The archival material shows that Fulbright Program 
administrators have been adaptable and resilient in their near-constant search for funding. 
The initial funding by surplus war property has been acknowledged to be seed money, the 
minimal resources required to establish the exchange programme and encourage further 
investment by other actors, both public and private, foreign and domestic. Creative funding 
sources, such as agricultural surplus exports and Finland’s American loan repayments, 
enabled the exchange programme to continue and expand in the 1950s. As the programme 
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grew, partner nations began to contribute on an increasingly equal basis with the United 
States. Congressional appropriations are still vital, however, as they provide a foundation 
upon which private and foreign funding sources can build.
Looking to the Fulbright Program’s place in Washington, D.C., the third question asks 
how the exchange programme’s development has been influenced by the bureaucratic 
structure of American public diplomacy. The twentieth century saw multiple shifts and 
reorganisations, and many public diplomacy advocates feared ill effects of bureaucratic 
restructuring on America’s activities in the field. The archives have shown, however, that 
these shifts had little impact on the Fulbright Program’s development. Senator Fulbright and 
other exchange advocates feared that the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs would 
be ruined by coexisting alongside propaganda activities in the US Information Agency 
(Johnson and Colligan, 1965, p. 72). Yet when the two activities were combined, these fears 
did not come to fruition. Since 1978, the exchange programme has been conducted by the 
same agency responsible for overseas information activities, under three different 
bureaucratic configurations: the US International Communication Agency, the US 
Information Agency and the US State Department. The Fulbright Program has, if anything, 
become significantly larger and more entrenched during this period. While it is true that 
American public diplomacy in general did decline in the 1990s, the Fulbright Program 
actually expanded during this decade. Moreover, my interview with Hoyt Purvis, Foreign 
Scholarship Board member from 1993 to 2003, showed that the attitude of the Board was 
decidedly positive and optimistic about the 1999 restructuring. Board members were well-
connected with the Clinton administration and managed to maintain the profile of the 
Fulbright Program. The archival material and interviews suggest that the bureaucratic 
structure of American public diplomacy has had little bearing on the development of the 
Fulbright Program, and that individual advocates have played a more significant role.
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The fourth and final research question considers how the Fulbright grantee experience 
fulfils the objectives of American public diplomacy. The archival material contains limited 
evidence to support grantee fulfilment of these objectives. Administrators and programme 
evaluators have used grantee testimonies to demonstrate the programme’s effectiveness. 
Coming from presumably grateful grant recipients, this anecdotal evidence carries inherently 
favourable biases. The archival material and interviews in this study suggest that the grantee 
experience has grown increasingly focused on the academic aspirations of individual 
grantees, rather than the grantees’ potential contributions to international mutual 
understanding and goodwill. This perceived shift has important implications for the purpose 
of the Fulbright Program. Is it meant to be a competitive, merit-based award for academic 
excellence? If academic prestige is the new focus for grantees, how does the Fulbright 
Program contribute to the objectives of American public diplomacy?
The Future of the Fulbright Program
As this study has shown, the Fulbright Program and the context in which it operates 
have both changed a great deal over the past six decades. In 1946, the world had just emerged 
from a state of total war for the second time in thirty years. The U.S. economy was in the 
midst of a post-war boom and an American consumer culture emerged. The twenty-first 
century provides a markedly different context, in terms of international politics, economics, 
culture and technology. Educational exchanges with the five BRICS countries (Brazil, 
Russia, India, China and South Africa) may become the Fulbright Program’s priority in the 
future. We also now face global, borderless challenges such as climate change and food 
security, and the Fulbright Program may be used to seek solutions through international 
collaborative research. How have recent exchange initiatives reached out to the BRICS 
countries and addressed new global challenges?
The rise of China has been arguably the most significant geopolitical change in the 
post-Cold War era. In the past two decades, China’s higher education system has become 
227
increasingly internationalised. Once primarily sending its students to the West and losing 
many to the ‘brain drain’ phenomenon, China is now both a sender and receiver of students 
(Gürüz, 2011). China has been an important target for American public diplomacy since the 
origins of the practice, as this study has shown, and it remains a vital partner in educational 
and cultural exchange today.
The Obama administration and the Chinese government have made educational and 
cultural exchange an important part of US-Chinese relations, notably with the 2009 launch of 
the 100,000 Strong Initiative. The stated goals of the 100,000 Strong Initiative are “to 
increase dramatically the number, and diversity the composition, of American students 
studying in China as a means to enhance people-to-people ties between our two 
nations.”(U.S. Department of State, 2012). Underserved and minority students are 
underrepresented in study abroad programmes, and particularly in China. The initiative has 
been supported by a wide range of organisations and corporate donors, including the Ford 
Foundation, Americans Promoting Study Abroad, Bank of China, Microsoft, Motorola 
Mobility Foundation, Deloitte and Hilton Worldwide (ibid.). A private non-profit 
organisation, the 100,000 Strong Foundation, has been created to continue the work of the 
initiative, making this an interesting example of state-private cooperation. There is still a 
great deal more work to be done: according to the Foundation’s website, there are twelve 
times more Chinese students studying in the U.S. than Americans studying in China (100,000 
Strong Foundation, 2014).
In recent years, Brazil has become another significant rising power in international 
politics. As is the case with China, Brazil and other Latin American countries have long been 
recognised as important targets of American public diplomacy. In 2011, following the 
successful establishment of the China exchange initiative, the Obama administration 
introduced a Latin American programme, 100,000 Strong in the Americas. The goals of this 
initiative are similar to its Chinese counterpart, but on a regional scale. “The purpose of 
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100,000 Strong is to foster region-wide prosperity through greater international exchange of
students, who are our future leaders and innovators. Increasing understanding in the Western 
Hemisphere and building closer people-to-people ties will help the State Department work 
together with the people of the Western Hemisphere to address common challenges including 
citizen security, economic opportunity, social inclusion, and environmental sustainability.” 
(U.S. Department of State, 2012). 
The concept of “common challenges” has been applied to other educational and 
cultural exchange activities under the Obama administration. The Fulbright Nexus Program 
brings together multidisciplinary scholars to address globally shared challenges. According to 
a statement from Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs official Alina L. Romanowski,
the Nexus Program facilitates the collaboration necessary to face such international 
challenges.“The [Obama] administration and the Secretary [of State Hillary Clinton] see that 
there are global issues, and the solutions to these global issues, whether it's health or energy 
or climate change or food security, require creative collaboration and partnerships...We need 
to create the environment and bring these folks together." (Wilhelm, 2010).
Looking to the future, we may be entering another period in which the programme 
reverts to a more global, holistic approach. During the first decade of the twenty-first century, 
Washington policy-makers, State Department officials and Fulbright Program administrators 
emphasised the importance of engagement with the Arab and Muslim world. Grants for the 
Near East and South Asia were increased, but this approach was temporary. Exchanges with 
these regions are higher than they were in the pre-9/11 era, but they remain a relatively small 
percentage of the global total. During the 2000-01 academic year, exchanges with the Near 
East and South Asia accounted for 8.5% of all Fulbright grants (FSB, 2000). In the 2011-
2012 academic year, they made up 17% of the total (FSB, 2011). While this doubling is 
significant, this is a small percentage of the total grants for an area of strategic importance in 
American foreign policy. Exchanges with Europe, by comparison, constitute 35% of the 
229
world total (ibid.). These figures suggest that the priorities and applications of Fulbright 
Program activities are not strictly tied to American foreign policy concerns.
Today, exchanges emphasise the importance of international cooperation, of bringing 
the world’s intellectual and technological resources together to confront global challenges. 
This turn away from emphasising particular areas of the world does not mean that the United 
States is not using exchanges strategically. Indeed, former Under Secretary for Public 
Diplomacy and Public Affairs referred to exchanges in such terms. “We have prioritized 
international study because we understand that this is not just a ‘nice to have’ addition to our 
foreign policy, it is a strategic necessity.” (McHale, 2011). In her speech to the Education 
USA forum, she links international study to America’s geopolitical, economic and scientific 
interests. Rather than being valued for its contribution to a single strategically important 
foreign policy matter, educational exchange is valued for the range of impacts that are 
thought to result from genuine engagement. The Fulbright Program has come full circle, in 
this sense. After periods of fighting Communism and terrorism, it has returned to the post-
Second World War model which sought genuine engagement and promoted international 
peace and development. 
Policy Recommendations
The findings of this study are highly relevant for policy-making in the areas of 
educational and cultural exchange diplomacy. As the Fulbright Program approaches its 70th
anniversary, questions of its purpose and nature need to be revisited. Policy-makers can learn 
a great deal from the history of the Fulbright Program, and thereby avoid repetition of past 
mistakes. This study has highlighted a number of discrepancies between the theoretical basis 
and the empirically observed practice of educational exchange. What measures can be taken 
by Fulbright Program administrators to increase effectiveness and improve programme 
outcomes?
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Policy-makers should work with academics and programme alumni to construct a 
clear statement of programme objectives. This study has noted several problems arising from 
a lack of clear objectives. Former grantees have reported feeling uncertain whether they were 
expected to act as scholars or as diplomats abroad (Kostelanetz, 1966). Other alumni have 
admitted to being motivated primarily by their own professional ambitions rather than any 
notion of building international understanding (Snow in Snow and Taylor, p. 237). As a 
merit-based competitive scholarship programme, it is perhaps unsurprising that the Fulbright 
Program has become associated with academic prestige rather than exchange diplomacy. As 
State Department officials like Thomas Farrell have noted, however, this was not the 
intended purpose of the Fulbright Program (Lipka, 2004). The programme needs a clear 
statement of its purpose that defines the responsibilities of grantees and articulates the 
programme’s role in America’s international relations.
A clear statement of purpose would also greatly improve programme evaluation. In 
order to determine the effectiveness of the Fulbright Program, evaluators must first have a 
clear set of objectives against which they can measure programme outcomes. This study has 
found that most existing evaluative studies have been limited in the scope and depth of their 
inquiry. Grantee satisfaction has often been equated with programme effectiveness. The 
anecdotal evidence of alumni, however, has been shown to suffer from inherent biases and 
inaccuracies. More concrete objectives could include quantifiable measures of impact, such 
as the number of public speaking engagements a grantee had undertaken during and after the 
sojourn. Public talks and audience sizes offer evidence of the multiplier effect, as they show 
that cultural knowledge gains are being shared with others in the home and host societies. 
Objectives could also include contact scenarios that meet Allport’s conditions for the 
reduction of prejudice. Facilitating contact opportunities in which grantees interact with host 
nationals on an equal basis and in pursuit of common goals would likely improve contact 
outcomes.  
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In order to guarantee the Fulbright Program’s continued relevance, this new statement 
of purpose should link the exchange programme’s objectives to global concerns.  The 
programme’s existing objectives, as outlined in the 1961 Fulbright-Hays Act, emphasise the 
ideals of mutual understanding, peace and cooperation (Public Law 87-256). This statement 
uses vague language and does not offer guiding principles for the administrators or 
participants of the programme. They also reflect, to some extent, the context in which they 
were written. Contact between individuals of foreign nations has become common in today’s 
interconnected world. Globalisation and Americanisation have spread American culture 
throughout much of the world, rendering attempts to share American culture with foreign 
publics somewhat redundant. The advent of the World Wide Web and social media in 
particular, has made learning about foreign cultures a much more accessible activity than it 
has ever been. In this new context  of global interconnectedness, the Fulbright Program’s 
legislative goal ‘to increase mutual understanding between the peoples of the United States 
and the peoples of other nations’ seems outmoded. 
Today, problems in international relations are often not due to a lack of 
understanding; rather, the most pressing concerns are borderless issues such as climate 
change, food security, social unrest, the decay of cities and pandemic disease. These topics, 
among others, are the subject of the Fulbright Program’s Nexus initiative. This is a promising 
direction for the Fulbright Program that ensures public funds are spent on research with a 
global impact. Directing the Fulbright Program towards common problems would also 
enhance the binational character of the programme. Cost-sharing would be easier to justify to 
foreign contributors, who make up an increasingly large percentage of the programme’s total 
funding.
In an era that increasingly demands evidence-based policy, the testimonies of satisfied 
grantees will no longer be sufficient to justify the programme. The exchange programme 
needs clearer objectives that outline what is expected from grantees and which also contribute 
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in some way to global challenges. The Fulbright Program must adapt, as it has so often in the 
past, to maintain its relevance. 
Further Research Directions
In closing, the findings of this study suggest a number of potential future research 
directions. This history of the Fulbright Program has highlighted the importance of alumni 
involvement. It has argued that American exchange alumni play an essential role, acting as a 
domestic constituency for the Fulbright Program. During times of budget crisis or 
bureaucratic reorganisation, they have been shown to come to the programme’s defence. 
When the Reagan administration proposed dramatic cuts to the public diplomacy budget in 
1981, and again when the Clinton administration restructured public diplomacy activities, 
Fulbright alumni lobbied Congress to support America’s educational and cultural exchange 
programme. Alumni have also been shown to support the programme in other ways, from 
volunteering on screening committees and interview panels to helping with the orientation of 
new Fulbright grantees in the U.S. and overseas. Some alumni devote their careers to public 
diplomacy, such as Richard D. Arndt and Lois Roth. President Obama has appointed several 
Fulbright alumni to the Foreign Scholarship Board, including Mark Brzezinski, Christie 
Gilson, and Gabrielle Giffords. Most previous studies of the Fulbright Program have used 
alumni surveys to measure the effectiveness of the programme, but they generally quantify 
professional activities, such as the number of papers that the alumnus has published. There 
are a number of potential research projects regarding exchange alumni that look beyond 
career achievements, from examining their lobbying activities to discerning the predictive 
factors of alumni involvement. In terms of archival sources for such projects, the University 
of Arkansas holds the papers of the Fulbright Program’s Alumni Association from its 
establishment in 1976 to 2004. 
In the field of international education studies, there has been relatively little work on 
the concept of education as a form of cultural imperialism. Set forth by Martin Carnoy in 
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Education as Cultural Imperialism, this approach to international education studies asserts 
that “The spread of schooling was carried out in the context of imperialism and colonialism—
in the spread of mercantilism and capitalism—and it cannot in its present form and purpose 
be separated from that context.” (Carnoy, 1974, p. 15). In much of the literature on 
international development, the global spread of education seems to be universally regarded as 
a positive, progressive phenomenon. This approach challenges that view by acknowledging 
the connection between education and the legacies of colonialism. The United States, it has 
been argued, has acted as a ‘cultural imperialist’ in the projection of its culture to overseas 
audiences (Rosenberg, 1982; Kennedy and Lucas, 2005). Future research on American 
exchange diplomacy could explore the extent to which, and the conditions under which, 
educational and cultural exchanges can act as a form of cultural imperialism.
In addition to this history of the Fulbright Program, there are many other aspects of 
the history of educational exchanges which merit further academic study. They have been 
used outside of the U.S. for aims that are not connected with public diplomacy. The European 
Union’s educational exchange initiative, ERASMUS, offers a particularly interesting case. 
Established in 1987, it is part of a project to create a common European identity amongst the 
European Union’s twenty-eight member states. Recent studies have found compelling 
evidence that studying abroad through the ERASMUS scheme can influence participants’ 
attitudes towards Europe (Sigalas, 2010; Mitchell, 2012). The programme operates on a much 
larger scale than other exchange schemes; more students participate in ERASMUS each year 
than participated in the Fulbright Program in its first sixty years (Ilchman in Kiehl, 2006). 
The programme is still relatively young, however, and the European Union is continuing to 
expand in both breadth and depth. Both of these factors suggest that further research on the 
effects of ERASMUS participation is merited.
In the case of the United States, another interesting route of enquiry would be to 
examine the role played by heritage organisations in the establishment and support of 
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educational exchanges. The American-Scandinavian Foundation, for example, initiated 
educational and cultural exchanges some forty years before the Fulbright Program was 
established in Scandinavian countries (Blanck, 2008). It created an infrastructure that later 
exchange programmes built upon in the U.S. and Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Finland. 
Public and private exchange activities, including Fulbright Program, benefitted from these 
long-standing institutional relationships. Japan-America Societies, likewise, are focused on 
building people-to-people relations between the two countries. The first society was 
established in 1957 by the Japanese Embassy in Washington, DC; today, there are thirty-five 
across the United States (Japan-America Society, 2014). Heritage organisations are 
overlooked in the public diplomacy literature, but they are worthy of further academic 
attention. In the United States, a country primarily made up of immigrants, the ties between 
Americans and their nations of heritage are fascinating. These organisations encourage 
second-, third-, and further generation Americans to maintain cultural and linguistic ties with 
the countries of their ancestors. If the assumptions regarding the relationship between cultural 
knowledge and foreign policy are correct, this should have important implications for public 
attitudes towards U.S. foreign policy matters.
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Appendix A
Randall Bennett Woods Interview
28 January 2013, 10:30am-11:30am in-person interview
Professor of US diplomatic history at University of Arkansas. Author of Fulbright: a 
Biography and J. William Fulbright, Vietnam and the Search for a Cold War Foreign Policy.
Molly Bettie: [off recording, introductions and summary of project: my primary research 
questions are 1) what has driven the evolution of the Fulbright Program over time and 2) how 
does the Fulbright Program fit within US public diplomacy?]
Randall Woods: Well, Fulbright introduced the bill just after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, you 
know. He was an internationalist, he was trained in Britain by a person who wrote on Wilson 
and the League of Nations, and his mentor and Fulbright agreed that that was a terrific 
mistake and that if the US had participated in the League of Nations, that that could have 
prevented the Second World War and contained aggression.
Fulbright was a lawyer and he was initially attracted by the whole concept of international 
law and government...very much a Wilsonian like that, in that respect. And so, initially, you 
know he co-sponsored the Fulbright-Connally resolution which put Congress on record as 
supporting a UN.
And initially that’s what he put his energy into, was supporting the resuscitation of the 
League of Nations. But after the San Francisco conference, as things evolved, it became clear 
that the Security Council was going to dominate the organization, that it was going to be just 
a kind of mask for great power politics, and so he became disillusioned, so he looked for 
another way to prevent war.
And of course he was influenced by his stay in Oxford, and in his telling of it, that he was just 
an utter provincial and his exposure to Oxford and the larger world changed him, and he 
believed that that experience...if you could get the leadership of the major countries to have 
that experience, then it’d break down cultural barriers and create understanding, it would 
undermine nationalism and xenophobia.
He initially envisioned the exchange program as a kind of laboratory for future world leaders 
who would study abroad, become enlightened, and get to know each other. So, like 
Kissinger’s international seminar at Harvard, as it later became.
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Now, he had a hard time getting money for the program, and isolationism was reviving in this 
country. He used sales from foreign lend-lease, but that quickly wasn’t sufficient and so he 
was going to have to get appropriation from Congress. And so he, early in the fifties, he sold 
it as a Cold War policy, you know, ‘we’re on a struggle with Communism on every front—
military, cultural’--and he was a Cold Warrior, he supported the Marshall Plan and Truman 
doctrine. But in order to get funds from Congress, particularly as this was in the heyday of 
McCarthy.
MB: Yeah
RW: And so, you know, he sold it as a...he talked about it in the same breath as USIA and 
Voice of America, that it was part of our cultural offensive to sell freedom. Structurally it 
came under cultural affairs in the State Department. By that time, McCarthy had put one of 
his people in charge of that Division and so they began to run security checks and this 
infuriated Fulbright, just infuriated him and so he sort of went to war on his own program 
when it was in the State Department. You know, after 1955 he just completely rejected the 
notion of selling it as an anti-Communist tool, overtly. He was afraid it had been co-opted by 
the hard right and he wanted to prevent that.
Fulbright was an elitist, his mother was an Anglophile elitist and he wouldn’t admit it but he 
was an elitist. So initially he saw the program as really confined to the Atlantic community, 
and maybe Japan, you know, the great powers. And I talked to some of the directors, they 
said they had a hard time selling him on—well, she went to him and said, “We’ve got to 
establish programs with Brazil,” and he said, “Well, why would you want to have a program 
with Brazil?” Because Brazil wasn’t a player, you know. But he loved to contact students and 
he loved visiting foreign programs. And you know, by the sixties he was hardcore student 
exchange. It was the student experience, all about the student experience. And the more the 
better, the more diverse...You know, Fulbright was a segregationist to begin with. He 
changed--they don’t like me here much ‘cause I say that...
MB: (laughs) well, it’s true...
RW: It is true, but they don’t like that. I’ve made a lot of enemies in Arkansas. But his views 
changed dramatically. Like so many white middle-class Southerners like my parents, he was 
radicalized by the civil rights movement. His racism had more to do with class than it did 
with color. If he was dealing with the elite of Ghana or Kenya or India, skin color didn’t 
matter. If you were educated and part of the elite, you were acceptable to him, so it wasn’t 
race prejudice as much as class prejudice. But he even moved away from that. Part of that 
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was driven by [the fact that] he’s a very middle class conventional person, and in terms of his 
views on foreign affairs, he was friends with Acheson and Kennan and Chip Bohlen and 
those people.
But after his opposition to the US intervention in the Dominican Republic, which is where he 
really fell out with Johnson, and then his opposition to the war in Vietnam, he came under 
constant attack from hawks, from conservatives, from representatives of the military-
industrial complex.
So by 1967, this guy wore 3-piece suits and you know, was a Rhodes scholar--his books 
looked like they were being published by New Left Press, you know?
MB: Absolutely
RW: You know, The Price of Empire—so he’s indicting the military-industrial complex. He 
couldn’t stand the radical counterculture, just couldn’t stand it, but he became radicalized as a 
result of his opposition to the war. Well, that fed into his viewing the program as student-
oriented and bottom-up, if you see what I’m saying.
MB: That definitely feeds into the idea of the strategic use of students, whether students are 
supposed to be ambassadors or if it’s just educational exchange for the sake of it, for the sake 
of education.
RW: For him, it was for the sake of it. He was adamantly opposed...He saw it as liberal arts. 
Late in life I think he came to accept—he wouldn’t do business, but he’d do technology, but 
still...
MB: That’s so important for the development side, too, as a form of aid for developing 
countries, helping their higher education institutions.
RW: Well he was a big supporter of foreign aid. He would support aid particularly in 
education, he just didn’t want it to be part of the exchange program. It’s elite, focused on arts 
and sciences, you know. He was perhaps the most important defender of foreign aid in the 
Senate and in his position as Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. So he 
was doing battle continuously with opponents of foreign aid.
MB: Another area that I’ve looked into is the promotion of American studies as a field, and 
how the Fulbright Program contributed to that. Was that something that he was interested in 
promoting?
RW: No, he was, well...he wanted people to travel. The American studies program...he 
believed that there was no substitute for living in the other culture. So if you wanted to learn 
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about America he wanted you to come to America. If you wanted to learn about China he 
wanted you to go to China not go to Columbia University and learn about China.
MB: Yeah, I think it came from later years in USIA, of ‘Telling America’s Story to the 
World’—that that idea was creeping into the program. 
RW: All of the people that I’ve known that were associated with the Fulbright Program are 
addicted to foreign travel, they live for it, just live for it—they’re addicted to it. And most 
Fulbrighters are that way.
MB: I’ve seen several cases of grantees holding multiple Fulbrights.
RW: That’s right. There’s no question that it’s a life-changing experience. And I don’t think 
there’s any question about the beneficial impact of foreign experience—in language, in 
culture, there’s just no substitute for it. So I think he was right. But he was very much a 
visionary—that’s not part of the American tradition. You know, I teach courses in American 
foreign policy, and so much of foreign policy is projection of American values and culture on 
other countries, and the reaction to that projection, rather than through any real knowledge.
You know, in Vietnam, until late 1966 there weren’t ten Americans in Vietnam who could 
speak Vietnamese.
MB: Oh no!
RW: Now that changed, but you know...He was a fairly unemotional man. He could get 
wound up, he could get angry or indignant but he wasn’t a particularly sentimental man. But 
he was sentimental about the program. It was his passion. He’d become unbalanced in 
defending it. 
Understandably, the last 25 years of his life was one triumphal tour after another. He’d go to 
these countries and they’d treat him like royalty. (laughs)
MB: That is one thing I wanted to ask, about his activities after leaving the Senate...
RW: Well, that’s all he did. (laughs) This anniversary of that and that anniversary of this—he 
was God. He was the deity of the Fulbright Program. 
Now, the other thing is, I had a Senior Scholar short-term grant to Argentina in Buenos Aires 
and they had their celebration of their program. These folks, the Cultural Attachés wouldn’t 
have much to do if they weren’t overseeing the Fulbright Program. And there is a community 
of Fulbrighters in these foreign countries that exercise considerable influence on Argentine-
American relations or Brazilian-American relations. They move in circles...The head of the 
Fulbright Commission, Norma González, is a powerful lady. She’s included, not in decision-
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making, but in terms of images, and she goes to all the cultural events, she knows people, she 
knows the decision-makers. There was a new American ambassador and the Argentine 
Foreign Secretary and the US Ambassador treated her as if she were Fulbright. So they’re 
powerful...In terms of soft diplomacy, the Fulbright community is unique.
MB: And I suppose, the smaller the country, the more important they are?
RW: I think so. After the first fifteen years it was...I don’t know whether they had a quota 
system or not, but it’s hard to get a Fulbright to England.
MB: Yeah, it’s very competitive. Western Europe in general is very competitive.
RW: Very competitive...but if you want to go to Botswana, no problem. So, ironically, as the 
Cold War evolved, the Fulbright Programs in the developing world which became the cockpit 
of the Cold War...Now, I haven’t investigated this, but I think you could see how, in Angola 
or Tunisia, how important that would be.
I found out in Vietnam, that one of the most powerful institutions there was the Boy Scouts.
MB: Oh wow, that’s great!
RW: I think half of the members of the North Vietnamese politburo and two-thirds of the 
South Vietnamese military were Boy Scouts. There’s this kind of ethos there, you know...
MB: Right, survivalist?
RW: [nods] The Boy Scouts in a certain context are extremely conventional and pro-
establishment, but in other contexts they can be very subversive.
MB: Absolutely. Let’s see what other areas we haven’t talked about...Another thing about his 
post-Senate activities, Did he have any involvement in fundraising—does his reputation give 
the program the prestige it needs to draw funds from donors?
RW: Sure, yeah, he was a willing instrument to the program here but particularly abroad. I 
went to Germany, I was the keynote talk there at the 50th Anniversary of the German 
program, and it’s hard to overestimate...He would come and they would bring him out. They 
would, you know...But I must tell you, the Fulbright Program is still a poor program. 
Fulbrighters don’t have any money. We try to raise funds for the college here, and they just 
don’t have any money. They’re not plugged into people who have money. Very unsuccessful 
fundraisers. Because, I think, they don’t want to condescend to spend their time with people 
who make money. But you don’t see even Warren Buffett or Bill Gates...And part of the 
problem is they’re arrogant. Fulbright people are very, kind of...and this is ironic, given 
Fulbright’s views of barrier-breaking and international homogenization. Fulbrighters are very 
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elitist. They’re part of this sorority or fraternity, and you’re not. And you don’t understand, 
and you never will unless you’ve had the Fulbright experience.
So people who have a lot of money who have not had the Fulbright experience, they’re put 
off. It’s off-putting.
MB: I think that’s one of the things with it being a prestigious award, that people look at the 
academic prestige and think it doesn’t need any money. Similarly, why would you donate to 
the Nobel Foundation—the public might think it’s endowed.
RW: Yeah. It would’ve been better if the Fulbright Program had been established by 
Carnegie or Mellon, rather than by Fulbright. They [Fulbright family] were big stuff around 
here, but they didn’t have any money. 
I was in Clare College in Cambridge, and that’s been endowed by the Mellon family, because 
Andrew Mellon’s son spent a year there.
Now, I didn’t do anything with the cultural program after the early 60’s. By that time, my 
focus was more foreign policy, Vietnam, and his ongoing battle in the anti-war movement so 
I haven’t done much. You know more about the program after the sixties than I do. 
MB: Well, the early years are the years where I think he’s most involved, directly, in the 
program.
RW: Well, I’m not sure if that’s true, I think he stayed active in the program. I just didn’t 
study his role after the mid-1960’s, so there may be a lot there that I don’t know about. Have 
you looked at his papers at all?
MB: I’m still on the BFS papers, but I plan to, yeah. It’s been slow-going because I’ve found 
some useful things.
RW: Found some stuff? Well, that’s good!
MB: Let’s see if there was anything else...Basically, I was most interested in his view on 
whether students could be used strategically, and it sounds like that changed over time?
RW: It did change, but even when, you know, I interviewed him extensively in ’88, I guess, 
and he still was very proud...He could tell you every foreign minister who was a graduate of 
the Fulbright Program. He was interested in student exchange, but he was also very proud of 
the power aspect.
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MB: I’m working on a section about the elite alumni, how the alumni feed back into the 
program, whether it’s through fundraising or volunteering to serve on selection committees—
these activities that alumni do to keep the program going.
RW: I don’t know how closely he monitored selections to the Board of Foreign Scholarships. 
He was appalled of course, when the Republicans...you know...there were certain board 
members that he was just appalled. I was overseas...I can’t remember which Bush 
administration, but the folks that were there, the cultural attachés that I encountered were 
anti-intellectual, and actually, almost opponents of the Fulbright Program. 
MB: I’ve noticed some of the appointees, people who were friends of George W. Bush back 
in Texas, friends, colleagues, fellow businesspeople, his mother’s Chief of Staff was one of 
the appointees—so that’s another thing I want to look at, how the make-up of the BFS 
changed.
RW: And that appalled him. He believed that the board ought to be mainly scholars and 
veterans of the exchange program. But he didn’t see any way around presidential 
appointment. And his attitude was the program’s a hell of a lot stronger than they are, I mean, 
it’s gonna survive. But he wasn’t really sure about that. He was always worried that the 
program was going to become a victim to the far right, you know. [laughs]
In the 70’s and 80’s, the Committee on Present Danger, they weren’t interested in 
international exchange. And ironically, Fulbright became a Rusophile, in sort of his New Left 
reaction to this criticism. He became just a kind of fan of...he loved the Bolshoi ballet. He 
would make speeches to the notion that it might be a Communist society, but culturally 
Russia’s so much more advanced and developed than the United States. Which, you can 
imagine how that was received.
MB: That wouldn’t go over well! I remember a quote of his, that it didn’t matter whether a 
country was Communist or Capitalist, if they’re keeping themselves to themselves, let them 
be.
RW: That’s right. In many ways, quite naïve. He was basically an academic whose mother 
wanted to send him to Congress. He believed that you could solve any problem, resolve any 
situation through education. Drove his colleagues in Congress crazy because he would 
lecture. He was sort of unwilling to admit the efficacy of prejudice and unreason in public 
debate. Sort of ivory-towerish.
Now, you know he developed a reputation as an anti-Semitic? He was an anathema to pro-
Israeli folks, particularly here—not so much in Israel, but here. And of course the pro-Israeli 
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folks here are holier than the Pope—folks in Israel kinda make fun of them. They helped 
defeat him in ’74. In ’72 he endorsed a Land for Peace deal. He wanted the US to guarantee 
Israeli borders that were pre-’67 Israeli borders. He was an anathema. And he held hearings 
on the Jewish lobby, and he tried to get the Zionist organizations in this country to register as 
agents of a foreign government.
MB: Wow!
RW: Yeah...Now, I don’t think that, given the disproportionate presence of Jewish folks in 
intellectual communities and intelligentsia, I don’t think that those folks...how shall I explain 
it...In Israel, you have the Likud and the Labor, you have the orthodox, the confrontational 
people and you have the Labor people at the founding of Israel who want a secular society, 
who want coexistence. Most Jewish intellectuals are of that variety, they’re not Likud. It’s the 
American Jews who are not intellectual, the business people or tradespeople—you see what 
I’m saying? [MB nods]
Certainly, I never saw any Jewish backlash against him within the intellectual community at 
all, not at all. And he was close to a lot of Jewish intellectuals. So it was purely external to 
the program.
MB: I think, to be fair, the definition of being anti-Semitic can quite different in the States 
than it is abroad—in the States, you know, if you suggest a two-state solution...
RW: If you say ‘Jewish’ [laughs]. Now, I got in big trouble, I raised some questions about the
first Gulf War. I went down to Central Arkansas to the library and I thought they were going 
to lynch me. They thought that I was, sort of, an academic reincarnation of Fulbright—who 
they consider anti-Semitic.
MB:  Because you’ve associated yourself with him? Right, that’s why I wanted to read some 
of your other works, the biography on Johnson, I read that one.
RW:  Well, at the Johnson library, they held me at arms’ length for two years, because they 
figured I was going to do a hatchet-job on Johnson because I’d done Fulbright. Now, they 
love me, they think I’m wonderful.
[End of interview] 
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Hoyt Purvis Interview
28 January 2013, 3:30pm-4:30pm in-person interview
Professor of Journalism at University of Arkansas since 1982. Former Press Secretary and 
Special Assistant to Senator Fulbright and Foreign and Defense Policy Advisor to Senator 
Robert Byrd. Served on Fulbright Foreign Scholarship Board 1993-2003. Founded Fulbright 
Institute of International Relations at University of Arkansas.
Molly Bettie: In the time that you were on the Board of Foreign Scholarships—so it was 
1993-2003?
Hoyt Purvis: Right.
MB: I’d read that you knew Clinton when he was in Senator Fulbright’s office and then years 
later, he appointed you to the Board of Foreign Scholarships?
HP: That was really nice, the way that all worked out. Bill Clinton was a student at 
Georgetown, working in Senator Fulbright’s office when he was a student, and that’s when I 
got to know Clinton. Then it turned out very nicely that when he was elected President, he 
appointed me to the Fulbright Board, so that’s very nice the way that turned out.
MB: Just going through your time on the Board chronologically, in the early 90’s there was 
the post-Cold War shaking up of public diplomacy structures, and questioning whether it was 
relevant anymore. How would you make the case for it still being relevant?
HP: Well, yeah, you’re right, I think there was certainly a period there where some people 
were questioning the whole area of public diplomacy, cultural diplomacy and educational 
exchange. But I think first of all, I would readily concede that part of the Fulbright emphasis 
had been...well, there was certainly a relationship between the Fulbright Program and the 
Cold War era. But I never personally saw the exchange program as primarily Cold War-
oriented. Certainly that was a part of the broader picture. So just to establish that fact...
And so, yes, it’s true I think that there was kind of an uncertainty, what’s the rationale for an 
exchange program of this scope when we’re beyond the Cold War?
Well, to me, there was never any question—there was ample rationale. That is, the basic 
goals of mutual understanding, of giving people an opportunity to develop a perspective from 
another country, to learn to understand and appreciate other cultures, other societies—those 
are the things, I mean, really go back and look at the case that Senator Fulbright had made 
from the beginning of the program. That’s what it was. And those goals didn’t diminish, in 
fact, in my view, in some ways they became even more important than ever because we were 
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in a situation where we weren’t sort of limited by the Cold War. And so I saw this as a time 
when we could really make some very important steps ahead.
Again, I would come back to the point that, to say that ‘Ok, the Cold War is over, then the 
Fulbright Program is over’, to me that would have been so far from what I had always 
understood the Fulbright Program to be, and the potential that the program had. So, I never 
really thought that we needed to reinvent ourselves, so to speak. It’s not to say that areas of 
emphasis didn’t change, but you know, you had the opportunity to begin to move 
ahead...well, with China, for example, which had been out of the picture, more or less, since 
1949—to a limited degree in the 70’s and 80’s, when things were re-opening.
But anyhow, I thought it was very short-sighted for anybody to jump to the conclusion that, 
ok, the Cold War’s over, now we can forget about these other things. Some people certainly 
have that view, but I never bought it for a second.
MB: And I think Senator Fulbright wouldn’t have [Purvis : definitely]. One thing, in Nancy 
Snow’s work, she talks about her time at USIA in 93-95 era, and she talks about how 
international business became an issue that was prioritized during that time. Do you think the 
Fulbright exchanges had any sort of link with this international business focus?
HP: I’m not sure exactly where you’re going with that. One thing that comes to my mind, 
there was certainly a squeeze on funding. There was a belief that came from somewhere 
within the USIA or wherever it might have been, the notion that something like the Fulbright 
Program should turn more to corporate support, particularly for programs in other countries. 
And so...because prior to that time, there had been very little funding for Fulbright, whether 
from this country or abroad, that was not from governments, universities or foundations. And 
so there was certainly a push from some quarters to get more corporate funding to help 
continue the program. I don’t know if that responds to what you’re asking?
MB: No, that’s fine, just to clarify, Nancy Snow’s example was that, when NAFTA was 
signed, that Fulbright exchanges with Mexico were increased. She links the two events, and I
just wondered if you felt that that was the case?
HP: I’m trying to think about any...Particularly with Mexico, there was an increased level of 
exchange with Mexico and some of that, I guess, there was some corporate involvement, 
some foundation involvement. And I suppose, at least, indirectly, that might well have been a 
result of NAFTA. And I will say this, there was...I hadn’t really thought about it to be honest, 
but there was, beginning with that time, with both Canada and Mexico, there was more 
activity from the partner countries. And there was more involvement from the business sector 
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than there had ever been before. Maybe that all ties in together. It’s not something I really 
had ever thought about that much, so...
MB: Ok, I thought that might be the case. So, in the late nineties, the time of the USIA 
closing down, I wanted to ask how the Board of Foreign Scholarships reacted to that.
HP: Well, it’s kind of interesting, because as you may know, Fulbright himself had never 
been keen on USIA and having the program based in USIA. It, as you know, started out in 
the State Department and when the USIA was created, the Fulbright Program in effect was 
moved into USIA, then the agency was renamed ICA under Carter and then eventually went 
back to USIA.
Fulbright was never happy with that arrangement because he felt that it could imply, or 
people could infer, kind of a propaganda connotation there. And particularly, when the ICA 
came along, too many people had fun playing with the initials there [laughs]. So with that 
background, the USIA...I think that whole decision was probably not the most well thought-
out decision in the history of American government. It was kind of one of those--again this is 
just my own perspective--it was kind of one of those decisions that sounded like a way of 
solving some other problems but without really making things necessarily better. Although 
again, I would say I’m certainly quite comfortable having the Fulbright Program in the State 
Department and I think that probably is where it belongs. And again, I’m not sure how much 
of this you know and I’m just speaking from my own perspective.
The concern of the Board and I think at that point, we had what, in my view, was a very good 
board and the members, most of them were people who were very committed to the Fulbright 
Program. The concern was that, in the process of this government reorganization, that the 
Fulbright Program was going to be shuffled around and stuck somewhere and not have very 
much of a profile, and not really have anybody to speak up for the Fulbright Program under 
the reorganization. So the Board’s concern was to see that the Fulbright Program did have a 
home, and did have, potentially at least, a little bit of clout within a very big government 
department. But it appeared that that was not necessarily going to happen. 
I think I can speak for all the people who were on the board at that time, we couldn’t see that 
anybody was really looking out for the interest of the Fulbright Program. Madeleine Albright 
was Secretary of State, and Madeleine was an old friend, we’d worked together in the Senate 
when I worked for Robert Byrd and she was with the Carter administration and Brzezinski. 
But we were afraid that Madeleine, the Secretary, that she had so many other concerns to deal 
with in that reorganization process that Fulbright was not on her priority list. And again, I 
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have very high regard for Madeleine Albright but that was the way we saw it. The Board 
made a couple of efforts to try to communicate with people involved in this process, and it 
didn’t seem like we were really going anywhere. Under the circumstances, what alternative 
did we have but to turn to the President. There were of course some of us on the Board who 
knew the President well. Lee Williams, I don’t know if you know who I’m talking about or 
not, but Lee Williams was a member of the Board, appointed by Clinton. Lee had been 
Senator Fulbright’s administrative assistant. It was Lee Williams who hired Bill Clinton to 
work in Fulbright’s office. I don’t know if you know the famous story about when Bill 
Clinton had contacted Fulbright’s office about getting a job. He needed a job while he was 
going to school in Georgetown, and some prominent people in Arkansas had contacted Lee 
on behalf of Clinton, to say, you know, this is a fine young man and he needs a job, and so 
Lee Williams talked to Clinton and he said there were two part-time jobs that were open. One 
was this job and one was this job, and basically it was a messenger-type job, and Clinton said 
‘Well, that’s great, can I take both of them?’ [laughs] And that’s what he wound up doing; he 
took both of the part-time jobs. So, that’s by way of background to give you some of the 
connection there.
So, several of us communicated to the President and let him know, we wanted to make sure 
that somehow, someway that the Fulbright Program was protected and had a certain profile 
within this reorganized State Department. I think that then the President spoke to the 
Secretary of State and that it got worked out, at least to some degree, that was generally 
satisfactory. Also along the way, the Board met with Patrick Kennedy, who was Assistant 
Secretary for Administration, he’s still there, I believe. In fact, if I’m not mistaken, he was 
one of the people who was testifying about Benghazi. Also, one of the key people here was 
Tom Pickering.
Well, Tom had been a Fulbright scholar, I believe he was a Fulbrighter to New Zealand. Tom 
had been ambassador to Russia and some other positions...At that time, he was 
undersecretary. Anyway, Tom Pickering was somebody who was well-placed in the State 
Department and the Board went over to the State Department and met with Ambassador 
Pickering and enlisted his assistance to help look after the Fulbright Program.
I’ll tell you something interesting about Pickering and talking about Fulbright--This past 
spring I went over to Oxford for the Fulbright Distinguished Lecture, which you know, 
Pembroke College where Fulbright was a Rhodes Scholar. They have this annual lecture--in 
fact there are several different lectures in Britain. Tom Pickering was the Fulbright 
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Distinguished Lecturer and I was visiting with him a little bit while I was there and we were 
reminiscing about what I’ve just been talking about there.
In the final analysis, of course, as far as I’m concerned the Fulbright Program should always 
have a high profile and visibility and clout and all those things. At least, I think, we managed 
to do something to keep the program...because there was a real concern that the Fulbright 
Program, with all of this reorganization, was going to kind of get pushed into a corner 
somewhere and that certainly was not what we wanted to happen.
MB: Absolutely. There have been a lot of these recurring crisis moments...
HP: There have, yes. We went through, again, talking about the mid-nineties after the 
Gingrich Congress came in there were real concerns about the future of the program 
financially. And that coincided with that same period of talking about raising funds through 
the corporate world for the Fulbright Program around the world. 
I’ve often thought that had Clinton not been President at that time, on the one hand, you 
could say that to some extent he had his hands tied because he was bound to hold down 
government spending, etc. but on the other hand, I think that if Clinton hadn’t been President, 
that the program might have run on really hard times because of the pressure that was there to 
eliminate programs and cut back spending, etc. I’m not suggesting the program was going to 
be done away with but at the same time, it was a time of real pressure.
MB: Do you think the alumni association and these organizations of teachers, are they very 
involved in lobbying?
HP: Yeah, and I myself was involved with the Fulbright Association for awhile, and I think 
by and large the Fulbright Association and some of the other groups have been effective in 
building grassroots support and have done a pretty good job of helping to keep support up in 
Congress. And that again was something that, when I was on the Board, we tried to really 
encourage. There’s a fine line there between working in the government even as a Board, but 
there was certainly no reason why the Fulbright Association couldn’t become more active in 
supporting the Program and building support in Congress and increasing knowledge and 
awareness of what the program’s all about. And I think that that had been going on, on a sort 
of haphazard basis for quite awhile. 
One of the things that we discovered was that most Fulbright alumni, of course many of them 
were academics, had not really been called upon to rally on behalf of the program. A lot of 
them were quite willing to do that if they were asked, you know. They hadn’t really thought 
about it that much. I think that was a program that the program had, it really had not done 
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enough to foster that kind of continuing involvement by people who had been the 
beneficiaries of the grants. So I think that certainly improved significantly during the time 
that I was there and during the time that I was involved with the Fulbright Association.
You know, it was always frustrating to the Board to find out that there were very few records 
that anybody could put their hands on about former Fulbrighters, and of course, you may 
know about this, I don’t know if you’ve encountered any of this in the archives, you may see 
some of it. One of the problems is, particularly with academics, and so many of the Fulbright 
grantees from this country as well as others had been people who went into academic careers 
or people who were already in academic careers, but as you know, a lot of times those are 
people who move around. It was really quite surprising to learn that there was not a lot of 
good information how to contact former Fulbrighters. Now, significant progress was made in 
that regard, but for most of the program’s history very little had been done to keep tabs on 
former Fulbrighters.
MB: Yes, I’ve seen some of the early directories, but it would be just a directory of grantees 
from France, you know, just country-specific. And one thing I haven’t found in the archives 
is anything about publicity or marketing—I get the impression that they don’t seem to 
advertise?
HP: There again, the nature of being a government program imposes some real restrictions on 
what you can do. But at the same time I think a lot more could have been done [laughs] than 
was. Of course, you could say, well, all the money is intended for grants and for 
administration of grants, and we can’t spend money for other purposes. Which I think is a 
valid argument, except that I still think a lot more could have been done without spending a 
lot of money. And there again I think the Fulbright Association and some other university 
groups around the country and around the world, they began to do a lot more on that but for 
many years, I think, very little was done.
I’m sure you’ve heard this a million times, ‘cause I’ve heard it ten million times, and that is, 
the Fulbright Program is better known outside the US than it is inside the US. And that’s 
pretty much the case, particularly if you look at Japan for example, although I think it’s 
probably levelled off a little bit. I was actually visited recently by a retired Japanese professor 
who was travelling around the country visiting places that he had known when he was a 
Fulbrighter, and he was still telling me that the prestige of the Fulbright Program in Japan is 
still remarkably high. There’s a real cache associated with Fulbright. 
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I was very fortunate that during the time I was Chair of the Board it was the fiftieth 
anniversary of the Fulbright Program, so we did do a lot of special activities that year and lots 
of programs around the country and around the world, which did get some publicity for the 
program. And I think it helped a lot but I think if you wanted to offer a critique of the 
Fulbright Program over the years, I would say that a definite shortcoming has been a 
consistent marketing and PR effort. There’s certainly been times, and recognition of the many 
distinguished people who were Fulbrighters who have gone on to great things--and that’s 
good, that’s what you want. But I think a certain amount of that is owed to the fact that, as a 
government program there are limitations on what you can do with publicity.
MB: I’ve noticed that today, they’re on Twitter and Facebook, and that’s sort of 
democratising, isn’t it, getting everyone to see it and raising awareness?
HP: Yeah, and I think there are certainly people over the years who’ve been innovative and 
effective at communicating, but still, compared to what might have been done or perhaps 
should have been done, it hasn’t been that effective.
MB: My last chronological issue is 9/11, I’ve been looking at the Annual Report of 2001 and 
the response of the Fulbright Program—an increase in funding and grants to the Middle East, 
you know. So I wanted to know about your impressions on the Board?
HP: It’s not something I’ve thought about too much recently, but it’s funny, because the other 
day I was going through some old computer files and email and I came across something 
from ’97. We had a Board retreat and talked about priorities. I could probably dig it out and 
send you a copy, it might be of interest. Anyhow, it was interesting because we were talking 
about the importance of doing more in certain regions of the world and shifting priorities. 
Part of the problem, as I think you’ll understand, is that the largest Fulbright Programs were 
Japan, Germany, Spain, and going a little bit further back, UK, France, etc. But the Germans 
and the Japanese were also putting lots of money in, and part of that dilemma is that you 
don’t want to diminish that, but at the same time, from our perspective, we needed to be 
focused on some other areas in the world and putting resources into that.
Now, about 9/11, I don’t know if you’re aware of this or not, but the Fulbright Scholarship 
Board was in session on the morning of 9/11. I guess Alan Schecter was Chairman of the 
Board then and of course, these are things you remember very vividly because of the overall 
significance of what was happening. There we were meeting, we were actually at the old 
USIA building which is just a few blocks southwest of the Capitol. The night before we’d 
had a social gathering and some of the members of the Board were rotating off the Board. We 
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met at something like 8:30 in the morning, and we were up on the top floor of the building. 
We started hearing a lot of hubbub out in the hall and somebody got up and closed the door. 
And I remember Lee Williams who I mentioned earlier lived in Northern Virginia, and he 
came in a little late, and he was kind of giving some hand signals like something was going 
on. But Alan was sitting at the head of the table there, I was sitting to his right but I could see 
out in the hallway...Alan was determined to keep that meeting going [laughs]. Suddenly 
we’re hearing not just a few sirens in the streets but lots and lots, I mean, this is not normal 
stuff, you know? Things just got more and more...there was obviously something happening,
so I finally got Alan’s attention and said, ‘Can we stop for a minute and see if we can figure 
out what’s going on?’ By that time, Lee stood up and said ‘Yeah, something hit the World 
Trade Center and there’s other things going on.’ And then about that time, the intercom in the 
building comes on and says ‘Please evacuate the building, there’s an emergency and take the 
stairs, blah blah blah.’ We finally work our way down to the first floor and they had some 
TVs so we could see what was happening. At that time, our plan was, we didn’t realize how 
serious this was, and we were just going to, there’s a hotel right down the street and we were 
just going to reconvene at the hotel and continue our meeting. Well, within a few minutes it 
became obvious that we weren’t going to continue our meeting.
Of course, I was living here at the time, so I was stuck in DC for the rest of the week. So, that 
was certainly a memorable time. And just an added thing, when the Oklahoma City bombing 
occurred, it turned out that happened to be a time that the Executive Committee of the Board 
was meeting in Washington. They put the building on lockdown, ‘cause it was a Federal 
building, they didn’t know...We were in a meeting in a small room, smaller than this, and we 
didn’t really know what was going on. I’m rambling on, but this is bringing back a lot of 
memories, things I haven’t thought about.
That night, I was flying back to Fayetteville, when we still had the old airport down here, and 
interestingly enough, there was a connecting flight in Nashville. So I flew from DC to 
Nashville and Nashville to Fayetteville—or at least, I was supposed to. Well, it was a very 
stormy night, so when we got to Nashville we were delayed quite a bit and finally took off for 
Fayetteville. When we got close to Fayetteville, it was one of those fairly small planes, 
bouncing all around and the pilot said ‘We’re not going to be able to land in Fayetteville, 
we’re going to go either to Wichita or Springfield.’ Great. So anyhow, we landed in 
Springfield, Missouri, and it was about one o’clock in the morning and it was a small airport, 
so everything was closed down.
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There was a full contingent of us going to Fayetteville. As you probably know, there’s a lot 
of people who come to Wal-Mart, business people, you know. So amazingly enough, the 
flights are almost always full in and out of Fayetteville. So anyhow, there we are at the 
airport, as it happens in a case like that you make your own little group of people. There were 
three other people and there was a guy who said he thought he could get a rental car and drive 
to Fayetteville—the rental car offices were closed, but apparently this guy had some clout. He 
got on the phone and this guy came and opened it up and rented us a car. They were sending 
a bus to take us to Fayetteville, but it was going to take a couple of hours to get to 
Springfield—so anyhow, this guy rented a car. I’m trying to make this story short, but maybe 
you’ll appreciate it...
MB: No, that’s fine! [laughs]
HP: So there are four of us in the car, and we’re driving toward Fayetteville. We get up into 
one of these little small towns. Suddenly we notice that there are police cars all around us and 
we’re being pulled over. So here we are, at three o’clock in the morning in a small town in 
Missouri, driving a rental car with Georgia license plates on it, the driver of the car has a 
Connecticut drivers license, there’s a woman in the back with a Massachusetts license, I had 
an Arkansas drivers licence and I can’t remember what the other guy had. Well, they had, as 
it turns out, there were rumors that the guy...whoever the guy was who did that bombing...
MB: McVeigh, right
HP: Right, Timothy McVeigh. There were rumors he’d been seen in that area. So they were 
stopping any kind of suspicious car. We sat there for a good half an hour while they radioed 
around and checked. They had us blocked in, front back and on the side. I guess they were 
trying to make a get-away. Anyhow, that didn’t really have anything to do with anything, but 
it made me remember [laughs] that story.
But after 9/11, obviously within the government, of course, that was the Bush administration, 
and by that time, probably about a third of the Board members were Bush appointees. They 
were all really good people, I think his administration appointed good people and they tried 
very hard, and succeeded in keeping the Fulbright Program viable. And of course one of the 
things that was emphasized was trying to be able to communicate better with the Islamic 
world. This would be a nice little wrap-up to the story--just five weeks ago today, sitting 
around this very table, a Fulbright scholar from Afghanistan defended his Masters thesis here 
and has now gone back to Afghanistan. 
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As the Bush administration and the public diplomacy people became more involved they 
tried to get the Fulbright Program more of a presence in Iraq and some other things. I think, 
for the most part, they were as successful as they can be under the circumstances.
MB: In the public diplomacy literature, there’s such an emphasis on Charlotte Beers and 
Karen Hughes and the advertising-style campaigns, the Shared Values campaign that failed in 
the Middle East. There’s just not as much material on educational exchanges and other 
activities.
HP: I think you’re absolutely right, Charlotte Beers was somebody who was an incredibly 
able person, in her business, knew advertising as well as anybody, but that didn’t translate 
into what really needed to be done, and particularly in something like educational and 
cultural exchange. They failed to appreciate what really might be done. Part of that, I think, in 
fairness to her and to others there, their intentions were very good but these things don’t 
necessarily transfer that easily from one realm to another. Unfortunately, it didn’t work out 
for her.
At the same time, there were a lot of career people who have made incredible contributions to 
the Fulbright Program and really provided continuity. Even if you have a good Scholarship 
Board, you’re always going to have some new people, people who are not well-steeped in the 
Program. I had the advantage, not having served on the Board, having been in one way or 
another certainly familiar with and connected with the Fulbright Program for many, many 
years.
And there were some of my colleagues, for example Caroline Yang, who had been the 
Director of the Japanese Fulbright Commission for many years and was a revered figure in 
the Fulbright world, she was on the Board. And of course, as I mentioned, Lee Williams who 
knew Fulbright personally better than anybody. I was fortunate to know Fulbright and 
worked closely with him for a long time, but Lee was there well before I came on the scene.
And we had Birch Bayh, former Senator, and John Culver, former Senator—both just great 
people who had a very good understanding of the way things work in Washington and the 
way things work in government. So I think we had an exceptional Board, at least in some 
respects. But again, those career people are the ones who keep things going from day-to-day. 
Now, the danger of that is that those people think they’re the only ones who know how to do 
things and the Fulbright Scholarship Board can be a nuisance because they come in and start 
asking questions and wanting to do things differently. But lots of good people have been 
282
involved in the program over the years and that’s been a real key to it—they’re people who 
really care.
The Fulbright Program is not just your sort of normal, bureaucratic program. It’s something 
that people can really get involved in, if they believe in the value of it, and obviously a lot of 
people have believed in that. That’s enabled it to succeed, and sometimes to thrive.
[end]
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US to UK Student Interview 1
11 October 2010, 2pm-2:45pm in-person interview
American Fulbright student grantee is pursuing a Master of Science in Sustainability 
(transport) at a large, urban university in the UK. Last year the student completed an 
undergraduate degree at a small, rural liberal arts college.
Q: Have you been to the UK before?
A: No, never.
Q: What are your first impressions of the UK in general?
A: Very good, so far. I feel at home here.
Q: So, you’re studying transport—how does the UK transportation system compare to the 
US?
A: There seems to be more of an emphasis on sustainability and environmentalism in the UK.
Q: What are your impressions of your British peers?
A: Good, generally. My programme is mixed, some British and some international, but 
everybody seems nice so far. I don’t get the tight jeans for men, though (laughs).
Q: What do you think of the Fulbright Program’s activities?
A: It’s been very good—we had orientation down in London and there are a couple of 
meetings coming up in Cornwall and Scotland. I’m looking forward to those and I’m going 
on a trip with my transport studies group next summer to Belgium, Holland and Germany, 
too.
Q: What would you say your purpose is here?
A: I’m interested in sustainability and figuring out how we can apply it in transport policy.
Q: What’s your living situation like—are you in uni housing or private?
A: I’m in Leodis [University accommodation near campus].
Q: Where are your housemates from?
A: A mix of countries, really—there’s a Canadian, an Australian, an Indian and a Nigerian.
Q: How do you think your experience compares with other international students here?
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A: I think it’s definitely easier for me as a native speaker of English. There’s a lot of 
handholding from Fulbright, too, like they set up my bank account for me and took care of 
the housing arrangements with the university before I got here. And they assign you a 
mentor, and mine’s Michael Arthur [the Vice Chancellor of the University]. He was a 
Fulbrighter [also a member of US-UK Fulbright Commission] and he took me to dinner and a 
show in town. That’s not something that the other international students would get to do 
(laughs).
Q: And how would you say you’re learning about British culture? Do you watch British TV, 
for instance?
A: No, I mostly watch American stuff, actually, like old episodes of Star Trek on demand. I 
guess I’m learning about British culture by just walking around—I take walks downtown.
Q: Do you speak any other languages?
A: No.
Q: Have you travelled anywhere else?
A: Not outside the U.S.
Q: While you’re here, how are you keeping in touch with people back home?
A: I keep in touch with my mom through e-mail and Skype, and with my friends through 
Facebook and Skype.
Q: Ok, as a final point, my research is about public diplomacy and the idea that American 
Fulbrighters are representing the US when they’re here. Do you have any comments on that?
A: I guess I’m in favour of it—I think that we do represent America here. But it’s not 
something that was emphasised by the Fulbright orientation or anything.
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US to UK Student Interview 2
29 November 2011, 3pm-3:45pm in-person interview
Student is undertaking an MSc in the School of Computing, University of Leeds. Completed 
undergraduate education in 2009 at Connecticut College, a top producer of Fulbright students 
for the 2011-2012 year. Extra-curricular interests in Commission biography include violin 
(award-winning) and water polo.
Q: Why did you decide to do a Fulbright in the UK?
A: I applied to both Marshall and Fulbright. I got rejected by Marshall a couple of weeks 
after I sent it in, and I didn’t hear back from Fulbright for ages. I thought they’d rejected me, 
too, but then I was asked for an interview. The interview lasted for about 10 minutes, and 
they told me I’d gotten it right there and then.
Q: Had you ever been to the UK before?
A: No, never.
Q: What’s your living situation here in Leeds?
A: I live on Clarendon Road in University accommodation. It’s a shared house, mostly 
international. There are 22 international people and only 2 British housemates. There are 
some Canadians, but I’m the only American. 
Q: Who do you hang out with the most?
A: I don’t hang out with any Americans—you’re one of the only Americans I’ve met here, 
actually. I’ve joined 2 water polo teams, and I mostly spend my free time with them. I guess 
I’d say my closest friends are 3 girls from Malaysia, UK and Canada. 
Q: The water polo teams sound great.
A: Yeah, I really enjoy it and I’ve been bringing American strategies over. It’s also really the 
only way I’ve been able to meet locals. If you had interviewed me at the start of the year, I 
wouldn’t have been able to say much about my impressions of British people because I 
hadn’t met many. 
Q: What made you want to do the Fulbright?
A: I don’t have a foreign language, but I really wanted to go abroad. I never did a study 
abroad in undergrad, and I liked the idea of doing research abroad instead of just spending a 
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semester abroad partying. I wanted to do an MSc, and since my subject is really specific, it 
led to a professor here at Leeds. I contacted him and he agreed to sponsor me.
Q: What have been your best experiences with Fulbright?
A: They took us to the Ascot Games and we saw the Queen.
Q: What do you expect to get out of the year?
A: I really want to just soak up the culture as much as possible. And I want to pass the 
MSc—I know that sounds obvious, but only one Masters by research student has ever passed 
in my department.
Q: Wow, that’s a lot of pressure.
A: I know!  I’m spending 7 or 8 hours a day in the lab, six days a week. Water polo is pretty 
much the only social activity I have time for. 
Q: As a final thing, how did you spend Bonfire Night and Thanksgiving?
A: On Bonfire Night I went to a fireworks display with friends, and last week for 
Thanksgiving, Fulbright hosted a dinner in Edinburgh for all of the Fulbrighters in Scotland 
and the North of England. I was the only one who came up there from England, but it was 
really great.
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Appendix B
Surname, First Name, M. Occupation/Affiliation Location Appointed Code
Appointing 
President
Alexander, Mark C. Prof of Law, Seton Hall University Newark, NJ 2010 1 Obama
Alisky, Marvin Howard Prof of Political Science, Arizona State University Tempe, AZ 1984 1 Reagan
Allen, James E. Jr.
Assistant Secretary for Education, Department of 
Health, Education and Welfare; Visiting Prof at 
Princeton
Washington, 
DC; Princeton, 
NJ 1970 2 Nixon
Anderson, Hurst Robins President, American University Washington, DC 1958 1 Eisenhower
Andrews, John N. U.S. Veterans Administration Washington, DC 1948 2 Truman
Anglada, Mario A. Executive Director, Aspira of America New York, NY 1980 4 Carter
Antonovich, Michael D. Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors
Los Angeles, 
CA 1991 2 GHWBush
Augelli, John P.
Prof of Geography, University of Kansas; University 
of Illinois KS; IL 1967 1 Johnson
Ayers, H. Brandt Publisher, The Anniston Star Anniston, AL 1980 4 Carter
Barcott, Rye Special adviser to chairman of Duke Energy Charlotte, NC 2012 4 Obama
Bayh, Birch
U.S. Senator; Senior Partner of Oppenheimer Wolff 
Donnelly and Bayh Washington, DC 1995 2 Clinton
Becker, Jean Loretta Chief of Staff, former President George H.W. Bush Texas 2005 2 GWBush
Belli, Lia Triff None listed
San Francisco, 
CA 1980 5 Carter
Benson, George Charles 
Sumner President, Claremont California 1956 1 Eisenhower
Berger, Brigitte Prof of Sociology, Wellesley College Brookline, MA 1984 1 Reagan
Billington, James H. Prof of History, Princeton Princeton, NJ 1971 1 Nixon
Blanding, Sarah Gibson President, Vassar College
Poughkeepsie, 
NY 1947 1 Truman
Blitz, Mark N. Former associate director of USIA VA 1993 2 GHWBush
Blyley, Katherine G. President, Keuka College Keuka Park, NY 1955 1 Eisenhower
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Booher, Edward A. President, McGraw-Hill Book Company New York, NY 1966 4 Johnson
Bradford, Melvin E. Prof of English, U of Dallas Irving, TX 1982 1 Reagan
Bradley, Omar N. Administrator, Veterans Affairs Washington, DC 1947 2 Truman
Brode, Robert B. Prof of Physics, UC Berkeley Berkeley, CA 1963 1 Kennedy
Brodhead, Richard H. Dean, Yale College; President, Duke University
New Haven, 
CT; Durham, 
NC 2002 1 GWBush
Brownell, Samuel M. US Commissioner of Education Washington, DC 1953 2 Eisenhower
Bruininks, Robert H. President, University of Minnesota
Minneapolis, 
MN 2003 1 GWBush
Brzezkinski, Mark Partner, McGuire Woods Washington, DC 2010 3 Obama
Bull, Bartle President, Firehouse Magazine New York, NY 1978 4 Carter
Butler, John Sibley
Prof of Management and Sociology, U of Texas at 
Austin Austin, TX 2003 1 GWBush
Caputo, Lisa M. Managing director, Citigroup Investment Bank New York, NY 2010 4 Obama
Carl, Beverly May Prof of Law, Southern Methodist University Dallas, TX 1980 1 Carter
Carley, John H. Attorney, Mudge Rose Guthrie and Alexander New York, NY 1971 3 Nixon
Carmichael, Oliver C. President, University of Alabama AL 1954 1 Eisenhower
Castor, Betty President, University of South Florida Tampa, FL 2011 1 Obama
Castro-Klaren, Sara Prof of Hispanic Studies, Johns Hopkins University Baltimore, MD 1999 1 Clinton
Chan, Shu Park Prof of Engineering, Santa Clara University Santa Clara, CA 1991 1 GHWBush
Char, Kenneth F. C. Vice Chairman and Director, Aloha Airlines Honolulu, HI 1980 4 Carter
Cheek, James E. President, Howard University Washington, DC 1970 1 Nixon
Clapp, Margaret President, Wellesley College Wellesley, MA 1951 1 Truman
Clark, Felton G. President, Southern University
Baton Rouge, 
LA 1956 1 Eisenhower
Corts, Thomas E. President Emeritus, Samford University
Birmingham, 
AL 2005 1 GWBush
Craig, William G. Headmaster, John Burroughs School St. Louis, MO 1966 1 Johnson
Cribb, Troy Kenneth Jr.
Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs (and 
other posts) Washington, DC 1989 2 Reagan
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Cronkhite, Bernice B. Dean of the Graduate School, Radcliffe College Cambridge, MA 1955 1 Eisenhower
Culver, John C.
U.S. Senator; Senior Partner of Arent Fox Kintner 
Plotkin and Kahn Washington, DC 1999 3 Clinton
Dawkins, Peter Miller
Managing Director of Lehman Brothers Kuhn Loeb, 
Inc. New York, NY 1985 4 Reagan
Deily, Linnet F. Former US Ambassador to WTO Houston, TX 2005 4 GWBush
Derthick, Lawrence G. US Commissioner of Education Washington, DC 1956 2 Eisenhower
DiMartino, Rita Consultant New York, NY 2002 4 GWBush
Dolibois, John E.
VP for Development and Alumni Affairs, Miami 
University Oxford, OH 1969 1 Nixon
Donsker, Monroe D. Professor of Mathematics, NYU New York, NY 1975 1 Ford
Drachkovitch, Milorad 
M. Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution Stanford, CA 1984 4 Reagan
Driver, William J. Administrator, Veterans Administration Washington, DC 1966 2 Johnson
Duggan, Laurence Director of Institute of International Education New York, NY 1947 4 Truman
Dunn, Charles W. Prof of Political Science, Clemson University Greenville, SC 1987 1 Reagan
Durham, G. Homer
President, Arizona State University and Prof of 
Political Science AZ 1964 1 Johnson
Dwinell, Lane Former Governor, New Hampshire Lebanon, NH 1971 2 Nixon
Edgar, James W. Superintendent of Public Instruction of Texas TX 1951 2 Truman
Edson, Gary R.
CEO PlayPumps Int'l US and CIO and Senior VP, 
Case Foundation Washington, DC 2008 4 GWBush
Ellis, Elmer President, University of Missouri Columbia, MO 1958 1 Eisenhower
Fahner, Tyrone C. Partner, Mayer, Brown and Platt Chicago, IL 1988 3 Reagan
Flournoy, Houston I. Dean of Public Affairs, USC
Los Angeles, 
CA 1976 1 Ford
Franklin, John Hope
Professor of American History, University of 
Chicago Chicago, IL 1962 1 Kennedy
Fulbright, Harriet Mayor
President, Center for arts in basic curriculum; Widow 
of Senator Fulbright Washington, DC 1995 5 Clinton
Gayner, Jeffrey B. 
Director of Foreign Policy Studies, Heritage 
Foundation Washington, DC 1981 4 Reagan
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Ghafari, Yousif Chairman, Ghafari, Inc. Dearborn, MI 2005 4 GWBush
Giffords, Gabrielle Former U.S. Representative Tuscon, AZ 2013 2 Obama
Gilson, Christie Prof of Education, Moravian College Bethlehem, PA 2012 1 Obama
Glazer, Nathan Prof of Education and Sociology, Harvard Cambridge, MA 1984 1 Reagan
Goldwin, Robert A.
Resident Scholar, American Enterprise Institute for 
Public Policy Research Washington, DC 1977 4 Ford
Grasso, Ella T. Secretary of the State of Connecticut
Windsor Locks, 
CT 1961 2 Kennedy
Green, Shirley Moore
Retired, Director of Communications Services for the 
Attorney General of Texas Austin, TX 2003 2 GWBush
Gregorian, Vartan President, Brown University Providence, RI 1990 1 GHWBush
Guerra-Mondragon, 
Gabriel
International consulting firm, former Ambassador to 
Chile New York, NY 2011 2 Obama
Gulliver, Adelaide 
Cromwell
Director of Afro-American Studies Program, Boston 
University Brookline, MA 1980 1 Carter
Hand, Lloyd N. Attorney-at-Law
Beverly Hills, 
CA 1966 3 Johnson
Handlin, Oscar Professor of American History, Harvard Cambridge, MA 1961 1 Kennedy
Hargraves, J. Archie President, Institute for Int'l Development Raleigh, NC 1974 4 Nixon
Hays, Brooks Prof of political affairs, Rutgers NJ 1966 1 Johnson
Healy, Tom Prof, New York University New York, NY 2011 1 Obama
Heyer, George Stuart Jr.
Prof of History of Doctrine, Austin Presbyterian 
Theological Seminary Austin, TX 1992 1 GHWBush
Hofgren, Daniel Financial Adviser New York, NY 1959 4 Eisenhower
Horner, Charles E.
Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute (neocon foreign 
policy research institute) DC 1993 4 GHWBush
Hovde, Frederick L. President, Purdue University
West Lafayette, 
IN 1951 1 Truman
Hubbard, Kathryn 
Fortune Co-founder, Bridges of Understanding Indianapolis, IN 2007 4 GWBush
Ihara, Teruo Prof of Education, University of Hawaii Honolulu, HI 1966 1 Johnson
Johnson, Charles S. President, Fisk University Nashville, TN 1947 1 Truman
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Johnson, John Willard Chairman, Permian Mud Service Inc. Houston, TX 2001 4 GWBush
Johnson, Walter Professor of History, University of Chicago Chicago, IL 1947 1 Truman
Johnson, Wyatt Thomas 
Jr. Deputy Press Secretary to President Johnson Macon, GA 1969 2 Johnson
Jones, Lewis Webster President, University of Arkansas Fayetteville, AR 1949 1 Truman
Katzen, Bernard Attorney, New York City New York, NY 1970 3 Nixon
Kelfer, Marvin G. President of Travis Savings and Loan Association
San Antonio, 
TX 1982 4 Reagan
Keppel, Francis US Commissioner of Education Washington, DC 1963 2 Kennedy
Kinder, Jack Allen
Executive Secretary for Missouri State Teachers 
Association Columbia, MO 1987 2 Reagan
Kintner, William R. Director of Foreign Policy Research Institute Philadelphia, PA 1970 4 Nixon
Lawrence, Ernest 
Orlando Prof of Physics, U of California Berkeley, CA 1947 1 Truman
Lewis, Shelby F. Prof Emeritus, Clark Atlanta University Atlanta, GA 2010 1 Obama
Lipset, Seymour Martin Prof of Government and Social Relations, Harvard Cambridge, MA 1967 1 Johnson
Lissy, David H. Department of Health, Education and Welfare Washington, DC 1974 2 Nixon
Lowitz, Donald S. Attorney-at-Law; Aaron, Aaron, Schimberg &Hess Chicago, IL 1971 3 Nixon
Lyons, Thomas T. Retired, Prof at Phillips Academy
Newburyport, 
MA 2003 1 GWBush
Mansfield, Harvey C. Jr. Prof of Government, Harvard Cambridge, MA 1987 1 Reagan
Marcus, Philip N.
Consultant with Heritage Foundation; President of 
Institute for Educational Affairs New York, NY 1987 4 Reagan
Mauk, William H. Jr. CEO of Penultimate Group Int'l Miami, FL 1999 4 Clinton
McBride, Anita B. Former Chief of Staff to First Lady Laura Bush Washington, DC 2008 2 GWBush
McCallum, Robert D. Jr. Former U.S. Ambassador to Australia Washington, DC 2009 2 GWBush
McDonald, Forrest Prof of History, U of Alabama Tuscaloosa, AL 1984 1 Reagan
McGrath, Earl James US Commissioner of Education Washington, DC 1949 2 Truman
McGuire, Martin P. Prof of Greek and Latin, Catholic U of America Washington, DC 1947 1 Truman
McMurrin, Sterling US Commissioner of Education Washington, DC 1961 2 Kennedy
Meriwether, James Prof of English, University of South Carolina Columbia, SC 1982 1 Reagan
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Babcock
Milione, E. Victor President of Intercollegiate Studies Institute Bryn Mawr, PA 1981 4 Reagan
Moore, Roger A. Harvard Law School Cambridge, MA 1954 1 Eisenhower
Murphy, Ewell E. Partner, Baker Botts Houston, TX 1991 3 GHWBush
Murphy, Victoria 
McCammon Director Pan Atlantic Consultants Portland, ME 1993 4 Clinton
Muse, Martha Twitchell President and Executive Director, Tinker Foundation New York, NY 1974 4 Nixon
Nee, Nelson V.
VP for International Services and Studies, US 
International University San Diego, CA 1988 1 Reagan
Nelson, Lyle M. Prof of Communication, Stanford University Stanford, CA 1971 1 Nixon
Ness, Susan
Founder, Susan Ness Strategies (communications 
policy) Bethesda, MD 2011 4 Obama
Niemeyer, Gerhart
Professor Emeritus of Government, Notre Dame 
University Notre Dame, IN 1981 1 Reagan
Nuesse, C. Joseph Dean, Catholic University of America Washington, DC 1954 1 Eisenhower
Oblinger, James L. Chancellor, North Carolina State University Raleigh, NC 2008 1 GWBush
O'Neill, Jan None listed Midland, TX 2001 5 GWBush
Osgood, Robert E. Dean, Johns Hopkins School of Adv Int'l Studies Washington, DC 1975 1 Ford
O'Shea, M. Lester Managing Partner of General Western Co.
San Francisco, 
CA 1987 4 Reagan
Perkins, Huel D. President, Huel D. Perkins and Associates
Baton Rouge, 
LA 1999 4 Clinton
Pike, Frederick B.
Prof of Latin American History, University of 
Pennsylvania Philadelphia, PA 1966 1 Johnson
Pipes, Daniel Director, Foreign Policy Research Institute Philadelphia, PA 1992 4 GHWBush
Plummer Cobb, Jewel Prof of Biological Science, Rutgers
New Brunswick, 
NJ 1978 1 Carter
Powell, Dina Habib
Managing Director, Office of Corporate Engagement, 
Goldman Sachs New York, NY 2008 4 GWBush
Purvis, Hoyt
Prof of Journalism and Political Science, U of 
Arkansas Fayetteville, AR 1993 1 Clinton
Radock, Michael VP for University Relations & Development, Prof of Ann Arbor, MI 1976 1 Ford
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Journalism, U of Michigan
Riedl, John Orth
Dean of Graduate School and Prof of Philosophy, 
Marquette University Milwaukee, WI 1958 1 Eisenhower
Ritcheson, Charles Ray University Librarian and Dean Provost, UCLA
Los Angeles, 
CA 1987 1 Reagan
Rivera, Tomas
Executive VP, University of Texas; Chancellor, UC 
Riverside
El Paso, TX; 
Riverside, CA 1978 1 Carter
Roach, James R. Prof of Government, University of Texas El Paso, TX 1966 1 Johnson
Roehm, A. Wesley Oak Park and River Forest High School Oak Park, IL 1962 1 Kennedy
Rose, Robert
Managing Director, Credit Agricole Futures; 
Managing Director, Bear Stearns Connecticut 1993 4 Clinton
Rosenblith, Walter A. Massachusetts Institute of Technology Cambridge, MA 1978 1 Carter
Rostow, Walt W.
Prof of Economics, University of Texas; Advisor to 
President Johnson Austin, TX 1969 1 Johnson
Rudolph, Susanne H. Prof of Political and Social Science, U of Chicago Chicago, IL 1978 1 Carter
Salisbury, Harrison E. Writer New York, NY 1980 5 Carter
Sammartino, Peter Chancellor, Fairleigh Dickinson University Rutherford, NJ 1971 1 Nixon
Schechter, Alan Prof of Political Science, Wellesley College Wellesley, MA 1995 1 Clinton
Scott, Hugh Counsel; Obermayer, Rebmann, Maxwell & Hippel Washington, DC 1977 3 Ford
Scruggs, Sherman D. President of Lincoln University
Jefferson City, 
MO 1954 1 Eisenhower
Seabury, Paul Prof of Political Science, UC Berkeley Berkeley, CA 1967 1 Johnson
Sears, John W. Lawyer Boston, MA 1991 3 GHWBush
Seidman, L. William
Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies; Former 
economic advisor, White House Washington, DC 1977 1 Ford
Siena, Jane Slate
Head of International Relations, Getty Conservation 
Institute Washington, DC 1999 4 Clinton
Smith, Elbert B. Prof of History, University of Maryland
College Park, 
MD 1978 1 Carter
Smoot, Jean J. Prof of English, North Carolina State University
Wake Forest, 
NC 1983 1 Reagan
Smyth, Francis Scott University of California Medical Center (MD) San Francisco, 1953 1 Eisenhower
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CA
Spaulding, Francis Trow NY State Commissioner of Education New York 1947 2 Truman
Spencer, Samuel R. Jr. President, Davidson College Davidson, NC 1980 1 Carter
Spogli, Ronald P. Founding Partner, Freeman Spogli & Co.
Los Angeles, 
CA 2002 3 GWBush
Stalnaker, John M. 
President, National Merit Scholarship Corporation, 
former prof of psychology Evanston, IL 1962 1 Kennedy
Stern, Alfred L.
Associate Director of Domestic Policy Staff, The 
White House; Prof of Philosophy, Wayne State 
University Washington, DC 1978 2 Carter
Storey, Robert G. President, Southwestern Legal Center Dallas, TX 1956 3 Eisenhower
Studebaker, John Ward U.S. Commissioner of Education Washington, DC 1947 2 Truman
Super, Katherine L.
Deputy Assistant to the President for Appointments 
and Scheduling Great Falls, VA 1993 2 GHWBush
Sutton, Francis X Executive Associate, Ford Foundation
Dobbs Ferry, 
NY 1962 4 Kennedy
Taylor, Anne Pannell former President, Sweet Briar College Easton, MD 1971 1 Nixon
Taylor, George E. director Far E and Russian Inst, Prof of History, UW Seattle, WA 1963 1 Kennedy
Terman, Frederick E. VP and Provost, Stanford University Stanford, CA 1960 1 Eisenhower
Theberge, James D. Georgetown University Washington, DC 1974 1 Nixon
Tonkinson, Margarita B. Administrator, University of Miami Miami, FL 1990 1 GHWBush
Trombley, Laura 
Skandera President, Pitzer College Claremont, CA 2012 1 Obama
Turman, James A. 
Associate Commissioner of Education for Field 
Services, Dept of Health, Education and Welfare
Washington, 
D.C. 1966 2 Johnson
Uhlfelder, Steven Uhlfelder and Associates, P.A. Tallahassee, FL 2001 3 GWBush
Valenti, Jack J.
President, Motion Picture Association of America 
(former aide to Pres Johnson)
Washington, 
D.C. 1967 4 Johnson
Vermeil, Donald Principal, Renco Properties, Inc. Palo Alto, CA 2001 4 GWBush
Wallison, Peter J. Attorney-at-Law; Rogers & Wells Washington, DC 1977 3 Ford
Ware, Richard Anderson President of Earhart Foundation Ann Arbor, MI 1984 4 Reagan
Weill, Gus CEO of Gus Weill Public Relations Baton Rouge, 1997 4 Clinton
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Whelan, James Robert Managing Director of CBN News Washington, DC 1985 4 Reagan
White, Helen Constance Prof of English, U of Wisconsin Madison, WI 1947 1 Truman
Wilgus, A. Curtis University of Florida Gainesville, FL 1963 1 Kennedy
Wilkie, Philip H. Attorney at Law
Rushville, 
Indiana 1953 3 Eisenhower
Williams, Lee Partner, Public Strategies Washington Inc. Washington, DC 1993 4 Clinton
Wilson, John Prof of History, Hillsdale College Hillsdale, MI 1984 1 Reagan
Wimpress, Duncan President, Trinity University
San Antonio, 
TX 1974 1 Nixon
Woodson, Robert L. Sr.
President and CEO, National Center for 
Neighborhood Enterprise Washington, DC 2002 4 GWBush
Yang, Caroline A. 
Matano International Education Consultant Kailua, HI 1995 4 Clinton
Yao, Esther Lee Prof at University of Houston at Clear Lake Houston, TX 1992 1 GHWBush
Zamaria, Rose M. Director, White House Operations VA 1993 2 GHWBush
